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ABSTRACT
This thesis offers a reading of a Classical Greek play, the "Ion" of Euripides, in terms of the
psychoanalytic theories of S. Freud and J. Lacan. There are four chapters, each dealing with a
particular aspect, or group of related aspects, of the play. Each chapter offers an exposition of
the relevant psychoanalytic concepts, followed by an application of them to a particular aspect,
or aspects, of the play.
Chapter one introduces some basic Freudian and Lacanian concepts. The Freudian aspects are:
the Oedipus complex, repression and the unconscious. The Lacanian concepts are: the signifier
and the signified in his theory, metonymy and metaphor in relation to desire, Lacan's view of the
unconscious, and the function of the phallus in the economy of desire. In the light of these
notions a psychoanalytic reading is offered of Ion's monody and his interview with Creusa.
Chapter two begins with a discussion of the notion of the ego in Freud and Lacan and the notion
of the Imaginary in the latter. Lacan's paradigmatic reading of Edgar Allan Poe's "The Purloined
Letter" then sets the scene for a structuralist overview of the play as presenting the child Ion as a
piece of news addressed 'to whom it may concern'.These theoretical considerations are then
brought to bear upon two matching developments in the play; Xuthus' acknowledgement of Ion
as his son and the response to this challenge by his wife Creusa and her old servant. It is argued
that both pairs are impelled by a unique opportunity to satisfy a desire and by a need to conceal
their aims and their success from the other pair. The desire of the 'minor' characters is also
discussed. It is argued that Xuthus, the old servant and the chorus all harbour impossible desires,
the impossibility of which they pass on to Ion and Creusa.
The third chapter examines certain turning points in the play; a) Creusa and Ion's second
meeting; it is argued that their symmetrically inverted positions re-pose the question of death and
castration; b) The Pythia's intervention; its language reinstates the paternal prohibition, and
proposes a solution resembling repression; c) Ion's moment of indecision before Creusa's
recognition of him; this represents the introjection of the name of the father; d) the happy
encounter and the complication of Ion's disbelief in his mother's story; it is argued that the re¬
surfacing of doubt threatens to freeze the play into a new form of aporia and stagnation akin to
the subject's inability to assume the other's desire; e) Athena's intervention; it is argued that
Athena's success depends on the efficient projection of all evidence into the future.
Chapter four is devoted to Creusa's earlier monologue spoken in the presence of the old servant
and the chorus. I outline the function of speech in analysis, the manifestation of neurotic desire
in relation to the Other and the structure of the phantasy (sic; technical term) as a blending of
conscious and unconscious elements. Creusa's monologue is then examined in successive
readings, each placing in the foreground a particular psychoanalytic aspect of it. The main aim
of this chapter is to view the monologue as exemplifying the question 'what is my desire?' in
relation to the Other's desire.
The general conclusion of this thesis is that Euripides' play embodies Lacan's teaching that one
must learn not to throw oneselfinto the void, in this case into the despair of aporia, or lack of
means. A gradual realignment of desire, an education and humanisation of that desire, starts
from a zero point of absolute ignorance, proceeds via the subject's apprenticeship in the
Imaginary, reaches the peak of aggressive disintegration on confrontation with a mirror image,
and is renewed by the re-establishment of appropriate language and symbolism. Success
depends on adaptation, on the subject's ability to integrate form and desire, on averting one's
eyes from a perfect transparent truth, on recourse to appearances, on letting 'nothing' and 'the
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INTRODUCTION
"Classics, almost by definition, are works of art which frame human experience in
enduring and universally meaningful form. If, to render their meaning fruitful for our
time, we resort to contemporary conceptualisations of experience, we do only what
every age has done and must do with great works of the past: translate them into our
own language". These are the words of C. Segal in 1968 in the first volume of
Arethusa [Segal 1968, p. 7] that proclaim Classics open to modern interpretations.
In 1993 Segal's article "Euripides' Alcestis: How to die a normal death in Greek
drama" appears in a book called "Death and Representation" amongst articles
discussing various theories and various examples, encompassing ancient and
Victorian literature, painting and photography and a bibliography spanning from
Hdorno to Zizek.
The psychoanalytic perspective is encapsulated in the terms desire and speech. Desire
is born with the subject. It comes from within. It maintains our interest in the world. It
shapes our preferences, feeds our intellectual curiosity or indifference, supports our
relations, circumscribes our ambitions. By definition it is inexhaustible and essentially
unsatisfiable. It refracts into many 'desires to' and even if they could all be perfectly
satisfied desire would not be exhausted.
Speech is the medium of analysis. We are saying speech and not language in order to
emphasise the actuality and immediacy of the produced word. Language is 'the
system', our common referent. It is governed by rules that permit certain combinations
and exclude others. Speech is an instance, a particular combination, compared to the
total.
The close relation of language and society is also important. Both are rule governed
systems. We use language to define and describe the social relations and it is in terms
of language and the set relations that we perceive ourselves with a certain degree of
stability. We live in a community and we are not one but many: children of certain
parents, women, men, colleagues, professionals, team members and so on. We
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maintain complex relations which are constantly redefined. We speak, we ask, we
demand, we give and we take. We are satisfied or dissatisfied. We change every time
we utter a new word. Still, we have a fairly concrete idea of who we are. We have a
name, a sense of identity and of what we want. We command a considerable amount
of memories and reasonable choices that we can defend if necessary. We have a will
of our own and we sometimes like to impose it on other people.
Psychoanalysis is interested in desire and its expression. Desire resides in the
unconscious and if we can afford to oversimplify it for a while we can see it as a force
that is structured in the unconscious, powers our being from within and derives some
satisfaction from all our activities. The unconscious is not an occult, dark-side-of-the-
moon aspect of self. It is another organised system just like language and society. In
its basic form it originates in a representation of the basic laws of society and
language. Consider, for instance, the Oedipus complex. It represents the permissible
kinship and social combinations by setting the limits at incest and parricide. Every
time a new member is born into language and into society it receives its place with
reference to those predefined terms and the mother and the father. Desire is therefore
closely related to a definitive loss- the return to or union with the mother- and to a
gain, the infinite variety of ways to evoke it and compensate for it from within an
organised system.
Our psychoanalytic approach relies on Freud and Lacan. Freud developed the
fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis. He developed a system of agencies (ego, id,
super-ego) and accounted for their relations. He was interested in describing as
adequately as possible the genesis and development of human sexuality which he
considered determinant of the psychological development of the individual. Freud
devised an intricate psychoanalytic terminology (examples are: the Oedipus complex,
the unconscious, sadism, masochism, neurosis etc.). Some of the terms have found
their way into everyday language, often hugely misinterpreted and misunderstood.
Within the field of psychoanalysis different analysts have interpreted Freud in
different ways, depending on the component they chose to emphasise. Some of them
'parted ways' with Freud. Others have claimed to have 'returned' to Freud and to have
restored proper meaning to his writings. One of them is J Lacan who, in the thirties,
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'returns' to Freud by bringing the psychoanalytic field in contact with the principles of
another science, Linguistics, and the approach dominating Humanistic Sciences at that
time, Structuralism. A new perspective and a new terminology is born. For instance,
Lacan speaks of the Symbolic and the Imaginary (to be read as nouns not as
adjectives)1, respectively the field of the organised social and linguistic relations and
the field of passions and emotions with which the bare structures of the Symbolic are
invested.
From very early Lacan and Freud found their way into Literary Criticism.
Psychoanalytic Literary Criticism2 applies the principles and methods of
psychoanalysis to the literary text. Psychoanalysis and literature have speech in
common. The analysand's utterances are speech in relation to Language, the text is
speech in relation to Literature. One thing, must be stressed however: psychoanalysis
deals with patients, 'real' people seeking cure. Psychoanalytic Literary Criticism does
not deal with 'patients' in the sense that it does not seek to cure. It seeks to advance
our understanding of literature. By applying Psychoanalytic Literary Criticism to a
text we are not trying to violate 'literature' by foisting diagnoses on it, we are seeking
entry into its world. We rely on the spoken word and we respect the formal boundaries
of the text. We are not trying to bring something new into literature itself but into the
study of literature.
All schools of Literary Criticism have something in common: the objectivity
characteristic of Science. Literature excites emotional responses but the study of
literature should not succumb to that. To deal with emotion does not necessarily mean
to respond with emotion and to communicate an emotional approach, especially under
the label of 'criticism' or 'analysis'. The Classical text, tragedy in particular, merits
objective analysis as much as any other genre. The case of psychoanalytic literary
criticism and tragedy, however, is slightly complicated. Ridden with strict definitions
of how to respond to tragedy and what one ought to feel, the emotional approach
' I use capital letters for the /maginary and the Symbolic when referring to them as fields in general.
Lower case is used when they are adjectives.
2 For a brief introduction to Psychoanalytic Literary Criticism, see: Jefferson and Robey [ 1986, chapter
6], A comprehensive and useful guide to the main trends of psychoanalytic literary criticism is
Ellman's [1994] collection of essays; also useful: Wright [1984, chapter 7 in particular].
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appears to have been the dominant approach for centuries. Freud's 'unfortunate'
appropriation of the 'Oedipus Rex' for expository purposes has caused indignation3,
and a feeling of general hostility towards psychoanalysis led Andre Green [1979, p.
20] in the late seventies to the following polemic statement: "Who abuses cultural
products most: he who seeks in them for a new vision that he supposes them to be still
capable of producing, despite the accumulation of readings already in existence, or he
who dispenses with radical questioning and brings to the works a mere paraphrastic
commentary saturated with the presuppositions of common knowledge?".
Before defining the directions and the particular purposes of the present
psychoanalytic reading I wish to say that my latent intention is to show what a
psychoanalytic reading is in general and how it emerges from the free interaction of
the theory and the text. We are not dealing with a powerful theory and a powerless
text. According to my experience they are equal and their equality shows itself in
every respect. Green makes a similar point [1979, p. 25]: "No doubt there is a risk-
and adventurous hermeneuts have often been criticised for just this- that one may
shape the work into a lock (or discover a lock in it) to fit one's own particular key. The
objection need not be taken seriously. A work only allows itself to take the form of a
lock if it can be so taken- if its material permits it to do so and if its form suggests it.
The important thing is not that one should be able to insert a key, but that one should
know what would be revealed by the door that one hopes to open".
Chapter One is divided into two parts, theory and application. The theory part covers
essential psychoanalytic notions first in Freud and then in Lacan. We apply some of
these notions to the first scene, and in particular to Ion's monologue and the first
meeting between him and Creusa. The theory part is considerably wider in scope than
J I am speaking about Vernant's "Oedipus without a complex" [1967], Vernant's criticism is well
articulated and valid. Indeed, one does not necessarily need to resort to psychoanalysis in order to read
'Oedipus Rex'. Sociology can do as an alternative point of view. What I find difficult to understand,
however, is Vernant's refusal to acknowledge psychoanalysis as another point of view, equally valid or,
even from the most conservative classicists' point of view, equally 'alien' to Ancient Drama. Otherwise,
Vernant's style of writing and vocabulary shows that he is very familiar with the progress of analysis
and structuralism in France at the time he is writing.
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is necessary for a psychoanalytic reading of the first scene. This is because it is also a
general introduction to Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis and the basis for further
extensions in the following chapters. After a very general sketching of the components
of the Freudian theory we introduce the Oedipus complex, the major structural change
in the child's psychological constitution. We also introduce its effect on the pre¬
existing structure (narcissism) and the results of their interaction (super-ego and ideal-
ego). The mechanism of Repression and a very brief presentation of the properties of
the Unconscious follow. We will be using the terms 'repression' a great deal in this
thesis. Apart from its significance in the formation of the Unconscious it is also the
mechanism responsible for the flawless functioning of the psychical operations and its
failure (return of the repressed) is the general term for 'trouble' or discomfort in the
system.
Against the background of the Freudian notions and presentation of the linguistic Sign
(Signifier and Signified) we introduce some of Lacan's key psychoanalytic concepts.
We define Lacan's interest in the Subject of the Unconscious, drawing a parallel
between him and Freud. We define Lacan's approach to language by explaining his
similarities to and differences from Saussure, one of the Linguists he draws on.
For Lacan, figurative language is more revealing than ordinary communicative
language. In fact the figures of speech 'metonymy' and 'metaphor' play an important
role in his theory because of their evocative power. Metaphor is incorporated into the
formation and dissolution of the Oedipus complex, which now becomes 'the Paternal
metaphor' (or Name of the Father). And because metonymy and metaphor participate
in the structure of the unconscious they also allow access to it in language. We discuss
the Lacanian version of the Unconscious and the function of the phallus in its
economy. We introduce 'desire' in Lacan and we close the theory part with a
discussion of the function and importance of the two figures of speech, metonymy and
metaphor, in theory and in practice. For the latter we present a Lacanian analysis of
one of Freud's dreams.
For the psychoanalytic reading of the play we follow the basic linguistic properties
that govern a sentence: combination and selection. Thus, we read the scenes of the
play as a succession of terms that combine and contribute equally to the meaning of
the play. We pay particular attention to two monologues, Ion's introductory
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monologue in the first scene, and Creusa's monologue in the third scene, both of
which afford a valuable insight into the nature of those two characters.
In Chapter One we present Ion's monologue and the first meeting with Creusa along
the lines of repression and the return of the repressed. We argue that Ion's morning
song is not a simple celebration of Apollo and purity but reveals Ion's mixed feelings
to the god and his own attitude to sexuality. We also argue that it is due to their
attitude towards Apollo and sexuality that Ion and Creusa like each other in the
beginning and treat each other with suspicion in the end. Discussing our findings from
a Lacanian perspective we set out the main reasons and the main lines of their ensuing
enmity. From a psychoanalytic point of view the future of the play is prepared right
here, before Apollo's oracle. It emerges from the renewal of old fears and
unacknowledged convictions which Ion and Creusa cannot see in themselves but can
successfully bring out in each other. We will consider the play as a series of attempted
beginnings, their initial encounter being the first of these. Each new beginning tries to
erase the previous one, allay their fears and resolve their problems. Each beginning is
doomed so long as it fails to consider the problems raised in the first scene, Apollo's
aggressive sexuality, his obligations and the fate of his child.
In Chapter Two we discuss Lacan's Imaginary in detail. Again we begin with Freud,
adding more to the picture of the theory by referring to the progress of sexuality from
pre-genital to genital maturity and introducing the death instinct in the psychical
economy. Turning to Lacan, we present the Imaginary, the compound field of the ego,
the senses and identifications. The presentation has three aspects. The first introduces
the genesis of the ego and two related notions, alienation and aggressivity. The second
presents the Imaginary from within Lacan's allegory of the optical schema, the physics
experiment he uses in order to illustrate the properties of the Imaginary and in
particular the dependence of human sexuality on vision. The third aspect examines the
interaction of the Imaginary and the Symbolic; first, the relation of desire to love (and
falling in love), and the three different modes of identification with another person;
second, the exploration of the Imaginary through language (Symbolic) in analysis. An
extensive reference to Lacan's reading of Poe's 'The Purloined Letter' and a
structuralist presentation of the successive stages of the plot provide the link between
abstract theory and application.
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Using the theory of the Imaginary I discuss Scenes Two and Three together, in order
to show that the study of the two pairs, Xuthus and Ion on one side and Creusa and
her friends on the other, offers a wealth of insights into 'human affairs'. We discuss the
relationship of the two members of each pair and of the two camps to each other. We
maintain the position that they are mirror-reflections of each other. At the risk of
appearing to abandon my earlier position on the equality of all components, I would
say that Scenes Two and Three are the most precious from a psychoanalytic point of
view because they expose all the misunderstandings and all the possible errors that
conventional logic and emotion can produce despite conforming to the rules of logic.
For that reason, I would draw the reader's attention to all the latent comparisons,
parallels and copying between positions and roles that are familiar in the genre. They,
together with the fact that each side thinks and reacts with the other in mind,
contribute to a general symmetry between the two scenes. The reason I draw attention
to these features in the introduction is because I wish to make a point about the
psychoanalytic approach. Looking into Scenes Two and Three we are not trying to
locate 'culprits' or to blame anyone. We are trying to unearth the meaning of what is
said in relation to desire and to throw some light on the omnipotence of desire that
seeks a way to satisfaction ignoring conventions. In Two and Three, there are some
poignant moments where hierarchies and powers seem to be demolished and
reconstituted at the whim of a king who fancies himself to be the father of an ex-
servant or a slave who imagines himself to be the next saviour of Athens. Responding
emotionally to Xuthus, Creusa, Ion or the old servant might end in 'I am better' or 'I
am worse' or 'I have nothing to do with them' but goes no further than comparisons or
taking sides- duplicating, more or less what they do. Recognising the similarities of
their behaviour and postponing taking sides, might just be revealing of human ways in
general, as it affords a glimpse into the perfect mechanisms of the Imaginary and the
Symbolic in which we are implicated despite our best efforts to 'outwit' them.
In terms of action Scenes Two and Three constitute new beginnings, interpretations of
the divine oracle affected by the unresolved issues of the early encounter (Scene One).
From a psychoanalytic point of view, what makes them wrong beginnings is not so
much their reasoning as the fact that with them, both camps seek to erase a previous
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bad start at the other's expense thus eternally reproducing the sterile love your friends
and hate your enemies when in need for 'good arguments'.
Chapters Three and Four are twin chapters. They explore the avalanche of changes
starting with Creusa and Ion's second meeting and the consequences of Athena's
intervention. They explore the Imaginary and the Symbolic from a different aspect,
due to the fact that Creusa and Ion now confront each other. There are two
psychoanalytical notions in the background. They are both related to the here and now
of the psychoanalytic experience that runs parallel to the here and now of the
confrontation. Analysis is devoted to the verbal reconstitution of the subject's history
with a view to conferring meaning on 'grey areas' and previously repressed events.
This opens the road to the cure. Part of the process is completed when the analysand
has explored all the (imaginary) influences in his life, persons and events. According
to Lacan, the next step is taken when a contradiction or meaninglessness emerges in
the account of personal history. Conferring meaning on that is a major turning point
and can only be reached when all 'excuses' and alternatives are abandoned. This is also
one of the few occasions that the analyst can intervene in a fruitful and helpful way.
The outcome of analysis and the return of the individual to society is finally sealed by
tying up the 'conclusions' of the experience to a form of the Oedipus complex, since it
represents a major rule of integration into society.
In our play the fruitful moment of contradiction and meaninglessness is the moment
when Creusa and Ion meet for the second time and between themselves exhaust all
their arguments about being right and protecting one's own rights. It is then and only
then that two interventions mark the end of the adventure. The first one, by the Pythia,
marks a new beginning, this time closer to the begging of life-lying-next-to-death. The
second, by Athena, completes the previous one. We argue that they are both accepted
only in so far as they make sense to Creusa and Ion by meeting particular desires but
not in an imaginary way. In order to prove our point we examine Ion's final doubt
about Apollo's truthfulness in the second half of the third chapter and, in chapter four,
Creusa's monologue and her withdrawal from the scene after planning Ion's murder.
For the theoretical support of our arguments we turn to Lacan's seminar on 'The
Psychoses' in which he explains the symbolic significance of the Name of the Father
(a notion we introduce in the first chapter) with particular emphasis on the function of
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procreation (being a father in this case) and the assumption of a 'mandate1, a symbolic
'mission' conferred upon the child by the father. Along these lines, we argue that Ion
accepts Athena's settlement so long as he has previously articulated his doubt and his
lack of any form of recognition by his real father. Athena confers meaning on Ion's
future by prophesysing his taking the role of the responsible father of four nations, and
by showing Apollo to be more 'human' for Ion's liking.
In Creusa's case, the examination of the monologue gradually leads us to the figure of
her father, Erechtheus, whom she both loves and fears. Examining the vocabulary of
the monologue and the meaning of her withdrawal from the murder scene after the
servant has taken her place, leads us to the conclusion that Creusa, literally and
metaphorically, avoids the eyes of her father. We argue that Athena addresses this
particular fear thus making it easy for Creusa to forgive Apollo in the end.
In the title of the thesis the word reading of the play appears. I have chosen this word
instead of interpretation in order to stress the significance of the process (of reading)
and to juxtapose it to the result, if the latter is to be considered as the main point of the
thesis. If I were asked to specify that main point I would choose to focus on the
particularity, the meaningfulness and the eagerness of the reception of Athena's
intervention by Creusa and Ion at the end of the play. It is the result of the process, a
long journey in which they learn to speak first of all and to express, albeit imperfectly,
their worries and fears. It is the result of a narrowing down of the causes of anxiety to
the figure of the Father and his symbolic function in their integration in society; it is
the result of mortals' having demanded it that gods appear.
With the word reading I also wish to emphasise the fact that I focus on the text only.
This is a textual approach. It extends from the beginning to the end of the text and
addresses all issues within these limits and with the tools provided by the text itself.
We will therefore forego three privileges usually associated with the genre: the poet,
the myth and the spectator. We will not be looking for Euripides or for possible
intentions when he was composing Ion. The structure speaks for itself and the
interplay of blindness and insight that invites us to an intellectual game of using in
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analysis the principles put forward by the text suggest a subtle poet, alert to the games
of appearances and (hidden) realities4.
Myth and the spectator have often 'claimed' the text. It always 'returns' to a larger
corpus of myths from which it has initially sprung, or, it is addressed to an audience
which is the ultimate receiver of the cultural product5. I do not think that such
'appropriations' advance the cause of the modern understanding of Ancient Greek
drama. Like the child-Ion in our play, a text is addressed to whom it may concern. To
monopolise it, to remove it from the current discourse in the name of a Classical
orthodoxy is wrong and, at the end of the day, meaningless.
By reading, finally, I wish to draw the reader's attention to the complexity of the
process itself. When we read we link the material to other writings and other
information. We rely on previous knowledge which comes to support our
understanding as we go along rather than to impede and halt it. The wider our
background knowledge is,the better. The greater our awareness and sensitivity of
cultural and social issues is,the better. Still, the text is our guide. We let all the other
4 Although 1 have excluded the poet from my reading 1 cannot resist the temptation to mention
Winnington-lngram's [1969] article: "Euripides: poietes sophos" as a tribute to an author that in the
eyes of the modern reader produced a piece of work for/of pleasure. There he is portrayed as
sophisticated, radical in his treatment of old themes, in the intellectual avant-guard, someone who
could not resist the temptation to amuse himself and his fellow-intellectuals (p. 132). He responds to
the demands of his audience: they want to oaepec; (lucidity) and to aocpov (cleverness) (p. 136) and he
gives them intrigues, unexpected turns, suspense, (optical) illusions and the deus ex machina.
5 In 'The children of Athena' Loraux [1984] starts her chapter on "Autochthonous Kreousa: Euripides
Ion " with the following statement: "Athens is the sole subject of Euripides' Ion, the Acropolis its sole
hero. Its catalyst is a woman called Kreousa and its topic is the specifically tragic discourse of
autochthony" (p. 184). I do recognise the metaphorical trend in this opening statement. I do agree that
Ion has a strong mythical component. I disagree with the word 'sole'.
In the 'Tragic effect' Green [1979] gives a sophisticated introduction to the spectacle-spectator
relationship and to the treatment of the myth(s) from a psychoanalytic perspective. I refer to the
introduction (pp. 1- 34) and the Epilogue: Oedipus, myth or truth (pp. 186-244). It is essential reading
and an exemplary piece of work on the psychoanalytic approach of both.
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issues reverberate between the lines. Psychoanalysis requires and presupposes this
wide understanding6.
I will conclude this short introduction by quoting a few lines from Kristeva's [1979, p.
211]7 "Giotto's Joy". It encompasses the writer of a piece of research, the work and its
author and the reader: "My choice, my desire to speak of Giotto (1267-1336) - if
justification be needed - relates to his experiments in architecture and colour... as
much as to his place within the history of Western painting". Everything begins with
the researcher's desire that is attached to a particular work of art- who knows why?
6 We accept that tragedy explores the grey areas of self-definition and, bringing the general to the
particular, we are trying to specify how this is achieved in our case. We accept the polarised antitheses
of the male and the female [e.g. Zeitlin 1978], the inferior place ofwomen in antiquity [e.g. Just 1989],
the practice of infant exposure, the network of the in-side and the out-side formed in terms of the city
[e.g. Goldhill 1986] and in terms of the mind [e.g. Padel 1992], the marked difference of the mortals
and the immortals [e.g. Vernant 1991] etc.
We will be referring to some cultural, mythical and social aspects during the analysis.
For the cultural awareness of the analyst, Lacan often draws his audience's attention to the importance
of reading literature, being in touch with the changes of the living language, maintaining an interest in
culture in general. A typical example of the degree in which cultural sensitivity affects the
psychoanalytic understanding in given by Lacan in the Seminar on Freud. It is on a case as different
from our Western culture experience as the twelve Olympians and concerns the Koranic law. Lacan's
patient exhibited a variety of symptoms related to the use of the hand. Reference to the analysand's
childhood related them to early sexual activity but it neither explained nor resolved anything
[Lacan:Miller 1975, p. 196]. Only when the analyst observed that the analysand was of the Islamic
religion and manifested a considerable "aversion to the Koranic law" (ibid) was he able to put things
into perspective. The Koran dictates the punishment of the guilty by cutting off their hand. That aspect
was incorporated in the personal problem and contributed to giving it an expression. The Koranic law
was a strong component of this man's cultural heritage and had been used in an very special way.
Access to the truth of the analysand's symptoms would never have been achieved had the analyst been
unaware of the characteristics of the Islamic culture.
7 Kristeva does not conduct 'psychoanalytic literary criticism' (not the Lacanian version anyway and
her affinities with the particular school are not within our interests). In early books she brings together
Freud and structuralism/semiotics. She has been a great influence on my studies though she is not
clearly represented in the present one. I simply appropriate the particular statement for expository
reasons- perhaps because of the wonderful word 'joy'.
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Desire does not need justification, we all know that by virtue of being 'desiring
subjects'. Desire is simultaneous with language: it desires to speak. As speech
addressed to 'whom it may concern' it must carry some easily recognisable form and
persuasion: it must give some reasons for the particular choice and must use language
to deliver it. These reasons do not cover the initial desire completely but they do not
betray it completely either. The interest in the particular work is accounted for in
terms of originality and historic prominence, thus promising an interesting
(communicable) reading beyond the personal interest of the researcher. 'Giotto's joy'
transposes 'desire' into the text. It becomes someone else's desire which now seeks
expression- in forms and colours. It lends itself to pleasure, not to pathology, to joy, as
it is a joy to read, to the artist's expression as expression ofdesire.
Desire finds its way in other people's desires, in different modes of expression
(painting, poetry etc.) and in 'objects' of different times; how it communicates its
promises and its lures, defines its aims and returns its due to its participants. Let us
look at psychoanalytic literary criticism from this perspective, as a multilayered act of
communication, in which we are trying to access what the text 'tries to say' and
looking for it in the same place as desire 'occurs', in speech. We do not know what we
will find but we look for it with an all too familiar certainty: that desire, one way or
another, must be expressed.
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CHAPTER 1
PART 1 THEORY: FREUD AND LACAN
FREUD: SOME ASPECTS OF THEORY THROUGH THE
OEDIPUS COMPLEX
A lot has been said and written about Freud (1856-1938). The doctor from Vienna was
not the first one to speak about human sexuality but he certainly took some bold steps
in the direction of sexuality in childhood and the exploration of the Unconscious.
Freud's impact on twentieth century thought has been enormous. Many decades later,
when Freud's theory has been successfully destroyed and reconstituted many times
and from many different perspectives, the 'Oedipus complex' and the 'Unconscious'
still remain the by-words of the analytic field. In the thirties, in France, J Lacan (1901-
81) the "psychoanalyst and influential thinker"8 brought Freudian analysis in touch
with linguistics in powerful writings of great insight and amazingly complex
language. Many call it 'Return to Freud'. Controversial, and no less exposed to attacks,
Lacan's version of Freud is equally influential in modern thought.
Reading Freud, and avoiding reading about Freud, one gradually becomes familiar
with his style of psychoanalytic writing. Freud has a certain way of exposing his case,
pointing out the weak and the strong points in his hypothesis, making suggestions and
concluding; the Freudian text is disciplined. Reading Lacan is an altogether different
experience. It takes a lot longer to get used to his style and to familiarise oneself with
terms he does not very often define. Lacan is dialogic and discursive. Many of the
texts are transcripts from lectures and seminars, spoken commentaries inspired by the
requirements of the conversation rather than by the rules ofwritten language.
^ From the back cover of Lemaire's book on Lacan.
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In order to introduce Lacan's theory we will introduce the main aspects of Freud's. In
this chapter we will start with a brief introduction of some key concepts: the Oedipus
complex and its role in sexual development, the notion of Repression and the
Unconscious.
Freud put together a comprehensive psychoanalytic theory of sexuality. His theory
was based on observations of patients he was treating and was always revised with
practice in mind.
In general terms, sexuality is born very early in life, initially as part of the life-
preserving functions (feeding for instance). It gradually separates itself from that
component and later becomes totally independent. Freud assumes the existence of
instincts, forces or energies known only via their subjection to specific purposes. Thus
he speaks of life-preservative and sexual instincts. Because he is not interested in the
biological preservation of the individual or the species but in the "psyche" he focuses
on what enters that domain only. Thus he is interested in sexuality not in its biological
but in its psychological sense9.
In Freud the "psyche" is an apparatus of functions and agencies rather than a concept.
Freud never uses the term. He speaks instead of the ego, the id and the superego
9 In "Life and death in psychoanalysis" Laplanche describes the 'genesis' of sexuality. Human sexuality
emerges from the vital order, that is, from the non sexual self preservative condition according to a
simple mechanism of'propping'. The (sexual) instinct 'props' itself upon another function in order to be
satisfied. It begins its life through the aim, object and source of another function and it later acquires its
autonomy: "Now the crucial point is that simultaneous with the feeding function's achievement of
satisfaction in nourishment, a sexual process begins to appear. Parallel with feeding there is a
stimulation of lips and tongue...This stimulation is initially modelled on the (vital) function, so that
between the two, it is at first barely possible to distinguish a difference. The object? It would appear to
be furnished at the level of the function. Can we be sure whether it is still the milk or already the
breast? The source? It too is determined by the feeding process, since the lips are also part of the
digestive system. The aim as well is quite close to the aim of nourishment. Ultimately, object, aim, and
source are intimately entwined in an extremely simple proposition allowing us to describe the process:
"It's coming in by the mouth." 'It' is the object; 'coming in' is the aim, and whether a sexual or an
alimentary aim is in question, the process is in any event a 'coming in'; 'by the mouth': at the level of
the source, we find the same duplicity: the mouth is simultaneously a sexual organ and an organ of the
feeding function" [Laplanche 1976, p. 17].
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[Freud 1923], The ego is a versatile agency, the centre of consciousness and identity
as we understand it, closer to the external world than the other two, regulator of the
input from the external world and co-ordinator of the demands of the other two
agencies10. The superego, which is formed after the dissolution of the Oedipus
complex, usually makes itself felt as a criticising agency. It sets high aims and
evaluates the performance of the ego, it appears as the voice of conscience and
occasionally turns against the ego with severity. The id is the not-conscious par
excellence. In the last version of the agencies, it contains the older 'Unconscious' and
whatever must remain repressed, barred, that is, from consciousness. Freud postulates
that a basic principle of the system is the Pleasure Principle: part of the duties of the
ego is to stop unpleasure from reaching consciousness, coming either from the outside
world or from the id.
The Oedipus Complex
Let us return to sexuality: Freud accounts for both the early development and that last
outcome, the genital maturity and the division of the sexes (feminine/masculine). It
could be said that sexuality starts from inside (without separate objects) and ends
outside (external objects). From the point of view of finding interest in and deriving
satisfaction from external objects we could also say that it starts from an objectless
disposition and proceeds to objects.
Given the early development of sexuality in the child, Freud postulates that the early
sexual interests will inevitably be addressed to the mother or the person taking are of
the child. The Oedipus complex represents the intervention of a rival, the father, who
discourages the particular direction of sexuality and diverts it to other objects.
In its typical arrangement the Oedipus complex involves the triad: mother, father and
child. In 'The language of Psychoanalysis' Laplanche and Pontalis (thereafter referred
to as LP) define the Oedipus complex in the following way:
'0 We will complete the properties of the ego later.
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"Organised body of loving and hostile wishes which the child experiences towards its
parents. In its so-called positive form, the complex appears as in the story of Oedipus
Rex: a desire for the death of the rival- the parent of the same sex- and a sexual desire
for the parent of the opposite sex. In its negative form, we find the reverse picture:
love for the parent of the same sex, and jealous hatred of the parent of opposite sex. In
fact, the two versions are to be found in varying degrees in what is known as the
complete form of the complex. According to Freud, the peak period for the experience
of the Oedipus complex lies between the ages of three and five years, that is, during
the phallic stage; its decline signals entry into a latency period. At puberty the
complex is revived and is then surmounted with a varying degree of success by means
of a particular sort of object-choice. The Oedipus complex plays a fundamental role in
the structuring of the personality, and in the orientation of human desire" [LP, p. 282-
7]-
A main characteristic of the economy of the complex is the primacy of the male organ
(phallus) and the fear of its loss (castration). Freud attributes the reality of the fear to
observation. The child initially considers that all human beings have a phallus and that
only those who are unworthy or punished lose it. The mother, in particular, seems to
have a phallus for a long time and to find her castrated is considered decisive for the
development of the child's complex [Freud 1923b, p. 311]. The fear of castration is
consolidated by the child's experience of verbal threats that aim at discouraging any
interest in the newly discovered genitals [Freud 1924, p. 317], Freud assumes that
castration defines the sexuality of both sexes11. For both, it entails the loss of the
'' Freud's attempts to account for feminine sexuality largely involve an extra detour in identifications.
In 'Femininity' [1933c, pp. 145-69] and 'Female sexuality' [Freud 1931, p. 371-92] Freud assigns two
extra tasks to the genesis of feminine sexuality: the displacement of the erotogenic zone (from the
clitoris to the vagina) and the change of object, from mother to father. The difference between the
sexes arises from the (famous) penis envy, the girl's resentment at realising she does not have a penis.
Gradually the wish to have a penis turns into a wish to have a baby (by the father). This is when the
little girl enters the oedipus complex and the hostility to her mother begins. Freud observes that unlike
the boys: "the castration complex prepares for the Oedipus complex instead of destroying it; the girl is
driven out of her attachment to her mother through the influence of her envy for the penis and she
enters the Oedipus situation as though into a haven of refuge. In the absence of fear of castration the
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penis- the masculine one as a result of punishment and the feminine one as a
precondition. Freud generalises: "If the satisfaction of love in the field of the Oedipus
complex is to cost the child his penis, a conflict is bound to arise between his
narcissistic interest in that part of his body and the libidinal cathexis12 of his parental
object. In this conflict the first of these forces normally triumphs: the child's ego turns
away from the Oedipus complex" [Freud 1924, p. 318].
A simple straightforward Oedipus complex can only be assumed for the simple cases
where the little boy loves the mother and the little girl loves the father and the other
parent is considered as a rival. But Freud soon realised that an inherent trend, the
constitutional bisexuality13 of the human being, meant that a straightforward outcome
of the complex and its identifications was by no means the general rule.
In fact the 'inherent bisexuality' of the human being meant that love and hate
(<ambivalence) can be directed to both parents, irrespective of the sex of the child: "a
boy has not merely an ambivalent attitude towards his father and an affectionate
object-choice towards his mother, but at the same time he also behaves like a girl and
displays affectionate feminine attitude to his father and a corresponding jealousy and
hostility to his mother" (ibid).
chief motive is lacking which leads boys to surmount the complex" [Freud 1933c, p. 163], Freud
himself recognised that his explanation of female sexuality was far from perfect. For Lacan the
importance of the Oedipus complex and of the differences in the sexuality of men and women are to be
accounted for in the level of their relation to the signifier. It is only on the symbolic plane that the
Oedipus complex has any meaning, and Lacan locates the difference in a dissymetry in the signifier
[Lacan:Miller 1981, p. 176).
Cathexis is an amount of psychical energy, conscious or unconscious, attached to an idea or an
object. Object cathexis is the investment of an object or an idea with psychical energy [LP, p. 62-66].
In early developmental terms, the difference between (love) object and identification becomes
somewhat confusing [LP, pp. 276, 207], It would be better perhaps to describe it as the difference
between taking in all the characteristics of the other (object) and taking in only a trait of it. As for the
influence of identifications in the oedipal situation let us simply say that it removes the (erotic)
cathexes of the other person and in its place institutes a trait-identification. The same authors stress the
dialectic relationship of narcissism to identification in life.
'J The idea was adopted by Freud in order to account for the difficulties in the assumption of the
characteristics of one sex [LP, p. 52]
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Despite these difficulties and the explanatory inadequacy of the Oedipus complex in
the case of feminine sexuality, Freud insisted that it was an adequate and necessary
mechanism: "The broad outcome of the sexual phase dominated by the Oedipus
complex, may, therefore, be taken to be the forming of a precipitate in the ego,
consisting of these two identifications [mother and father] in some way united with
each other. This modification of the ego retains its special position; it confronts the
other contents of the ego as an ego ideal or super-ego" [Freud 1923 p. 373].
The notions ego-ideal {super-ego) and identification are to be understood in relation
to another important notion in the Freudian field: narcissism. We are now looking at
the Oedipus complex from a slightly different perspective. Narcissism is the early
relation of the individual to oneself or an image of oneself (ex: the mother). Freud
traces the origins of narcissism in early infancy when the sexual instinct is still
satisfied via the ego or life supporting function. At that period, he says, a human being
has at its disposal two sexual objects, "himself and the woman who nurses him"
[Freud 1914], This early 'choice' constitutes the 'primary narcissism'14.
The mechanism of the Oedipus complex 'transforms' narcissism and the dissolution of
the complex results in an interesting reversal. When the narcissistic object is given up
under the pressure of the threat of castration, it does not disappear, it is displaced
outside. In the place of lost narcissism the ideal-ego is raised: "This ideal ego is now
the target of the self-love which was enjoyed in childhood by the actual ego. The
subject's narcissism makes its appearance displaced on this new ideal ego, which, like
the infantile ego, finds itself possessed of every perfection that is of value" [Freud
1914 p. 88],
14 it will later affect object-choices: "A person may love:
(1) According to the narcissistic type:
(a) what he himself is (i.e., himself), (b) what he himself was, (c) what he himself would like to be, (d)
someone who was once part of himself.
(2) According to the anaclitic (attachment) type:
(a) the woman who feeds him, (b) the man who protects him,
and the succession of substitutes who take their place" [Freud 1914, p84]
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The agency responsible for the 'displacement' of narcissism outside the subject is the
ideal-ego. Freud marks the affinity of the early narcissism to ego-ideal (superego) by
this terminological reversal: ideal-ego/ ego-ideal. He comments: "... behind it [the
ego-ideal] there lies hidden an individual's first and most important identification, his
identification with the father in his own personal prehistory. This is apparently not in
the first instance the consequence or outcome of an object-cathexis; it is a direct and
immediate identification and takes place earlier than any object-cathexis15. But the
object-choices belonging to the first sexual period and relating to the father and
mother seem normally to find their outcome in an identification of this kind, and
would thus reinforce the primary one" [Freud 1923, p. 370], In terms of objects,
therefore, the Oedipus complex decides the 'fate' of narcissism by putting an end to it
but at the same time preserving it. The success lies in the tension of an identification
and a love-choice which continues to exist because it is rendered inaccessible. The
agency of the super-ego is born out of this restructuring and preserves and safeguards
the established situation.
The relation between the ego and the super-ego, amicable or not, depends on the
nature of the two agencies. Since we have introduced the notion of narcissism, we can
complete the picture of the ego's functions. Freud assumed the existence of an almost
irreducible and indestructible amount of energy, libido, which is invested and
withdrawn from sexual objects. Apart from its regulatory role, the ego, which has its
origin in the early narcissism,16 can also play the role of a sexual object. If necessary,
LP (p. 205) define identification as the process by which "the subject assimilates an aspect, property
or attribute of the other and is transformed, wholly or partially, after the model the other provides. It is
by means of a series of identifications that the personality is constituted and specified".
'6 After an undifferentiated oral phase where object-cathexes and identifications are still
indistinguishable, the ego begins to react to the object-cathexes proceeding from the id: "and it either
acquiesces in them or tries to fend them off by the process of repression" [Freud 1923, p. 368], What
happens to the sexual object that must be given up interests us here: "an alteration of [a person's] ego
which can only be described as a setting up of the object inside the ego. ..by this introjection, which is a
kind of regression to the mechanism of the oral phase, the ego makes it easier for the object to be given
up or renders that process possible. It may be that this identification is the sole condition under which
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it can withdraw the sexual interest (object-libido) from the external world and
transform it (desexualisation) into narcissistic libido. This is more or less what
happens in the oedipal phase when the interest from the mother is withdrawn: it is
taken in. The same mechanism allows the ego to abandon sexual objects in all its life
and also to safeguard its integrity.
When the superego turns against the ego, the latter perceives it as a threat of death. At
this point Freud observes that living in fear of death cannot be derived from actual
biological death nor is biological death interesting for analysis: "the fear of death is
something that occurs between the ego and the super-ego" [Freud 1923, p. 400]. It is a
development of the fear of castration, that forced the ego to abandon its object
cathexis. "It would seem that the mechanism of the fear of death can only be that the
ego relinquishes its narcissistic libidinal cathexis in a very large measure- that is, that
it gives up itself, just as it gives up some external object in other cases in which it
feels anxiety" (ibid).
Freud observes: "Putting it more generally, what the ego regards as the danger and
responds to with anxiety-signals is that the super-ego should be angry with it and
punish it or cease to love it. The final transformation which the fear of the super-ego
undergoes is a fear of the super-ego projected on to the powers of destiny" [Freud
1926, p. 297],
Repression
The results of the Oedipus complex and its dissolution are. of course, kept away from
consciousness. In "The dissolution of the Oedipus complex" Freud notes that the
mechanism responsible for the dissolution of the complex is 'repression'. With
repression we enter the domain of the id and what in very broad terms must remain
there. To this he attributes the genesis of normality and illness: "we have here come
upon the borderline-never a very sharply drawn one- between the normal and the
pathological. If the ego has in fact not achieved much more than a repression of the
the id can give up its objects" [ibid, emphasis added] or, as Freud then adds, the only way for the ego
to obtain control over the id.
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complex, the latter persists in an unconscious state in the id and will later manifest its
pathogenic effect" [Freud 1924, p. 319].
But in order to do justice to this key psychoanalytic concept we must refer to its two
distinct functions: the repression in relation to the instinct and repression in general.
Repression subdues the 'instinct', the irresistible unspecified life pressure, to
requirements of organisation and structure. The instinct is a force, a pressure, that
directs the organism towards an aim. It has a source, some part of the body, its aim is
to eliminate the tension it arises from there, and it achieves that via an object [LP, p.
214], The instinct participates in the psyche as represented by an idea (Vorstellung)
while it has a fixed portion of energy, a quota of affect permanently attached to it [LP,
p. 374], Repression bears on both.
Primal repression "consists in a psychical (ideational) representative of the instinct
being denied entrance into the conscious. With this a fixation is established; the
representative in question persists unaltered from then onwards and the instinct
remains attached to it17" [Freud 1915b, p. 147, emphasis added]. Every other
repression is modelled on this one and will be draw towards this core: "The second
stage of repression, repression proper, affects mental derivatives of the repressed
representative, or such trains of thought as, originating elsewhere, have come into
associative connection with it. On account of this association, these ideas experience
the same fate as what was primally repressed. Repression proper, therefore, is actually
an after-pressure" [ibid].
Banished in the unconscious the instinctual representative may not suffer permanent
repression. It may 'proliferate in the dark'. From the experience of analytic
associations Freud concludes that the instinctual representative may actually enter
17 Primal repression is a fixation, an inhibition of development, of the instinct to an idea and the
registration of this idea in the unconscious [LP p. 33], Laplanche and Pontalis point out that although
the idea is essential the mechanism of its formation is far from clear: although the primary repressed
will act a pole of attraction for other ideas undergoing repression their origin can only be attributed to
anticathexis, defence mounted from the other side of the system, the ego: "As regards the nature of this
anticathexis, it remains obscure. Freud considers that it is unlikely to derive from the super-ego, whose
formation is subsequent to primal repression. Its origin should probably be sought in very intense
archaic experiences..." (ibid).
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consciousness when sufficiently distorted or made remote from the original idea
[Freud 1915b, pp. 148-9], This leads him to say that the effectiveness of repression
must be maintained non stop: "The process of repression is not to be regarded as an
event which takes place once, the results of which are permanent...repression demands
a persistent expenditure of force, and if this were to cease the success of the repression
would be jeopardised, so that a fresh act of repression would be necessary. We may
suppose that the repressed exercises a continuous pressure in the direction of the
conscious, so that this pressure must be balanced by an unceasing counter-pressure"
[Freud 1915b, p. 151].
This is the basic relation between repression and the representative of the instinct and
the affect, the unbound part of it: "either the instinct is altogether suppressed, so that
no trace is found, or it appears as an affect which is in some way or other qualitatively
coloured, or it is changed into anxiety" [Freud 1915b, p. 153]. It is in the last two
cases that Freud situates the failure of repression: "If a repression does not succeed in
preventing feelings of unpleasure or anxiety from arising, we may say that it has
failed, even though it may have achieved its purpose as far as the ideational
representative is concerned" [ibid].
Examining the mechanism of repression Freud observes that we know it works only
through its outcome. He adds that the repression of the ideational representative
creates substitutive formations and symptoms [Freud 1915b, p. 154], These two are
not results of repression but of the return of the repressed, more or less the failure of
repression. Freud's last word before the examples is that repression is withdrawal of
cathexis [Freud 1915b, p. 155],
The economy of cathexes, the surfacing of ideational representatives into
consciousness and the idea of repression are key parts in the theory of the
'unconscious'.
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The unconscious: a very short introduction
The unconscious18 is not the mysterious world of dark forces but another organised,
law-governed system. Laplanche and Pontalis list the essential characteristics of the
unconscious in the following way:
"a. Its 'contents' are 'representatives' of the instincts.
b. These contents are governed by the mechanisms specific to the primary process,
essentially by condensation and displacement.
c. Strongly cathected by instinctual energy, they seek to re-enter consciousness and
resume activity (the return of the repressed), but they can only gain access to the
system Pre-conscious-Conscious in compromise-formations after having undergone
the distortions of the censorship.
d. It is more essentially childhood wishes that become fixated in the unconscious"
[LP, p. 474],
In "The Unconscious" Freud distinguishes between Conscious (Cs), Preconscious
(Pes) and Unconscious (Unc).19 While the preconscious and the unconscious are
distinguished by their degree of accessibility20, the difference between conscious and
unconscious is explained by resorting to our certainty about what is conscious: "There
is no need to discuss what is to be called conscious: it is removed from all doubt. The
oldest and best meaning of the word 'unconscious' is the descriptive one; we call a
psychical process unconscious whose existence we are obliged to assume- for some
such reason as that we infer it from its effects- but of which we know nothing...we call
A nice and relatively easy introduction to the Freudian notion of the unconscious is given by
Manoni (1971).
'9 Abbreviations appear instead of the full word in the original. We will be using them when quoting.
20 Freud draws on analytic experiences: sometimes in analysis a patient may miss the significance of a
remark he has just made. If he recognises it when pointed out to him then the thought in the remark
was only temporarily unavailable, preconscious but easily drawn to the surface. If, however, he refuses
to see the thought then, says Freud, we have come across an unconscious thought [Freud 1933b, p.
103],
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a process unconscious if we are obliged to assume that it is being activated at the
moment, though at the moment we know nothing about it" [Freud 1933b, p. 102],
The unconscious is developed in two directions: a. its contents and internal structure,
b. its relation to consciousness and the communication of the systems.
"The nucleus of the Unconscious" says Freud "consists of instinctual representatives
which seek to discharge their cathexis; that is to say, it consists of wishful impulses"
[Freud 1915c, p. 190], The peculiar relation of the representatives in the unconscious
gives it its special character. They exist side by side. Even when their aims seem
incompatible they may combine and form an intermediate aim, a compromise. There
is no negation, no doubt, no certainty in the unconscious. There is no 'time' in the
sense that its processes are not ordered temporally and are not altered by the passage
of time. There are only "contents cathected with greater or lesser strength". The
working principle of the unconscious is the 'primary process', a mode of combination
of ideas by condensation and displacement: "by the process of displacement one idea
may surrender to another its whole quota of cathexis; by the process of condensation it
may appropriate the whole cathexis of several ideas" (ibid).
The communication between the unconscious and the conscious interests Freud as
much as the former's contents. While neurotic symptoms and dreams afford us an
insight into the eruption of the unconscious despite repression (see, for example, how
condensation and displacement work in dreams [Freud 1933, p. 49]) the smooth
transition from the one agency to the other and the linking of different representatives
is secured by the intervention of the preconscious. It imposes some order onto
ideational representatives: "it devolves upon the system Pes. to make communication
possible between the different ideational contents so that they can influence one
another, to give them an order in time, and to set up a censorship ; 'reality-testing' too,
and the reality principle, are in its province" [Freud 1915c, p. 193], On the issue of
unconscious impulse-representatives and their derivatives arriving at consciousness
Freud develops the following arrangement: "The Unc. is turned back on the frontier of
the Pes. by the censorship, but derivatives of the Unc. can circumvent this censorship,
achieve a high degree of organisation and reach a certain intensity of cathexis in the
Pes. When however, this intensity is exceeded and they try to force themselves into
consciousness, they are recognised as derivatives of the Unc. and are repressed afresh
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at the new frontier of censorship, between the Pes and the Cs. Thus the first of these
censorship is exercised against the Unc. itself, and the second against its Pes
derivatives. One might suppose that in the course of individual development the
censorship had taken a step forward" [Freud 1915c, p. 198].
The Oedipus complex could be seen as representing a cross-roads; the complex brings
together a variety of features such as the fact that human sexuality is completed in two
stages, childhood and adolescence, with a latency period between them and the fact is
that the phallic stage will not be fully developed into genital sexuality until then. The
sexual instinct undergoes considerable transformation too. Freud speaks not only of
the effects of repression but also of other vicissitudes if repression does not work
properly. Regression to earlier phases of sexuality (oral or anal-sadistic) are possible
and in fact are quite common in illness. In most cases the characteristics of a sex are
assumed under the combined pressure of channelling the instinct into genital sexuality
and of conforming to external behavioural patterns. The superego may play a role in
illness with its severity. Upon the division into subject (ego)- object (external world),
pleasure- unpleasure, active- passive. Freud sketches the future of castration and the
polarity of the sexes: "A first antithesis is introduced with the choice of object, which,
of course, presupposes a subject and an object. At the stage of the pregenital sadistic-
anal organisation, there is as yet no question of male and female; the antithesis
between active and passive is the dominant one. At the following stage of infantile
genital organisation, which we now know about, maleness exists, but not femaleness.
The antithesis here is between having a male genital organ and being castrated. It is
not until development has reached its completion at puberty that the sexual polarity
coincides with male and female. Maleness combines [the factors of] subject, activity
and possession of the penis; femaleness takes over [those of] object and passivity"
[Freud 1924, p. 312].
What can go wrong always remains bound to the particulars of the situation and Freud
always insists that each case is an individual case. Freud has documented a variety of
disturbances and problems, ranging from withdrawal of cathexis in mourning to
excessive super-ego demands and to analysing sadistic phantasies and homosexuality.
In "Sexuality in neuroses" [Freud 1906, pp. 71-81] and in the summary of the "Three
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essays on sexuality" he specifies a number of internal and external factors that can
influence sexuality towards normality or illness, including constitution and heredity,
weakness of the genital zone, excessive repression, sublimation and accidental
experiences [Freud 1905, p. 164 and Freud 1906, p. 76], The analytic inquiry into the
patient's history goes, as we know, back to childhood and into the unconscious where
forgotten experiences or the real reasons for any such 'developmental fixations' may
be found [Freud 1906, p. 77], Again Freud looks in the direction of repression as a
conditioning factor in the process of development [Freud 1906, p.78, Freud 1905, p.
163 and Freud 1919, p. 162] and concludes: "I showed that normality is a result of the
repression of certain component instincts and constituents of the infantile disposition
and of the subordination of the remaining constituents under the primacy of the
genital zones in the service of the reproductive function. I showed that perversions
correspond to disturbances of this coalescence owing to the overpowering and
compulsive development of certain of the component instincts, while neuroses can be
traced back to an excessive repression of the libidinal trends" [Freud 1906, p. 79],
LACAN: LANGUAGE AND PSYCHOANALYSIS
The signifier in Linguistics and in Psychoanalysis
It is impossible to speak about Lacan's psychoanalysis without introducing the notions
of the Signifier and the Signified. The terms originate in Linguistics. They were first
used systematically by F Saussure to differentiate between the acoustic image
(Signifier) and the concept (Signified) and to stress that there is no inherent relation
between the two21. [Lemaire 1970, p. 12], Saussure writes: S/ s, the Signified over the
signifier, the concept over the word.
21 There it nothing that relates the concept 'tree' with the particular string of letters in the English
language.
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It is beyond the scope of this presentation to explain why Saussure's formulation was
considered revolutionary and marked the beginning of modern linguistics. Suffice it to
say, that with Saussure the study of language was reorientated to systematicity rather
than to the history and the origin of words.
From Saussure onwards language is defined by the following properties: "The
language is: 1. transcendent 2. diacritical 3. comprehensive 4. conventional 5.
binary" [Boothby 1991, p. 120].
The first term implies that man enters an already organised system, an "established
institution" into which he is accepted: "The human being's relation to language is less
that of a workman to his tools than it is like that between a fish and the water in which
it swims and breathes" [Boothby 1991, p. 121].
The second term, diacritical, implies that language is a system governed by internal
relations on all levels, from utterance to phoneme. The meaning of an element is
determined by its position in the organisation of the whole: "the respective value of
the pieces depends on their position on the chessboard" (ibid).
The third term stresses the endless possibilities of language in covering and
representing 'new' meanings or meanings for which it does not have specific words.
The fourth term summarises Saussure's innovation: the arbitrariness of the signifier,
or, in very simple terms, that there is only a conventional relation between a concept,
e.g.: 'tree', and the series of phonemes put together to represent it.
Finally the fifth term states that language can be broken down to minimal units,
(phonemes) which can also be broken down to distinctive features. The distinctive
features are qualitative oppositions of sounds, ex: voiced/voiceless, aspirated/non-
aspirated etc. Words therefore are bundles of distinctive features, combination
acceptable in the particular language.
The operations of selection and combination govern language at all levels. Selection
and combination are 'the two axes of language'. With words, for instance, selection is
related to 'the storehouse of memory', the pool of words in which a particular one
belongs, semantically or otherwise. The word 'education', for instance, can be
associated through its meaning (signifier) to 'upbringing', 'training' etc. and through its
sound (signified) to 'educate', 'educator' or even to 'application' 'vindication' etc.
[Lemaire 1970, p. 30-1]. Selection is the range of synonyms and antonyms for each
31
signifier. Combination refers to the terms present in the sentence, those that were
chosen out of the possible candidates for each 'slot' in the sentence. Here the emphasis
is on what permits all these signifiers to appear next to each other: the rules of
concatenation that govern a language (ibid). In traditional grammar terms we would
find the equivalent of this axis under 'syntax'. Combination and selection will later
become Lacan's metonymy and metaphor.
For the purposes of psychoanalysis Lacan writes: S/ s, the signifier over the signified.
He accepts that we are human beings because of language. We are 'humanised' when
we enter language and the system of organised relations in which we have a place and
in which we designate ourselves with a proper name. Lacan had to adapt the ideas
borrowed from Linguistics to the requirements of the analytic field. The analyst deals
with symptoms. The symptoms are expressions (verbal, kinetic or other) of a
'problem' that remains obscure to the patient himself. He comes to analysis for cure, in
order to find out, with the analyst's help, what is the meaning of the symptom, or, in
other words, what the symptom tries to say.
The reversal of the Signifier/signified 'summarises' a major deviation from Saussurean
linguistics that can only be understood in relation to the process of psychoanalysis and
the value of speech (actual concrete language) in it. Like Freud22, Lacan was
interested in developing a system that could account both for the genesis of
sexuality/meaning (now that language was introduced) and for why the analysand's
speech can successfully lead both to the meaning of his symptoms and to their cure. In
a sense, Lacan considers the symptom as a signifier without meaning. He knows that
22 preuci never developed a theory of language in relation to the unconscious/ primary process. He
confined its use to consciousness, to the secondary process. He had observed, however, that the
primary process was governed by the laws of condensation and displacement, that the communication
of the systems conscious and unconscious was possible by means of association of a thing presentation
(an unconscious idea) with a word presentation and had attributed great significance to the primal
repression, the repression of the ideational representative of the instinct in the unconscious. Lacan
brings the laws of language to these. He revises the signifier and uses metonymy and metaphor in
relation to condensation and displacement.
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its meaning is not lost but resides in the unconscious and occasionally overpowers
repression and surfaces in language (return of the repressed). He starts from there.
The Lacanian Subject
Before proceeding with our discussion we need to introduce- though slightly out of
context- the terms Imaginary, Symbolic, Real and Other in order to align some of
Lacan's ideas to Freud's. We need to stress right from the beginning that Lacan's
interest lies in the Subject, not the subject-ego of the Freudian topologies but the
Subject of the Unconscious. The basic idea of the Lacanian subject is given (further
down) in the schema L.
The symbolic is the register of language. It is also the law-governed body of relations
by which society is defined and held together (relations of kinship, prohibition of
incest etc.). Both language and society are organised structures/systems. According to
[Laplanche and Pontalis 1972]: "Lacan's use of the notion of the symbolic appears to
serve two purposes: a) to relate the structure of the unconscious to that of language
and to apply to the former the same methods which proved fruitful in linguistics; b) to
show how the human subject comes to be inscribed within a pre-established order
which is itself symbolic in nature..." [Laplanche and Pontalis 1972], The terms
'symbolic' however, and any Lacanian term for that matter, cannot be defined very
strictly. As LP note this would be 'against the spirit' of Lacan's thought. Thus they
recommend that the 'symbolic' in general and the previous definition in particular
should be considered as two complementary parts: structure (of discrete elements) and
law, introduced to each and every individual by the father in the oedipal adventure,
(ibid).
The Imaginary23 is the register of narcissism. The primordial mother-child relation is
to be found in this register. The functions of the ego, its relation to the ideal-ego and
all the aspects of sexuality belong there too. [Laplanche and Pontalis 1972, p. 192],
-■} -iZJ The Imaginary and the Symbolic are discussed from a different perspective in the next chapter.
I lere we focus on the mechanisms of the Symbolic mainly.
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The Real24 should not be confused with reality. It is better defined as neither symbolic
nor imaginary and is excluded from language, from symbolisation [Lacan 1973, p.
280]. The statement most often associated with the Real is 'that which returns to the
same place' and in that sense it means the trauma as not-incorporated in the other two
registers [Bowie 1991, pp. 94-5],
The Other is a versatile but often confusing notion. It means a) the unconscious; b)
language, the site of the signifier, the Symbolic; c) the site of intersubjectivity
between patient and analyst in analysis; d) the Mother and the Father; e) the third
party invoked in analysis when it comes to the question of truth [Lemaire 1970, p.
157], Most of the times Lacan refuses to specify which one he means, thus leaving it
upon the reader to decide. The general intention is to let the term Other reverberate
with the connotations of its constitution and its decidedly oedipal character25.
In "Ecrits" [Lacan 1959, p. 193] we find a representation of the subject of the
unconscious. It is known as schema L and summarises Lacan's interest in the
unconscious (Other).
Boothby [1991, p. 172] maps Freud's relevant notions on schema L: S = Id, o (ego) =
ego, o (other) = reality and the object relation, O = superego. Though oversimplified
and slightly misleading this comparison can serve as an approximation of the two
theories.
-4 The Real appears very little in our discussions.
25 We will not be using the fifth meaning at all. As for the other four we will be trying to specify the
particular use according to the occasion. I must make it clear, however, that the desired effect (by
Lacan) relies in their non-specificity.
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The schema describes the subject's relation to the Other, and the interpersonal
relations of the ego with other human beings. Though 'static' it represents the tensions
which really are 'the subject' in the Lacanian sense. The four corners of the subject
are:(S), "the locus of its ineffable existence"; o (small letter standing for 'other',
different from O), his objects; o', his ego; and O, the locus from which the question of
existence is presented to him beyond the anxieties of the ego [Lacan 1959, p. 194],
The SO' diagonal shows that the subject is dependent on what is being unfolded in the
Other [Lacan 1959, p. 193], which is articulated as sporadic discourse according to the
laws of signification, as opposed to the relative stability of the images of the ego.
This is the way in which Lacan describes what one encounters in analysis: "...it is a
truth of experience for analysis that the subject is presented with the question of his
existence...as an articulated question: 'What am I there?', concerning his sex and his
contingency in being, namely, that, on the one hand, he is a man or a woman, and, on
the other, that he might not be, the two conjugating their mystery, and binding it in the
symbols of procreation and death. That the question of his existence bathes the
subject, supports him, invades him, tears him apart even, is shown in the tensions, the
lapses, the phantasies that the analyst encounters; and, it should be added, by means of
elements of the particular discourse in which this question is articulated in the Other.
It is because these phenomena are ordered in the figures of this discourse that they
have the fixity of symptoms, are legible and can be resolved when deciphered" [Lacan
1959, p. 194],
The Quilting point and the retroactive effect ofmeaning
Let us now return to the properties of the S(ignifier)/ s(ignified) in order to see how
Lacan treats their relationship.
Following Saussure, he advocates the autonomy of the signifier in the following
sense: the meaning of a signifier is always to be found in another signifier whose
meaning is to be found in another signifier and so on, thus making it possible to
exhaust the entire vocabulary of a language going from signifier to signifier. In this
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conception of language the signified seems to disappear. As Wilden explains the
emphasis is now on the flow from signifier to signifier and the correspondence of the
signifier and the signified must be understood as a correspondence between the
totality of the signifier to the totality ofthe signified" [Wilden 1968, p. 239],
In the "Agency of the letter" Lacan demonstrates the supremacy of the signifier over
the signified by substituting the signified of the door-signs 'ladies' and 'gentlemen'
with the same signifier-image, the sketch of two identical lavatory doors. Reference to
the signified (to the doors) is of course inadequate to explain its meaning. This can
only be done by further reference to other signifiers [Lacan 1957, p. 151-2]. Further
on, Lacan attributes special significance to the bar that in the S/s sign separates its two
parts. This bar, he says, is resistant to signification, and by this he means the
separation of the unconscious from the conscious. The signified is the unconscious
meaning and it is 'arrived at' in analysis via the flow of the signifier.
This is the point at which Lacan deviates from Saussure. While Saussure could
assume that the totality of the signifier never meets the totality ofmeanings/signified,
Lacan had to arrive at in some sort of signified in analysis. Lemaire explains: "In
psychoanalysis, the signified is reached only at the outcome of the analytic treatment.
Placed in the circuit of consciousness, each layer of the unconscious which has been
revealed takes refuge in 'mystery'. If one then goes back in analytic time from layer to
layer, from chain to chain, one eventually encounters the original text of the
unconscious" [Lemaire 1970, p. 45],
This signified, which, in essence, is just another signifier 'banished' in the unconscious
defines the function of language in the Lacanian field. It is the point de capiton, the
quilting point by virtue of which speech is drawn to a centre of gravity. Bowie
comments: "it [the signified] appears as that which the signifier almost successfully
dispels, and its characteristic motions are those of slipping, sliding, hesitating, fleeing,
expiring, dispersing, disappearing. And when Lacan comes to acknowledge the
strange power of endurance that certain meanings nevertheless have, and the ability of
such meanings to hold human lives together or to wreck them, he speaks not of
signifieds that have somehow broken free from their tutelage to the signifier but of
'the point to which signified and signifier come together to be knotted
together'...These fixated meanings are points de capiton- upholstery buttons, or places
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where the mattress-maker's needle has worked hard to prevent a shapeless mass of
stuffing from moving too freely about. If these points are too firmly implanted they
can drive the individual to despair and self-sacrifice, but if they are too few or too
loose they threaten him with madness...between the extremes of suicide and psychosis
lies the fabric of ordinary lives- the upholstery of speech, the impersonal structures of
language that weigh upon our freely chosen words and button them down" [Bowie
1991, p. 74],
Taken from 'The subversion of the subject' [Lacan 1960, p. 303, s(O) and (O) added]
the graph below is a visual representation of the function of the quilting pointing and
of another important feature of the Lacanian conception of language, the retroactivity
ofmeaning.
Zizek explains: "What we have here is simply the graphic presentation of the relation
between signifier and signified. As is well known, Saussure visualised26 this relation
as two parallel undulating lines or two surfaces of the same sheet: the linear
progression of the signified runs parallel to the linear articulation of the signifier.
Lacan structures the double movement quite differently: some mythical, pre-symbolic
intention (marked A) 'quilts' the signifier's chain, the series of the signifier marked by
the vector SS'. The product of this quilting (what 'comes out on the other side' after the
mythical -real- intention goes through the signifier and steps out of it) is the subject
marked by the matheme $ (the divided split subject, and at the same time the effaced
signifier, the lack of signifier..." [Zizek 1989, p. 101].
-6 See [Lacan:Miller 1981, p261] for Saussure's schema.
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We will ignore the notion of the split subject for the moment. It refers to the 'genesis'
of the subject of the unconscious we have not yet introduced. We will say, instead,
that the concept of the retroactive effect of signification allows us to represent the
signifying intentions of the subject (the production of speech in order to say
something) as proceeding from a point (O, unconscious) which endows them with
meaning belatedly. An example of how the quilting point and the retroactive effect of
meaning work in practice is given by Lacan in 'The Psychoses'. He reads Racine's
Athaliah [LacamMiller 1981, pp. 258-67] in such a way as to derive the key signifier
'Fear of god' out of the entire signification of the play. As he observes 'the fear of god'
is nowhere to be found as a signifier in the play; it is however the (missing) key
signifier, the one on which all signifiers converge, and is, therefore, the quilting point
to be arrived at 'later', by the signifying intention of the entire play.
Because the big O stands for both 'unconscious' and the 'Symbolic' the signifier 'Fear
of God' always resonates with the social/religious connotations that make it an
exceptional signifier. It conveys the idea of a god that is or should be feared, and who
inspires a multitude of other fears [LacamMiller 1981, p. 267]. It is the double origin
of the subject's language in his 'private' unconscious and in the social register that
Lacan invites us always to bear in mind.
The Paternal Metaphor
Let us now turn to Lacan's version of the Oedipus complex, the unconscious and
language. The purpose of the Oedipus complex is to destroy the dual relationship of
the mother and the child (primary narcissism). Lacan speaks of its outcomes as the
institution of the Paternal metaphor (or, Name ofthe Father)27. He uses the linguistic
term, metaphor, in order to stress the symbolic nature of the operation, the fact that it
is in essence a story of representation.
The notion of representation is important. We can think of the Signifier/signified
relation, the word 'tree' and the object (tree) we recognise in nature. The linguistic
For a thorough discussion of the Paternal metaphor see [Ragland 1995] chapter 6.
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representation brings the tree into language but not the object itself and relates it to
other signifiers. In a similar fashion the human being is 'only' represented in language.
This 'only' should be understood in two ways. First, in terms of the use of language:
by using a proper name or saying 'I' the speaking subject 'summarises' the variety of
factors and elements he really is as part of an organised society. Second, and most
important for our discussion, the ability to say 'I' marks the separation of the
Unconscious, its 'dropping out', its creation as a 'hidden structure'. Lacan notes: "if the
subject who is called 'John' or who translates himself in discourse as 'I' saves himself
through this nomination in so far as he inscribes himself in the circuit of exchange, he
becomes, on the other hand, lost to himself, for any mediate relationship imposes a
rupture of the inaugural continuity between self and self, self and other, self and the
world" [Lemaire 1970, p. 68], In other words, by entering language as 'John' or 'I' it is
subjected to the division between representation, the 'I' of the utterance, and what is
represented\ himself as subject. The 'I' of the discourse and the T of the enunciation
(the speaking subject) will never again coincide.
The unconscious is engendered by two operations: alienation and separation28 [Lacan
1973]. We will discuss alienation, which is related to the Imaginary, Narcissism and
28 Two operations, alienation and separation, engender the unconscious. The idea of representation is
central to their function. In order to understand their function we should go back to Freud's primal
repression, which concerns the repression of the idea representing an instinct. By being attached to an
'idea' (to use Freud's word) the instinct enters the unconscious. The idea, the signifier representing the
instinct, is then repressed. Lacan stresses the significance of recognising exactly what is repressed:
something that is already of the order of representation- since the instinct cannot enter the unconscious
in any other form but through a representation. This is Lacan's Vorstellungsreprasentanz [Lacan 1973,
p. 217], the equivalent of Freud's primal repression effected upon entry to language, constituting by-
half the unconscious and bearing upon the repression or the loss of an object particular to the instinct.
Lacan observes: "We locate this Vorstellungsreprasentanz in our schema of the original mechanisms of
alienation in that first signifying coupling that enables us to conceive that the subject appears first in
the Other, in so far as the first signifier, the unary signifier, emerges in the field of the Other and
represents the subject for another signifier..." [Lacan 1973, p. 218, emphasis added].
Alienation is explained by Lacan as the subject's division from its cause, cause being the unconscious
or what it signifies there: "The register of the signifier is established because a signifier represents a
subject for another signifier...being produced in the place of the Other (the symbolic), the signifier
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causes the subject to arise there, but at the cost of becoming fixed. What was ready to speak there
disappears, being no longer anything more than a signifier...the alienation resides in the division of the
subject from its cause...our subject is faced with the vel [symbol of disjunction in mathematics] of
receiving a certain meaning or being petrified. But if it keeps the meaning, it is this field of meaning
which will be eaten into by the non-sense produced by his being changed into a signifier" (quoted by
Lemaire 1970, p. 76, emphasis added).
For both Freud and Lacan the Vorstellungsreprasentanz, the binary signifier, will become the central
point of the repressed, the pole of attraction for all subsequent repressions. Why this is important is
explained along the lines of the second operation, separation. It takes up from the point of alienation,
given that the first representation of the instinct is already alienating in its essence- at least as far as the
preverbal, unary, mythical subject is concerned. The key to separation is the overlap of two lacks, one
originating in the loss of the primordial complement (object of the partial instinct) the other coming
from the Other with the full force of'desire' in it. Very often Lacan says that man's desire is the desire
of the Other, and the Other is primarily the M-Other in the beginning: "The desire of the Other is
apprehended by the subject in that which does not work, in the lacks of the discourse of the Other, and
all the child's whys reveal not so much an avidity for the reason of things, as a testing of the adult, a
Why are you telling me this? ever-resuscitated from its base, which is the enigma of the adult desire.
Now, to reply to this hold, the subject...brings the answer of the previous lack, of his own
disappearance, which he situates here at the point of lack perceived in the Other. The first object he
proposes for this parental desire whose object is unknown is his own loss- Can he lose me? The
phantasy of one's own death, of one's own disappearance, is the first object that the subject has to bring
into play in this dialectic, and he does indeed bring it into play..." [Lacan, p. 214], What 'the desire of
the Other' means in its properly unconscious foundation and its relation to the signifier is explained by
Benvenuto and Kennedy [1986, p. 130]: "In Lacan's view, the object of human desire is the desire of
the Other in at least two senses: one can translate the French 'le desir de 1' Autre' as both the Other's
desire (not mine but the Other's), and as desire for the Other. The infant early on tries to identify
himself with the mother's object of desire in order to be that object of desire, which in addition he has
desires for her. This basic structure of desire would follow from the law of the signifier, in that it
signifies something only in relation to another signifier, so desire is always desire for another thing".
Along similar lines Lemaire chooses a quote from Lacan with emphasis on language: "The subject
realises himself in the loss from which he sprang forth as an unconscious. Here separare, separate,
ends in se parere, to engender oneself. This sliding from one verb to another is based upon their
common pairing with the function of the pars ... Here, it is from his partition to his parturition that the
subject proceeds. Parere is firstly to produce. This is why the subject can produce what concerns him
here, a status which we will qualify as civil (etat civil). Nothing in anyone's life unchains a greater
determination to arrive..." [Lemaire 1970, p. 7], Due to the same operation the subject will be able to
'implant' his lack in the symbolic, make it 'audible' there: "In order to deck himself out (se parer) in the
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the Ego, in the next chapter. Here, we will concentrate on the paternal metaphor which
Lemaire puts in context in the following way: "By forbidding dual union with the
mother, the resolution of the Oedipus forces the subject's original desire, together with
all its accompanying phantasies, into the position of something misrecognised, and
substitutes a symbol for them in accordance with the process of the 'paternal
metaphor'. In other words, accession to the symbolic order is simultaneous with and
indissolubly connected with primal repression which, for the Lacanians, is effected in
accordance with the formal process ofmetaphor" [Lemaire 1970, p. 95].
A metaphor allows the substitution of one term for another, the former falling to the
level of the signified [Lemaire 1970, p. 86], The usual representation provided by
Lacan is:
The oedipal scenario is recast with emphasis on the phallus: At first, wishing to secure
the presence of the mother the child wishes to become everything to her by trying to
be the object that satisfies every desire of hers, the phallus. This is the period of the
primary narcissism for which Lemaire observes that the child "is not a subject, but a
lack, a nothing, because he is not individually situated...he merges with the object of
the other's desire and, fusing with his mother as a mere extension of her, presents
himself as a nothing as a blank" [Lemaire 1970, p. 82]. At a second stage, the father
intervenes and he deprives the child of the object of his desire: "the child comes up
against the Forbidden ... he encounters the Law of the father" [Lemaire 1970, p. 83],
At a third stage, he identifies with the father and registers himself in language through
this relativisation. The last step is very important and the mother herself plays an
important role in its realisation: "If., the father is recognised by the mother both as a
signifier to which he succumbs, the subject attacks the chain, which we have now reduced to a simple
binarity, in its interval. The interval which is repeated, the most radical structure of the signifying
chain, is the cite haunted by metonymy, the vehicle of desire....it is the extent that the subject
experiences something Other than the effects of meaning solicited of him by discourse motivating him
in this interval that he effectively encounters the desire of the Other. What he will place there is his
own lack. But what he thus fills in is the constituent loss of one of his own parts, because of which he





man and as the representative of the Law, the subject will have access to the 'name of
the father' or 'paternal metaphor... If the child does not accept the Law, or if the
mother does not recognise this position in the father, the subject will remain identified
with the phallus and subjected to the mother's desire" (ibid). What the Paternal
metaphor does, of course, in terms of signifiers, is, to install the paternal signifier, a
representation of the Father, in the Other, in the Unconscious. The withdrawal for the
lived experience, from the immediacy of the relation to the mother, is substituted by a
signifier. Lemaire observes: "Primal repression is only possible if the subject posits
himself as no more being the thing or the lived experience that the substitute he gives
to this lived experience. This repression is therefore only possible if the subject has at
his disposal an original signifier of self which he can posit as the negative of his
coanaesthesia and which will allow him to effect the negation inherent in primal
repression: the thing is no more its substitute than it is the self [Lemaire 1970, p. 86],
By being given this signifier by the father, the child can accede to the symbolic order.
The formal representation of the Oedipal substitution and repression is given by an
adaptation of the metaphor formula [Lacan 1959]:
Lemaire observes: "I do not think it false to say that of the subject 'crosses himself out'
in the Spaltung (the separation-repression of the Unconscious), if he effaces himself to
the profit of a signifier, it is in so far as he is the phallus that he is crossed out. The
lack of being engendered by the imposition of the law explains the eternalisation of
the desire, which is metonymically displaced from signifier to signifier in the
'demand', that is, for Lacan, in the traditional forms of culture"29 [Lemaire 1970, p.
88],
29 in "The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis" Lacan [1973] explains the 'character' of the
unconscious by giving an account of the unconscious in Freud and his own theory according to the
function of the cause. What interests us here is Lacan's view of the manifestation and the origin of the
unconscious: 'At first, the unconscious is manifested to us as something that holds itself in suspense in
the area, 1 would say of the unborn. That repression should discharge something into this area is not
Name - of - the - Father Desire of the Mother
Desire of the Mother Signified to the subject
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Phallus and Desire
Let us continue our discussion by clarifying some of the terms appearing in Lemaire's
statement: the phallus, or better, why the phallus in the particular equation, desire,
demand, and finally, the metonymic displacement from signifier to signifier.
Lacan's theory of signification is 'completed' with the signification of the phallus,
which appears both in relation to the maternal desire prohibited/lost forever to the
subject and in relation to the division of the sexes. Lacan sketches the directions of
analysis to the point of leading the patient to see the function of the phallus in his
desire [Lacan 1961, p. 267], Arriving at the function of the phallus, 110 matter what
one discovers there, is defined by Lacan as the objective and the end of analysis
[Lacan 1961, p. 274], Approaching the constitution of the unconscious and the
emergence of desire from the point of the phallus-as-signifier allows Lacan to say: "it
surprising" [Lacan 1973, p. 23], Looking for the product-at-the-gap, Lacan observes that by nature
they appear and disappear, they come and go, a fact which allows him to speak of 'discovery' and
'rediscovery' of what surprises the subject as it is produced but also, and most important for our case,
about the discontinuity of the unconscious. In the discontinuity of the unconscious Lacan sees the most
fundamental and subject-making function of the unconscious by refusing to place it against a
background of totality: "Is the one anterior to discontinuity? I do not think so" says Lacan and goes on
to specify that analysis is not interested in some sort of'enveloping psyche' or some sort of'double of
the organism', that the only one " introduced by the experience of the unconscious is the one of split, of
the stroke, of rupture" [Lacan 1973, p. 26], He therefore urges analysts not to think of the unconscious
as the discontinuous as opposed to continuous or total but to keep their eyes fixed on the subject qua
indeterminate. The following quotation may be considered, I believe, as a statement on principles by
Lacan: "If you keep hold of this initial structure, you will avoid giving yourself up to some partial
aspect of the question of the unconscious- as, for example, that it is the subject, qua alienated in his
history, at the level at which the syncope of discourse is joined with his desire. You will see that, more
radically, it is in the dimension of a synchrony that you must situate the unconscious- at the level of
being, but in the sense that it can spread over everything, that is to say, at the level of the subject of the
enunciation, in so far as, according to the sentences, according to the modes, it loses itself as much as it
finds itself again, and in the sense that, in an interjection, in an imperative, in an invocation, even in a
hesitation, it is always the unconscious that presents you with its enigma, and speaks- in short, at the
level at which everything that blossoms in the unconscious spreads, like mycelium (fungus), as Freud
says about the dream, around a central point. It is always a question of the subject qua indeterminate"
(ibid).
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belongs to being, and man, whether male or female, must accept having it and not
having it, on the basis of the discovery that he isn't it. It is here that is inscribed the
final Spaltung by which the subject articulates himself in the Logos..." [Lacan 1961,
p. 277],
The phallus is inscribed in the dialectic of signification: "It is the signifier intended to
designate as a whole the effects of the signified, in that the signifier conditions them
by its presence as a signifier" [Lacan 1958, p. 285], It represents the entire oedipal
drama of the desire of the Other, hence it becomes a 'privileged signifier' for its access
to desire and demand and the elusive 'wholeness' of being. This is how Lacan
describes the effect of the phallus as signifier: "A condition of complementarity is
produced in the establishment of the subject by the signifier- which explains the
Spaltung in the subject and the movement of intervention in which the 'spitting' is
completed.
Namely:
(1) that the subject designates his being only by barring everything he signifies, as it
appears in the fact that he wants to be loved for himself, a mirage that cannot be
dismissed as merely grammatical (since it abolishes discourse);
(2) that the living part of that being in the urverdrangt (primal repressed) finds its
signifier by receiving the mark of the Verdrangung (repression) of the phallus (by
virtue ofwhich the unconscious is language) [Lacan 1958, p. 288].
Because the phallus is a signifier, the subject has access to it in the Other and it is
because of that fact that Lacan calls it 'the ratio of the other's desire' which does not
have to do with finding it there but with discovering that the Other, too, is subject to
the same signifying Spaltung. The importance of this statement must be appreciated
against the other Freudian/Lacanian assumption that the Other is initially taken to be
complete and capable of satisfying any need. Lacan situates the branching off of
normality and illness at the moment of discovery that the Other (mother) does not
have it: "This is the moment of the experience without which no symptomatic
consequence (phobia) or structural consequence (penisneid [penis envy]) relating to
the castration complex can take effect. Here is signed the conjunction of desire, in that
the phallic signifier is its mark, with the threat or nostalgia of lacking it" [Lacan 1958,
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p. 289], The transition from being to having or not having the phallus will on the one
hand give reality to the subject and on the other derealize the relations signified.
The word 'desire' has appeared a few times in our discussion, in relation to the mother
and the phallus. Indeed, it is the term Lacan uses to designate what is essentially
lacking, unsatisfiable, left out and consequently inexhaustible in relation to sexuality
and being. Desire is different from 'need', the organic manifestation of a lack (ex:
hunger). It is also different from 'demand', the verbal manifestation ofa lack. Sheridan
relates the three terms in the following way: "The human individual sets out with a
particular organism, with certain biological needs, which are satisfied by certain
objects. What effects does the acquisition of language have on these needs? All speech
is demand; it presupposes the Other to whom it is addressed, whose very signifiers it
takes over in its formulation. By the same token, that which comes from the Other is
treated not so much as a particular satisfaction of a need, but rather as a response to an
appeal, a gift, a token of love. There is no adequation between the need and the
demand that conveys it; indeed, it is the gap between then that constitutes desire, at
once particular like the first and absolute like the second. Desire (fundamentally in the
singular) is a perpetual effect of symbolic articulation. It is not an appetite: it is
essentially ex-centric and insatiable. That is why Lacan co-ordinates it not with the
object that would seem to satisfy it, but with the object that causes it..." [Lacan 1973
(translator's note), p. 279],
Metonymy, metaphor: an example of the manifestation of desire
In "The direction of treatment and the Principles of its Power" the relation of desire
and demand is further explained by Lacan. Demand in its oldest form, says Lacan,
produces the primary identification with the mother, brought about by her
omnipotence, "the identification that not only suspends the satisfaction of needs from
the signifying apparatus, but also that which fragments them, filters them, models
them upon the defiles of the structure of the signifier" [Lacan 1961, p. 255], Caught in
the network of the signifier the want-to-be is expressed in the form of 'want-to- be-
the-phallus-of-the-mother'. It is again the loss of object of this and the primordial lack
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that will keep up desire and will establish the phallus in the position of the privileged
signifier. Lacan observes: "Desire is that which is manifested in the interval that
demand hollows within itself, in as much as the subject, in articulating the signifying
chain, brings to light the want-to-be, together with the appeal to receive the
complement from the Other, if the Other, the locus of speech, is also the locus of this
want, or lack...it is also what is evoked by any demand beyond the need that is
articulated in it, and it is certainly that of which the subject remains all the more
deprived to the extent that the need articulated in the demand is satisfied" [Lacan
1961, p. 263],
According to the description of desire by Lacan we understand that it is inaccurate to
talk of the satisfaction of desire- in the singular. Desire is expressed and its
satisfaction is indirect. We could say that desire is essentially satisfied by being
always expressed and by always proceeding (for the unconscious) into language. This
brings us to the more practical aspect of the psychoanalytic usage of language and in
order to understand how language conveys desire we need to take a small step back, to
the Freudian mechanisms of condensation and displacement which in Lacanian
terminology are assimilated into metonymy and metaphor, "metaphor is based upon
relations of similarity between terms and metonymy upon relations of contiguity
[Lemaire 1970, p. 33]. The classical example for metaphor is a line form Victor
Hugo's poem Booz Endormi:
'Sa gerbe n'etait point avare ni haineuse' ('His sheaf was not miserly or spiteful')
for which Lemaire commends: "The signification generated by the metaphor is that of
an advent to paternity, that of fertility. If a spark of fertility springs from the
heteroclite arrangement of the terms: gerbe, haine, avare, it is because gerbe, the
flower of summer, is associated by similarity with phallus, a symbol of fertility- or
even with its outline- and with love and generosity. One could certainly - and
correctly- say that phallus and gerbe are metonymically connected with father (the
part from the whole) but the existence of some metonymic connections within the
'vertical' associations in no way contradicts linguistic thought, so long as one remains
within the same register of thought" (ibid).
Metonymy is defined by the following example: 'have a cup' (container for content):
"The substitution here is made because of the relation between the tea one drinks and
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the cup containing it. The contiguity expresses the leap, the displacement from
register of thought to a neighbouring register" (ibid).
In 'The instant of the letter' Lacan returns to the horizontal and vertical dimension of
language in order to introduce metonymy and metaphor (explained shortly): "we have
shown the effects not only of the elements of the horizontal signifying chain, but also
of its vertical dependencies in the signified, divided into two fundamental structures
called metonymy and metaphor.
We can symbolise them by, first:
that is to say, the metonymic structure, indicating that it is the connection between
signifier and signifier that permits the elision in which the signifier installs the lack-
of-being in the object relation, using the value of 'reference back' possessed by
signification in order to invest it with the desire aimed at the very lack it supports. The
sign - placed between ( ) represents here the maintenance of the bar - which, in the
original algorithm, marked the irreducibility in which, in relations between signifier
and signified, the resistance of signification is constituted.
the metaphoric structure indicating that it is in the substitution of signifier for signifier
that the effect of signification is produced that is creative or poetic, in other words,
which is the advent of the signification in question. The sign + between () represents
here the crossing of the bar - and the constitutive value of the crossing for the
emergence of signification" [Lacan 1957, p. 164],
Wilden explains the two terms by referring to Freud. Fie notes that Lacan replaces the
Saussurean algorithm with his own formulations in order to fit the psychoanalytic
repression, condensation and displacement of signifiers (Vortellungen) into the
linguistic diacritical theory of meaning.
Metonymy and metaphor correspond to displacement and substitution. Thus,
metonymy is displacement from signifier to signifier, but since the original term,
which is latent, remains unexplained, it corresponds to the censorship's seeking to




of Freud's classical cases, 'Wespe' (wasp) was a distortion for SP, the patient's
initials). The meaning or significance of the original term (unconscious) is still to be
discovered; hence the retention of the bar. Moreover metonymy, by displacement of
the 'real' object of the subject's desire onto something apparently insignificant,
represents the manque d' etre (lack of being) which is constituent of desire itself...In
this way need becomes (unconscious) desire by 'passing through the defiles of the
signifier' and becomes manifest as (conscious) demand.
The metaphorical structure works differently. As a substitution the S' accounts for the
'passage of the signifier into the signified- that is, it accounts for the repression of the
particular signifier, S. The patent or manifest term represents the (distorted) 'return of
the repressed' (the symptom), equivalent in everyday way to the mechanism involved
in the poetic metaphor, where it is what is not said that gives the metaphor its
evocative power. This crossing of the bar is constitutive of the emergence of
'signification' [Wilden 1968, p. 242-3],
Let us follow the metonymic course of desire to that elusive past via another example
from Freud. It is the dream of the botanical monograph discussed by Lemaire. Freud
says:
"I had written a monograph on a certain plant. The book lay before me and I was at
the moment turning over a folded coloured plate. Bound up in each copy there was a
dried specimen of the plant, as though it had been taken from a herbarium" [Freud
1900, p. 254],
By his own associations Freud links the dream to certain elements of the previous day
and from that he retrieves the memory of having seen a monograph on cyclamens, his
wife's favourite flower. The associations now become interesting: Freud reproaches
himself for forgetting to buy his wife her favourite flowers while she had cooked
artichokes for him, his favourite dish. Artichokes and pulling them apart leaf by leaf
in order to eat them brings up the memory from childhood of Freud and his sister
tearing up a coloured book with infinite joy. When the associations deriving from the
particular trend stop Freud turns to another manifest element of the dream, the
'herbarium', which brings up a memory from adolescence, the headmaster of his
school having assigned the senior students the task of clearing the herbarium of little
worms (Bticherwurm: bookworms) that had found their way into it. Another memory
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follows: "of the day when Freud's father gave him his Bible, the thing he held dearest
to him in the world, 'except his spouse'...Freud hurriedly devoured it, rather as a
bookworm would do" [Lemaire 1970, p. 172], The ideas are put together in the
following way: "It becomes clear that in Freud's unconscious, his father's gift of the
Bible was interpreted as being the gift of his wife. Freud assimilates his mother to the
Book, and hence to all books. The Bucherwurm is Freud himself, with his passionate
interest in books (since the tearing of the book); as a fertile discoverer he devours
them, tears them apart and violates them...The unconscious wish to commit incest (to
be a passionate discoverer of his mother) is sublimated, thanks to the gift of the Bible
and the scene of tearing up the book, into a passion for reading and scientific
discovery. This is the wish satisfied by the dream, since the dream shows Freud to be
the author of a monograph, but we have shown the unconscious detours through
which a more primitive wish comes to light at the same time in this dream" [Lemaire
1970, p. 173], A network of signifiers can be reconstituted (ibid):
cyclamen






From a Lacanian point of view this example shows the alienation of desire in
language as it 'travels' from signifier to signifier and is diverted to eternal
sublimations, the desire to make fertile discoveries and to write books [Lemaire 1970,
p. 196]. It always evokes that distant desire of the mother, more accurately the desire
to be what she lacks, the phallus. Lemaire commends: "Articulated with signifiers,
expressed in words, the desire can never be satisfied since, beneath this significant
articulation, there still remains the primal need which aims at fusion with the mother.
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Having been caught in the signifier by the paternal metaphor (the interdiction evoked
by the Bible), this need can aim at satisfaction only by following the signifying
'concatenation'. It thus becomes metonymic, a reflection, that is, of itself and it is,
therefore, always elsewhere, eternally straining after a more adequate substitute for
the lost object" [Lemaire 1970, p. 196].
Freud spoke of the unconscious, condensation and displacement, the Oedipus complex
and the mechanism of repression. Lacan introduced the theory of language into the
field of psychoanalysis, said that the unconscious is structured like a language, and
promoted the figures of speech, metonymy and metaphor in particular, into main tools
of analysis. With Lacan language is everything and everything is language, questions
and answers are formulated in it.
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PART 2 SCENE ONE: A BEGINNING
Scene one is the mother of all scenes. It is formative in many ways. The 'character' is
shaped here, out of questions like: 'who am I?', 'what does my desire mean to you?'
and the replies elicited from the other. It resembles the genesis of the unconscious not-
out-of- oneness and unity30 and, like the unconscious, it receives the mark of the
phallus, the signifier of an unfinished adventure in which the drama of human desire is
briefly (unceremoniously) condensed. The important point is that the adventure
receives the blessing of the signifier. In the place of ignorance, the total ignorance of
facts and identity, the stagnation of no-knowledge, no-idea, no-progress rises the
urgency of the traumatic encounter, the unbelievable blasphemous news and the
strangeness of its implications. Desire begins to move again. It is engendered and set
in motion by the same power that tears it apart and threatens to destroy it. It springs
out of the crack-in-the-wall of the god's perfection and self-sufficiency and demands
the death of the subject who always eternally anticipates that very moment, when he
will be finally asked to sacrifice his life and prove his devotion.
The chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part we will discuss the key issues of
Scene One from the point of view of the unconscious and the return of the repressed.
First, we will discuss Ion's self-introduction, his morning song (11. 82-183); second,
the meeting with Creusa, up to the point she tells him the secret of the rape; third, the
last moments of the meeting and the failure of communication due to the news.
In the second part we will discuss the consequences of Ion and Creusa's first meeting
in terms of desire and the Other and we will examine the future implications of the
news of the rape on Ion. We will argue that the misunderstanding of the father's desire
and the enmity that develops between Ion and Creusa have their roots in the refusal to
accept the news of the rape as true.
Ion's Morning Song and the first Meeting with Creusa
Self introduction
We will be looking into Ion's self-presentation from two perspectives. The first deals
with the terms in which he describes himself, the words of his presentation and their
significance. The second deals with the effect of his speech, what it stands for and
what it reveals as a complete piece of spoken discourse addressed 'to whom it may
concern'.
Ion's self introduction is a mixture of self-aggrandisement and degradation31. One
moment he is the happy son of Apollo (1. 136), the next he is a nameless servant (53/
102, 51/ 131, 135).
"I have no father or mother; / All I would owe to them I give to Apollo's temple /
which nursed my orphaned childhood" (1.110-11) and also:
"Slave to no mortal master, / But an eternal god, I am exalted, / Toil without
weariness in praise andprayer" (1. 130-5) and also:
"I am Apollo's servant and he is my protector; / Then I will do his bidding/And never
cease to serve him" (1. 182-3)32.
The eager servant defines his existence through his labour. His name is his labour. His
gratitude is his labour. His reward is his labour.
Submission and withdrawal before the father/god motivates his behaviour to others as
well. He addresses the other servants with a series of imperatives, playing furtively
with the authority inspired by the father:
31Hamilton [1985] considers Ion a priest of Apollo but also draws attention to the conflict between the
exhalted official position and the menial tasks he performs (p. 58). He also highlights the difference
between a personal and a popular piety (p. 72) which is, 1 believe, particularly relevant to our case.
deGrummond [1983] highlights Euripides' interest in psychological (rather than physical realism) and
shows (in the case of Heracles) how the opening lines of the main character or hero set the
psychological 'key' more or less and predisposes the audience for what is to follow by utilising the
'subjective' aspects of reality.
32 All translations in this Thesis are by Vellacott [1954] unless otherwise indicated.
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"Go to the Castallian spring; / wash in its silvery eddies, / and return cleansed to the
temple. / Guardyour lipsfrom offence"
He threatens the birds that fly over the temple by exhibiting the weapons of the god,
the bow and the arrows:
"Keep clear of the temple walls and the roof /... take care I will shoot (again).../ if
you will not obey me, / The sweet notes ofyour song will drown in blood... there must
be no uncleanness here" (1. 155 - 179).
The daily tasks are carried out with excessive zeal. Beyond responsibility these
imperatives generate his own obsession with cleanliness and purity. They are all
devoted to the father and represent what Ion is always talking about, endless devotion
in words and acts. Submission opens and ends his speech, as Ion celebrates the unique
privilege of being a slave to Apollo.
The servant's gratitude to the master goes together with silence, ignorance of identity,
namelessness and a general fear for blasphemy and pollution. In Ion's presentation the
temple appears to be not just a pure shrine but a sanitised environment that reflects its
purity back to its residents, and for this reason the sudden outburst of aggression
against the birds seems incongruous and exaggerated. Looking at the whole song we
notice that the three themes, the glory of Apollo and his shrine, Ion's namelessness
and the return of the birds are repeated again and again. It appears that purity separates
'the inside' from 'the outside'. 'Inside' is the familiar surroundings of the temple, the
repeated morning ritual, the self-guarded cleanliness, the continuous attempt to be
pure. The world 'outside' the temple frustrates this attempt and preserves it at the same
time. Ion cannot control what comes from outside but in focusing his attention on that,
he misses the significance ofwhat passes his lips unguarded.
Let us examine the movement of Ion's speech and the vocabulary of his self-
presentation.
There are two main poles of attraction or interest. The first is his relation to Apollo,
the second is sexuality.
Apollo is the Father who wants nothing, and lacks nothing. To Ion he is not just
master-Apollo but a figure comparable to the father of the early oedipal stage. He is
the object of love and the source of identification. But the relationship is strange and
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unilateral. Being larger than life, with no desires and no demands, no imperfections
and no rivals, this distant father shows no interest in Ion who is reduced to repeating
his own offer of love and devotion for ever. Considered as a series of isolated words,
Ion's vocabulary expresses his total devotion. The effect of the speech, if taken as an
attempt to say 'something' that goes beyond devotion, reveals the opposite, an
aggressive almost self- destructive disposition and an absolute frustration.
Ion says: "coq yap appxcop owraxcop xs ysycot; zovq 0pe\|/avxa<; <borPot> vaovc, 0spa7isuco"
[I have no mother or father; All I would owe to them I give to Apollo's temple, which
nursed my orphan childhood], (1. 109-11).
Next, he begins to praise Apollo's laurel, the god's symbol and the material of his
broom33 (1. 1 12-25). Praise of laurel, the plant of Apollo and the material of his
broom. It cleans the floors of the temple and grows in immortal gardens watered by
everlasting water. Ion uses that laurel to clean every single day.
The obsession with the ritual reveals its causes. Ion identifies with the laurel because
it is the god's plant. Ion is the laurel, the material his broom is made of. He is one of
the symbols Apollo is associated with. He offers himself as a love-able object to the
father. Beyond that, he joins the namelessness of slavery with the immortality of the
symbol-laurel and escapes the embarrassment of his status by locating himself in the
timeless repetition of the daily duties. The 'laurel' is the knot-signifier of an
undetermined signification, one in which Ion tries to locate himself not in terms of
illegitimacy but in terms of being special. The laurel is the difficult signifier34 of his
purity and his privilege, what he would rather be in order not to be called an
Vellacott's translation is very 'vivid: "Come, little broom, of fresh and lovely leaves / Gathered from
the immortal laurel-groves / Sacred foliage fed by unfailing waters / That gush from myrtle-thickets-
come my broom / Used for Apollo's sacred hearth within this ritual task I offer to Apollo....blessed
be thy name, Apollo" (1. 112-25). In the text we represent some of the possible meanings of the laurel-
symbol in his speech.
34 The laurel is a 'difficult' signifier, a dense symbol: of the woman, Daphne, who defended her purity,
of the uncontrollable lust of Apollo, of Ion's own mark of excellence, of his desire to be something
even if that implies his death and his turning into a wooden object - to mention but a few of the
functions of an 'eternal' symbol.
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illegitimate nobody. Whether Apollo replies or even notices the little game is
irrelevant. The essential thing is that Ion invents a signification in which he
participates with an exceptional role.
In the lines following the laurel-praise Ion presents himself as the son of Apollo (1.
128-40). This should be a wonderful example of tragic irony for all those who know
that he is, indeed, the son of Apollo. From a psychoanalytic point of view this shows
how imperative desire is: it remains attached to the object that sustains it, even if it
only means that it will be disappointed again and again.
Praise ofApollo / blessed is my toil / better a servant to a god than to a mortal (1.
131-3). The unexpressed idea of any family relation is renounced and repressed; the
success of repression allows the idea to return as an innocent joke; the attachment to
Apollo is preferable to any other family:
Iwill not cease to serve you/1 call Apollo 'myfather'- goodfor me (1. 135-6)
Different translations have been suggested for the line35:
'the name ofPhoebus, lord ofthe temple, that brings blessing to me, I call by the name
Father' or
'the bounty ofPhoebus I call by the name ofFather' or
'the name ofFather, which is serviceable (axpsAijuov) to me, that ofPhoebus, the god
ofthis temple, I repeat' (p. 79).
It is possible that Ion offers his services in exchange for using Apollo's name. It is
possible that the name 'father' disguises sexual attachment, or even that Ion knows full
well that he only 'plays' with the name of father as he plays with the bows and arrows
that he is unable to use. The word incpskipov (useful) suggests a practical aspect. It
seems to subtract something from Ion's romanticism. It seems to voice a demand for a
better life which is not entirely covered by the eager submission to the non-desire of
the self-sufficient god.
In all cases, presenting himself first as parentless, then as a love object (laurel) and
then imagining himself to be the son of Apollo, Ion shows that his dependence on the
god involves him in more than one way. I would suggest that the power of the line lies
in the obscurity of meaning which oscillates between the useful and the gratificatory /
See Owen [1939, p. 79] for a discussion of the three translations.
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playful usage of the name. The oscillation between usefulness and gratification, again,
reveals the lack of real support, the need for continuous motivation and the
awkwardness of the situation. Ion is under constant pressure (by himself) to keep
proving and justifying his existence by his labour, always careful of his own spoken
next line, fending off the danger of blasphemies, blurring the line between a demand
for recognition and an 'innocent' figure of speech.
Sexuality, the other interest, returns from outside. It emerges as Ion suspends the
chant to Apollo and his attention is drawn by the birds flying over the temple.
Gradually the speech builds up into a display of aggression against the uncontrollable
birds.
In lines 145- 184 Ion's interest is diverted from the theme of purity: he states his
intention to fetch water from the spring. He suspends this task in order to scare away
the birds. He threatens to kill them and, addressing the birds, tells them to go away
and mind their children or procreate. Then he is overcome by shame for thinking
about killing the birds because they are Zeus's messengers.36
Sexuality and uncleanness come together. While Ion avoids miasma by not killing the
birds, he is already excited enough to become aggressive and betray the upset caused
by any mention of sexuality. This outburst of emotion is better appreciated against the
background of the previous part, the play of words about Apollo's paternity, from
where excitement lingers on. The hidden thoughts escape his guard. The father-son
dyad re-emerges but it is now sneered at in the form of the birds. Ion unwittingly
exposes himself to the impurities he so carefully tries to avoid. In the middle of
shouting out his purity and renouncing sexual thoughts they come back to him, from
outside, from somewhere else, from his own rhythm and vocabulary that is only
meant to keep them away.
The birds must go away to mind their offspring (or to 'procreate') he says. But, then,
metaphorically speaking, he must clean their mess and fall from grace. The
responsible-for-purity son of Apollo is swiftly transformed to the nameless servant
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who cleans bird droppings. The pressure of reality cuts short the exaltation of the
morning song which turns into an aggressive, embarrassing, self-punishing display of
disappointment for the impure thoughts. The loss of control in the chant is reflected in
the content of the last part: uncontrollable sexuality, dirt, parentlessness. This return
of the repressed and the mounting of repression at the same time 'impregnate' Ion's
speech with half-concealed blasphemies making him all the more cautious and all the
more obsessed with cleanliness and purity, the somatic aspect of which is just the
representative of the corresponding intellectual virtue in which he constantly fails.
At the opening scene Ion introduces himself with some very controversial
characteristics. He literally has to invent his self-presentation since he cannot expect
the usual support from a socially established 'I'. Ion's itinerary in words starts with a
complete effacement and dislocation and ignorance of identity. His speech is
punctuated by the repetition of the words 'pain' and 'labour'. It is full of declarations of
eager submission, gratitude and joy and playful assumptions of the Name of the
Father. It is a song of happiness and purity, order and cleanliness and ritual propriety
which 'flows' with the sincerity of Ion's exaltation.
Between the lines it is an altogether different story. There he loses the thread of his
thoughts and the speech is distracted by the arrival of birds, by the duties of the day
and by the frequent returns of un-expressed desires. There Ion falls victim to his own
eagerness. He stirs his song towards impure subjects which he hardly manages to
suppress. He wants to be a servant, then more than a servant, then a servant again. He
wants to be the indispensable object-symbol of purity and he wants to be the son of
Apollo. He renounces the uncontrollable sexuality responsible for his existence37 and
he degrades the function of procreation into an impure characteristic of the animal
kingdom. Swallowed up in hasty silence, suspended in badly concealed protests of
innocence, the desire to be necessary is annihilated by the absolute self-sufficiency of
36 Owen [1939, p. 81] draws our attention to the fact that all the birds mentioned are symbols of gods,
notably Apollo and his father Zeus, and also that Ion does not care whether they drop dirt at other
temples, not even at Apollo's birthplace at Delos, so long as they stay away from Delphi.
o "JJ' Ion does not know his parents. In his discussion with Creusa he says that he is perhaps the product
of'injustice' or error (1. 325) of uncontrollable sexuality in our vocabulary.
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the father. Ion is no one as no one needs him. He is everyone as the order of the world
needs him.
The idiosyncratic relation to Apollo emerges from the progress of his speech. From
the psychoanalytic point of view Ion is at the cross-roads of structural change
(approaching maturity), but for the moment all the major concerns of his existence,
are condensed in one person: the father god. There is no other referent (no mother) in
the introductory monologue. Ion wants to be loved by the father and timidly tries to
identify with him (using his name and weapons). But Apollo is an unusual love-object
and an impossible-to-imitate figure. And if maturity implies relinquishing the love
object of the past then we might ask: how can one relinquish what one never had?
How can the Oedipus complex or any similar structure ever set desire in motion when
the Father has crushed the narcissism of the child by completely ignoring it? Ion is left
to identify not with a characteristic of the father but only with objects of his cult
(laurel and weapons) thus returning for ever to the point of departure, of offering
himself as a love-object to his indifference. He has discovered his desire in the desire
of the Other but the Other desires nothing. And instead of seeing his desire vanishing
he performs his own self-effacement: I do not desire, I am pure. His narcissism, for we
have to assume some sort of ego-supporting shred of narcissism, is only sustained by
a feeble unrecognised desire: to see a crack of imperfection in the absolute splendour
of the sun-god, to be more than meets the eye.
Crushed under the omnipotence and omni-indifference of the father38 Ion tries to map
his desire as devotion to someone who may not even notice it, hence coming up
against his own privation / objectlessness and the need to renew his faith non stop.
The father is an object of both life-supporting and sexual significance. From this point
of view Ion is still in the pregenital early phase of mixed ego and sexual aims. He
supports his desire in relation to this multivalent object by sustaining identity, love
and symbolic position- the main topics of interest. He then renounces them all in form
and starts from the begining. The fear lurking behind his words is a fear of division.
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The scenario of Apollo's paternity mixed with the erotic elements of devotion, 'mad'
but lived, locate Ion in a precariously pure state, which, despite its anxieties, allows
him to assume an identity in place of the missing one. In the pure environment of the
shrine, uncontrolled sexuality, the twin of namelessness, is systematically ignored and
the effort is concentrated on maintaining that fragile balance. Purity avoids discussing
its disgraces, excrement and sexuality, avoids asking questions, knowing, inquiring
and generally disturbing the present eternal order. But purity can only be sustained in
a mythical world.
Interpersonal relations
In psychoanalysis the desire of the mother forms the child's desire. Ion and Creusa
form each other's desire from the beginning39 of the play. An identification and
solidarity are established immediately, based both on the unusual topics and the style
of their discourse. Also responsible for this early identification is Apollo's strangeness
and indifference which remain unexpressed in the background.
We can divide the dialogue into two parts: in the first (lines 238-329 discussed in this
section) we examine Ion and Creusa's solidarity-in-suffering. In the second (lines 330-
400 discussed in the next part) we look into the effect of the unexpected news of the
rape.
The two parts together resemble the structure of the monologue, rising tension, the
return of the repressed and simultaneously the return of repression.
In this section we will discuss Ion and Creusa's first meeting, its content and
significance. We will apply the same principles, that is, look into what is said and how
it is said. We will also examine the significance of their first meeting for the economy
38 The importance of the larger-than-life father is explained by Lacan in the discussion of Schreber's
case [Lacan 1959, pp. 199-221], It is to the benefit of Creusa and Ion that the paternal figure, even that
of Apollo and Erectheus, not just Xuthus, is somewhat 'denigrated' in the end.
39 Conacher [1967, p. 268] speaks of the "unconscious" affinity between Ion and Creusa but does not
explain what he means. Wolff [1965, p. 170] also speaks on an unconscious sympathy between them.
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of desire which now finds the crack of imperfection that will set it in motion-
imperfect though it will be.
Four major elements stand out in this part: the discovery of 'beyond what meets the
eye', the mythical story of curiosity and punishment, the reproduction of ignorance
and the impossibility of ever finding what one looks for, the object of one's desire.
Nothing would have happened had it not been for Creusa's tears. They suggest a lack
which will not be adequately accounted for in the process of the discourse. And
although her own family history and present childlessness would justify her sorrow,
the old memory (1. 250) responsible for the tears instigates Ion's curiosity till the
moment it is transformed into 'the other's desire' literally, the other woman's desire for
whom Creusa visits the temple secretly.
The excited curiosity fuels a symmetrical (imaginary) discourse of questions and
answers. Ion asks a series of questions to which he seems to know the answers
already. Then Creusa asks her questions and Ion is unable to answer. The dialogue is
kept at an invariable line-for-line exchange, which seems to establish a rhythm, a
lulling repetition. Questions are asked and dropped before receiving a proper answer,
indicating that the focus is not so much on receiving information but on reinforcing
already established views on happiness and identity.
For Ion anyone who can answer: "Who are you? Where do you come from, and what
is your family? What name may I call you?" (1. 228-9) ought to be happy. Under the
influence of his thoughts and his preoccupation with the questions40 of identity he
ignores Creusa's remark that family and good name did not make her happy: "thus far
I am fortunate" she says (1. 264). Instead of paying attention to that, Ion will embark
on exploring, not to say experiencing, Creusa's goodfortune by making her repeat the
facts he already knows. The effect of his inquiry will be uncanny- in the
psychoanalytic sense of the word41.
40 Walsh [1978, p. 302] notes Ion's inclination to link happiness with status and birth. Further on he
claims that despite being ignorant of the noble birth he unconsciously shows his nobility" (p. 304) but
does not explain how this is done.
41 In 'The Uncanny' [1919, p. 370] Freud related the feeling of uneasiness (uncanny) with the return of
something familiar that has been repressed. In our case it is not so much Ion's knowledge about Athens
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Ion asks: "...your father's ancestor sprung from the earth?" (1. 267). Creusa insists:
"My descentfrom him has not helpedme" (1. 268).
Instead of appeasing his curiosity her enigmatic answers make it stronger. Although
they talk to each other, Ion is continuously ignored by being given elusive answers.
Just like the indifferent Apollo, Creusa reproduces his slave-status by extending his
ignorance and sustaining his dependence. The game of questions and answers,
however, is kept up because neither complies 'to the point' of the other's demand: Ion
does not stop asking relentless questions and Creusa neither refuses to reply nor
provides clear answers. An impression that there is something more than meets the
eye is created.
Curiosity feeds on itself, sustains itself by asking non-stop and remaining unsatisfied
but for the certainty that the other knows more than he is eager to reveal. The desire to
know figures undisguised as intellectual curiosity. It concerns something 'innocent', a
myth or a story, not sexuality anyway. But it asks for information that it already has,
aiming not at receiving it exactly but at gaining access to the truth of the Other which
eludes even the most successful spot-on questions. This desire to know about the
Other's desire is indirectly answered from within the myth of Creusa's family. It is a
story of death, sexuality and curiosity which ought to deter him or anyone from asking
any further questions.42
Ion is told that the guardians of Erichthonius, the daughters of Cecrops, were punished
for their curiosity and for disobeying Athena's order not to open the box in which
Erichthonius was growing. This is a story of blood with the obvious threat that anyone
who gains access to the secrets of procreation is punished with death. Sexual
knowledge is here represented by the desire to see the contents of the box. To want to
open this Pandora's box does nothing less than mark mankind with the results of
curiosity and the eagerness to satisfy desire despite death.
and Creusa's family story that impresses her but the sequence of the questions that 'scan' her life with a
near- chronological order.
42 The desire would be satisfied indirectly by the prohibition and warning contained in the story:
anyone who gets curious about such matters is punished with death. Normally, the threat of castration
would be enough to dissuade the child/Ion from asking more questions and would redirect his sexual
interests to other causes.
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Ion is not deterred. He ignores or misses the significance of the warning and proceeds:
He asks about Creusa's own father: "Is it true, or merely a tale, that your father
Erechtheus killed you all?" (1. 277), "And how did you escape their fate?" (1. 279) to
which Creusa answers that he had to do it and that she survived because she was a
baby in her mother's arms. While the daughters of Cecrops are punished for curiosity,
the daughters of Erechtheus are sacrificed to save their city. In the family history the
violence of punishment precedes voluntary sacrifice. The transformation occurring
within the span of a generation leaves Creusa suspended between the punishment and
the consent of the females of her line, two layers of 'history' tied up with the
obligation of death.
The story continues: Erechtheus is swallowed by the Earth for killing a son of
Poseidon [Owen 1939, p. 93], The king is buried near the grottoes of Apollo and
Dionysus. This suspends Creusa's duty to be like the females of her line and preserves
her sacrifice for another occasion. She is the last woman of her line.
A new line of questions is pursued. It concerns Apollo. On asking Creusa whether the
god is worshipped there, he receives an enigmatic reply: "It is nothing. The caves
there hold a certain shameful secret that I know of (1. 288). Nothing more is said and
Ion appears to drop the issue, which again ties the answer to Creusa's secrecy.
A new set of questions begins. Who is your (Athenian) husband? Ion learns that the
husband is not Athenian but nevertheless noble, a descendant of Zeus, and the reason
he got Creusa as his wife is because she was given to him by their city as a reward for
helping them against the Euboians. The last daughter of Erechtheus, who had
survived, sacrificed herself in a different way to save her city, she married a non
Athenian. All males are associated with death. All women's lot involves a sacrifice.
A new set of questions begins: why are you here, are you both for the same reason?
To which Creusa answers "we have no children". Then we have the following lines:
"You mean that you never bore a child all your life? /Never any child - Apollo knows
how true this is" (1. 305 -6). Again Creusa is placed at a (socio-cultural) dead end: of
the unfulfilled traditional feminine role.
Ion locates Creusa at the end of all the converging lines of his inquiries. She is the
missing element, a lack, the last in line, the key to all the previous lines and a
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paradoxical presence. She is the queen of Athens, the child, the daughter and the wife,
the knot of all traces, with which he is fascinated: "who is that woman?" he will later
wonder. She becomes the object of his newly found desire and a near-mirror of
himself. She is like him and yet different. He can identify with her 'likeness', he can
respond to her familiar lack (childlessness). Ion is like the child who senses the lack of
the phallus in the mother and offers himself as the phallus, identifies with the
imaginary complement of her lack and shapes his existence around this fundamental
alienation.
But we must not forget that it is Ion who has immobilised Creusa at the meeting point
of the past, the present and the future with the content and the style of his questions.
Relentless questions referring to men and half answers have made Creusa an
evocative, veiled 'nothing' pregnant with meaning.43 As the figure of Apollo
momentarily fades into the background, desire emerges with the willingness to help
this woman- to serve her perhaps.
Creusa picks up the tension of Ion's discourse and re-directs the aporia to its sender.
Unable to answer 'who am I?' without referring to a line of losses, she will address the
same question to Ion: 'who are you?' Ion, who in the morning song oscillated between
43 Creusa's reduction to 'nothing', to being like Ion, is executed with uncanny precision. Ion
reproduces his desire to be absolutely necessary by performing a generation scanning, the backbone of
which is the topographical coincidence of the fragmentary information at the gaping mouth of the
chasm:
chasm (gap / cave) —> covers father
chasm —> covers shame
chasm —> grotto of Apollo
husband —> non Athenian, helper, receiver of gift, visitor at Delphi—> xenos, spectator, childless,
visitor twice to the holy grotto of Trophonios, chasm.
It is the same 'chasm' that appears in his speech and in the abandoned questions supported by the
excited sexual curiosity. As for Creusa, Ion's talent to be uncanny on simple questions that concern his
own lack of family has already drawn her discourse around the gravitational point of the 'rape' and her
own quest of identity, what, strictly speaking, prohibits her from speaking openly. Ion will be exposed
to a familiar story with no meaning, one which he has equally created by invoking the veiled answers
and easing off the repression of the next piece of speech.
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exhaltation and aggression, will be unable to respond with anything else but his own
aporia.
In the second part of the dialogue (1. 306- 329), in front of the other, Ion will have to
renounce his high aspirations or his desire to be important or more than meets the eye.
Creusa asks: "who are you /your mother is to be envied" (1. 308) "were you sold or
dedicated by someone / where do you live in here / how old were you when you
arrived / who brought you up / how have you been kept all these years / do you know
your parents at all?" And he answers: "They call me Apollo's slave, my lady, and so I
am. /1 know nothing except that I am said to belong to Apollo. /1 know neither my
father nor my mother. / My home is any part of the temple... /1 was brought up by
Apollo's priestess. I think of her as my mother. /1 am the child of some woman who
was wronged perhaps. / I am Apollo's slave; these clothes are all his. (To the
question 'why did you not try to find your parents') I have no evidence at all" (1. 309-
328).
Just as Ion was projecting his own interests in his questions so does Creusa. Ignoring
his admissions of ignorance Creusa will ask all the questions - down to the last one -
to which Ion cannot provide an answer.
Both of them can do nothing more than reproduce pain and shame because this is the
only reality they know. Both appear to speak their mind but the effect is invariably the
same. Ion gradually reduces Creusa from noble to childless woman and brings out the
fragility of her present position. Creusa reduces Ion from 'child of a proud mother' to
servant, to result of sin. The exchange of information degenerates into a gratuitous
repetition of 'nothing'. Disguised in sympathy, this unproductive communication
states only one thing: ignorance. Imagine them being stuck in an eternal exchange of
sympathy and commiserations.
At the moment their discourse is all used up and suspended, Ion and Creusa see their
desire retreating further and further away from any form of satisfaction. The
vulnerability of both is ascertained along with supremacy of the father. The 'more than
meets the eye' is swallowed up in the creation of identical cases of misery, at the end
of which no one but the omnipotent father commands all meaning. And as long as he
commands meaning and knowledge and truth they can be or have nothing for each
other.
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Then something unexpected happens. Something completely in line with the laws of
signification, the dynamics of repression and the return of the repressed. In place of
the discourse of consciousness, of the "I" that suffers from complete ignorance, there
returns the repressed secret of the Other's desire. It follows naturally from the
constraints of their discourse: since they cannot talk about their desire they will talk
about the desire of the Other. The story of the rape is in this sense an account of
Apollo's desire together with the frustration caused by his indifference and an attempt
to hold on to their own desire which is fading away unsatisfied.
Failure of communication
This is the immediate context in which the return of the repressed erupts. It passes the
guard of Creusa's lips with minimum repression; it's not about her, it's about a
friend44. The return of the repressed is Creusa's secret spelled out, unveiled. The
unusual news is contrasted to the rhythmic active / passive sway of the first part and
survives being swallowed up by this rhythm because it is too extraordinary, too
phallic to be contained.
Speech represents the rape, punishment for present sexual excitation and curiosity.
The rape news is the encounter with something unthinkable, it comes from out-of-
nowhere and it is a million times more intense than the sexuality suggested by the
hovering birds and a million times more polluting than their dirt. It changes reality
dramatically, shatters purity and the world of similar pains, shatters the unified
universe of no time and eternity into before and after. It creates time.
Ion unwittingly inserts himself into the maze of Creusa's story, promising to help,
seeing himself implicated in her childlessness, his parentlessness, Xuthus' descent
from Zeus, and all the small details that allow him to identify with the missing child,
the missing information and himself as missing / missed. The rekindled curiosity now
rushes forth to meet its satisfaction. At last Ion will be told more.
44 Standard case of negation cited by Freud [1925, pp. 437-42] is: 'it was not my mother' meaning 'it
was my mother'. The negation maintains the minimum repression that allows the signifier to emerge
without upsetting 'the order of the world'.
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'TIoiov, xi xpr^auG3; dog "U7iox)pyr|aco, ybvai" (1. 333) [what is it that you want my lady,
I will help you] says Ion, and without knowing he pledges more than his help. Creusa
will ask Ion for an impossible favour, to confront Apollo with his sin.
The reply to the appalling 'Apollo has raped a woman', is a fine example of the return
of the repressed.
Cre: "®oi|3co pvyryvai (pqai Tig cpi/.mv spcov" [Having had sex with Phoebus one ofmy
friends says]
Ion: "OoiP® ynvp ysyooaa; pi] A.sy', cb csvi]'1 [With Phoebus, woman having being?
You must not say it!] (1. 338-9)
Ion is trapped in a no-win situation. He will either have to confront Apollo with the
request or bury it. In both cases, whatever the outcome, he has lost his purity. He now
knows something about the Father's sexuality and it is dangerous knowledge, a secret.
The danger is reflected in his request to Creusa to abandon her request. The reason is
slightly odd and the generalisation too sweeping. The loss of purity supports it:
"oi)k 'eotiv ooxig ooi 7ipo(pr|tst>aei tabsI' [There is no one who will ask (act as go
between) this question for you] (1. 369).
Retracting his promise, re-establishing silence and purity, is in effect an effort to
repress Creusa's demand. Ion's disbelief threatens to immobilise him in a state of lost
purity which he will be trying to recapture ever after. It is in the effort to regain
Paradise Lost immediately that he will prohibit Creusa from asking. In fact with every
new step Ion removes himself further and further from his paradise of innocence. As if
it was not enough that he exceeded his duties by posing as the mediator of Apollo, he
now speaks in his place.
When Creusa claims that her friend suffered ever since the incident he wonders:
"Suffered? With a godfor her lover?" (1.342)
Ion's doubt is not unfounded. In myth it is an honour for a woman to be chosen by a
god and the fact is made public right away. But that woman has already kept it "secret
from the father" (1 340) - the referent of 'father' left wonderfully vague to
accommodate either the father of the child or hers.
The concern for Apollo's involvement in the story is succeeded by questions about the
fate of the child:
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"Where is he then? Is he alive? / Was there any blood on the ground? /How long is it
since the child was lost? / suppose that Apollo took him and brought him up secretly"
(11.345,351,353,357).
Considering the possibility that Apollo took care of the child already means that what
the woman says is not at all impossible. This is an implicit answer to the question first
raised about Apollo's involvement.
Ion's personal interest is made clear in the following line: "How sad! what you tell me
echoes my own sadness" (1. 359).
The voice of reason re-institutes repression upon whatever remains of Ion's innocence.
In fact it is quite 'charming' to see the child who was sacrificing itself in front of the
omni-indifferent father now speak on his behalf.
" Well, do you see that your case is very weak in one point... is Apollo to reveal what
he intends should remain a mystery?" (1.363/ 6).
In the end the return of the repressed erupts as irrational fear:
" That is what our folly would amount to, ifwe try to force a reluctant god to speak, to
give signs in sacrifice or in the flight ofbirds" (1. 371).
The imminent catastrophe is the price of curiosity, Ion's weakness. In fact curiosity is
traditionally, and in this case too, a feminine 'virtue'. The spectacular return of the
repressed in the form of a seemingly innocent weakness is reinforced by the language
of the body, in the ample references to seeing what one should not have seen and of
knowing what one should not have known (interdiction of knowledge). It is not
surprising, therefore, that the reply to rape comes from Ion's own self-defences,
imposing an even more impossible task, to inform the god or reverse, undo45, what
happened. It is easy to see that the answer lies in the direction of the assumption of the
punishment as usual, even in the most innocent form, the punishment of the present
curiosity.
More remarkable than the loss of innocence is the form of defence against the
meaning of the 'rape'. Ion refuses not the event itself but its place in any kind of
45 Freud [1926, pp. 274-8] explains that two main modes of symptom formation intent to a) undo what
has been done or b) isolate the ugly.
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discourse. He banishes the unfit piece of information out of mind and out of spoken
language, to the place that can hold it along with similar elements, to the unconscious.
The technique-guardian of purity is an old favourite: the sealed lips. Only it arrives
too late, after the repressed, the amazing piece of news of uncontrolled sexuality, has
broken into conscious discourse. Ion returns Creusa's demand to her: do as I say, obey
me, do not ask, drop your demand. In line with the in-action of the entire scene, Ion
suggests a course of action the success of which could only be guaranteed by the
other's eagerness to renounce his or her own desire.
Alternatively, to satisfy the other's desire means danger for life, death. Once again,
Creusa and Ion see their desire go unsatisfied and are told (by each other) to hold on
to that. What makes this little sacrifice unsatisfactory this time is not clear. May be it
is the 'right time' for change. May be the ways of the past are not efficient any more.
May be it is the fact that they have already wasted their only asset, their purity and
silence and having been each other's witness makes it difficult to pretend that
everything is as it used to be.
Creusa and Ion will develop a unique enmity. Not the mythical rivalry of the mother
and the son [Campbell 1956, Jung 1957] but the rivalry of the siblings for the love of
the Father. Their struggle will be to death, the same death they refused to serve in the
other's demand. Their desire will take the form of a race in time: to reach Apollo
A
before the other. Their futile battle will be to declare their innocence, the one just lost,
to the entire world since they cannot declare it to each other. Both Creusa and Ion will
be trying to find witnesses to their purity and to their affliction and in order to succeed
in that they will even accept the difficult task of serving other, more dangerous
desires.
The disastrous first meeting is suspended by the arrival of another Father, Xuthus.
External constraints impose the silence they did not manage to uphold. The entire first
scene is suppressed46.
We examined the first scene in terms of a fundamental unconscious characteristic, the
return of the repressed and the repression. In the first part. Ion's self presentation, the
46 'Suppressed': removed from consciousness and unresolved.
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return of the repressed reveals its sexual nature. The declaration of purity serves the
purposes of repression. In the second part, Creusa and Ion's early solidarity the return
of the repressed underlines Ion's uncanny questions and the upsurge of the sense of
loss in both interlocutors. In the third part, a consequence of the disappointment and
the failure of the previous one, the repressed returns in the form of unexpected
traumatic news.
The first scene establishes the problem of identity and being, Ion and Creusa's
inability to claim their rightful place in society (nameless slave, childless woman) and,
more importantly, to claim their own desire. Unable to express clearly what they want
they are condemned to seeing their desire- and the key to it- alienated, locked away, in
Apollo's silence. Together they briefly create a desire for each other which is swiftly
swallowed up by their ignorance and the fact that they recognise the Other (Apollo or
Father) as the only one capable of satisfying it. Thus desire is eternally suspended,
waiting for the favour of the Father, the refused love and the acknowledgement of the
child as worthy receiver of that gift.
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DISCUSSION: AN EXPLORATION OF THE OTHER'S DESIRE
How does one represent confusion? The confusion of desire that goes unnoticed in the
ideal sanctuary, Delphi, but shows itself as soon as it comes in contact with real
people? We shall try to describe it verbally, by exposing the consequences of the time
after the news of the rape.
The rape destroys the little boy's ideal of the perfect father, hence it is bound to cause
an aggressive reaction. It is a very special signifier holding together sexuality and
aggressiveness. It does not fit in the environment of ignorance and as such it is a
'wrong answer' to the half-formed early questions that concern sexuality. It is a
catalyst-signifier in the economy of desire and produces its effects from the margins
of the symbolise-able and represent-able; the 'rape' can never be talked about or its
news circulated or acknowledged as a form of sexuality. It hits the meaningless
questions and answers, Ion and Creusa's ignorance and aporia, it stops the exhalted /
am nothing/ I am everything and forces the question of the Other's desire to the
foreground. It comes from the other's (interlocutor's) verbal demand: do something for
me, help me.
Creusa's demand speaks itself. It 'radiates' desire to be received by the other along the
lines of: she says that but what does she want from me? It tells Creusa's truth: for her,
sexuality is an ugly experience of forced maturity. She may not say it in so many
words but she achieves the effect of it in a perfect way.
To Ion, the rape signifies the castration he would never admit47. It is reinforced by
other evidence of paternal cruelty. It is the same castration, threat and warning, that he
encountered in Creusa's family history. Women do not have a phallus because they are
punished. They are punished with death for their curiosity. As act of violence the rape
'makes sense' in a context of violence.
Ideally, the subject's recognition of castration in himself works in a 'normalising' way.
That's what the oedipus complex is about. The sexuality of the parents gradually
47 Lacan argues that the neurotic knows that he is castrated but refuses to admit it [Lacan 1960, p.
323],
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becomes a matter of indifference. But in this play it is too early for that while the
indifference of the parents is still the burning issue. In the place of the big
renunciation of the parents' sexuality that would put the subject's desire under a more
plausible perspective, there appears the most ambitious of all tasks: the adventure of
saving the god's honour. What ought to be done conceals what one wants. An
imaginary identification with a slight lack in the sufficient father suddenly creates a
purposeful future out of a timeless present. According to Ion's own interpretation of
the events, the matter of Creusa's accusation needs to be settled. This will be his guide
and his 'mission'. The desire to inform the god about what happens, is formed under
the pressure of his compulsive purity and namelessness. In his morning song, Ion had
presented himself as nothing less than the regulator of the order of the world and
nothing more than a nameless servant. Under the present circumstances he seizes the
opportunity to approach Apollo as someone else: as the representative who has spoken
on his behalf. This slight displacement of role and identity creates a certain sense of
purpose which is, strictly speaking, irrelevant to what Apollo wants. It depends on
what Ion thinks Apollo wants which, again, depends on his conception of identity and
desire. So long as Ion assumes that the other wants something, so long as he assumes
a role in order to respond to that need, he is condemned to repeating the sequence of
events that led to the present48. Let us not forget that it was Ion's eagerness to help
Creusa, even before knowing what he would be helping her with, that created the
confusion.
The question 'What does the Other want?' is not easy to answer. As we will later see,
in psychoanalytic terms it leads straight back to 'What do I want?', to the subject itself.
As long as it remains unanswered, this question creates paradoxes and contradictions
that, in our case, only reproduce the gap between the before and the after the news or
between the innocence of repressed sexuality and the polluting knowledge of the
return of the repressed. In fact, refusing to address this important issue, the subject
48 Consider Ion's devotion in terms of the traditional version: the child 'senses' a lack in the mother and
tries to be the phallus of this lack; here, Ion senses a lack in the father.
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will be trapped in an endless repetition of the refusal and will be encountering
situations in which he has no choice but to participate despite himself49.
We will now introduce some of the difficulties encountered by Ion (and Creusa) in
relation to that unresolved situation. They all reflect the fragmentation of the unified
innocent world in thought and in language.
Speaking of a child 'out in the wider world' and Apollo's gratuitous sexuality, Creusa
causes Ion's strong reaction not because his sense of propriety is offended but because
what she says comes dangerously close to his own half-formed ideas of uncontrollable
sexuality and paternal indifference. Creusa, too, is uncannily precise because in her
speech she only represents her own aporias and nothing more. The effect of the news
on Ion exposes exactly what does not work, the paternal metaphor, the Name of the
Father:
"7icoq obv Succnov xouq vopouq bpac; ppoxotq / ypat|/avxaq, abxouq avoptav
bcp/aaKCxvsiv;/ si 5'- on yap eaxat, xco kbyoi 5s '/ppoopai / Sucac Ptatcov dcoasf
av0pco7ioi<; yapcov, / an teat HoaciSwv Zsuc (f oq obpavou Kpaxsi^ / vaovq xtvovxsq
adudaq Ksvcoasxs. / xac r\8ovaq yap xrjq 7tpopr|0tac Ttapoc / aTrsnSovxeq ?x5iksTx'. onKsx*
av0pco7ionq KaKcoq / fsyciv Sucaiov, si xa xebv Oscov tcaka / piponps0', b./J.a xobq
bibaaxovxaq xadsi' [How can it be right for you to make laws for men, and appear as
lawbreakers yourselves? Why, if - suppose something impossible, for the sake of the
argument - if you, Apollo, and Poseidon, and Zeus King of Heaven, are to pay to men
the lawful indemnity for every rape you commit, you will empty your temples in
paying for your misdeeds. You put pleasure first and wisdom after- and it is sin! It is
unjust to call men bad for copying what the gods find good: the sin lies with our
examples!] (11. 443-51).
49 Once, Ion had contemplated 'a better luck' for himself. When Xuthus will tell him that he is his
father, a father that meets most of the requirements of that 'better luck', Ion will feel trapped into
following Xuthus despite himself. Creusa would have asked for a child. When she will be given a child
she will turn against it. In both cases one gets what one wishes for but it reaches him/her via so many
detours and so many unanswerable questions that the inevitable 'isn't that what you wanted?' is felt as a
cruel joke rather than an act of generosity.
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Ion wonders about the father's relation to the Law. He is alerted to a profound split
between the two. If the rape accusation is true, then the gods, all gods, are excluded
from the 'universe' they regulate. The father's uncontrollable sexuality50 seems to be
provoking a question similar to 'is the Legislator subject to the Law he makes?'. In
terms of sexuality, the question is simpler but equally difficult to answer: 'Is sexuality
subject to regulation or is it an animal instinct, just like Ion had observed in the flying
birds? If we wish to follow all the extensions of the question we could generate a
string of 'serious' issues. For instance: if there is an animal sexuality in Apollo does
this affect his divinity? If all gods conceal similar affairs do they still have the right to
dictate rules? All these questions and many more spring from the same basic
unarticulated aporia: is it true that there is no (universal) law?
Oscillating between what is debatable and what is an article of faith, the questions
have one thing in common: they are never asked. Ion cuts speculation short, both in
the dialogue with Creusa and, later, in the last lines of the scene. Instead of following
his doubt in the direction of the father, he chooses the "easier" way of doubting the
truth of the other, Creusa's purpose in making the allegations (1. 430). When the
sanitised world of the temple is not just threatened by droppings but is about to
crumble by a massive attack of impurity, Ion, the servant responsible for order and
cleanliness, will regress into pursuing the lost purity which might return him to the
wonderful suspension of ignorance - and by now - to the renunciation of knowledge.
The consequences of the effort to 'repair' the damage while ignoring the real issues it
involves have, in all cases, the same effect: dead end and a feeling that nothing is what
it seems. The attempt to restore Apollo's good name - not to say his purity - is, for Ion,
the essential issue that sets the value of an imaginary identification with the father. By
refusing Apollo's sexuality and the wider implications of the disparity of the Father
50 The knowledge of sexuality is "a special kind of knowledge, a knowledge of enjoyment
(jouissance), which is by definition excluded from the Law in its universal-neutral guise: it pertains to
the very stature of Law that it is 'blind' to this knowledge" [Zizek 1992, p. 159], This is the way Zizek
defines the schism between the Father and the Law. The context of Zizek's statement is not Greek
drama but film noir. But aren't Ion and Creusa a little like the classic film noir detective who sets out to
solve a case only to discover that he is more implicated and more involved that he ever thought? And
isn't he unwilling to test his own assumptions till the very end? (See also Zizek 1992, chapter 5).
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and the Law, Ion turns a blind eye to the very logical implication of the situation, to
the fact that he has been serving lawlessness all along. In normal circumstances not
every 'rumour' is believed or provokes such an aggressive reaction. Thus, while
remaining within the bounds of propriety, Ion and Creusa manage to interfere with
each other's phantasies rather than with the practical aspects of identity. While one is
prepared to defend anything exposed to public view, be it one's status or lack (slavery,
childlessness, namelessness), one is never prepared to be confronted with one's worst
fears.
Creusa and Ion's relation after the news and the prohibition to say more is very
interesting. The entire first meeting is traumatic: it starts innocently and ends
tragically, establishing, at last, what should have been apparent from the beginning,
the strangeness of the two interlocutors and the strangeness of the situation. The
fragmentation of the peaceful world can be represented by the dis-location and
estrangement settling in gradually, spreading over the subject, the other and the Other.
In the next five pages we will try to present it as a composite expression consisting of
the following: 'why me?', the deflection of strangeness, the growing similarity
between Ion and Creusa, Ion's transformation, the verbal assumption that allows doubt
to enter the picture, and the exposure of the difficulty of the relation to self, other and
Other.
Getting involved in the discussion of sexuality Ion and Creusa discover that the
unexpected turn of the events concerns them more than they could ever imagine.
They, of all mortals, are picked out by the hand of destiny to reveal or cover the truth
about the gods and destroy or preserve the order of the world. The inability to answer
the question 'Why me?' and the failure to see any purpose in all these is followed by a
renunciation of the entire experience. The entire experience is blocked out and in its
place arises the growing dislike for the other, who blocks the return or the access to
Apollo. As usually happens in cases like this 'it is the other's fault'. The other's fault
conceals the absurdity of the immediate relation with the father. It is also the other's
fault that what s/he says sounds true to 'me' in an uncanny way. In the other's words
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one sees only what surfaces from one's own unconscious. Blaming the other,
scapegoating the other is the supposed easy way out51.
Clearing the obstacle / other will of course generate several permutations of meaning.
Ion and Creusa will literally pass through each other, in this sense, in the entire play.
The meaning of the rape, violence+sexuality, though not explicitly accepted, will have
to be decided. The future, the always deferred interpretation, will explore its
constituents, violence and sexuality, trying to determine if they are indeed inextricably
linked. All possibilities will be explored in and through language. This game is played
at the limits and to the limits. Consider the strangeness at the end of the scene between
Creusa and Ion concerning both the experience and the attitude to the other:
"xi 7IOT8 Aoyoiaiv rf 7tpoq xov 0sov / Kpimxoicn oust kotSopoua' amaaexat; [Why
does this stranger rail upon the God/ In riddles of dark sayings ever more] (1. 429-30,
transl Way 1958)
and then:
"axap Onyaxpoc xr|<fEpsyOsmq xl got / pskst; 7ipoapKsr V ouSsv" [Yet, with Erechtheus
daughter what have I to do? She is naught to me] (1. 433-4, transl Way 1958).
In this context, the complete estrangement in the end signifies an attempt to take flight
from the events and, more importantly, from the growing 'likeness' of Ion and Creusa.
Estrangement as well as refusal to recognise what is involved in rape will be
suppressing the 'violent' knowledge. The allegiance to the father will, from now on, be
a constant refusal/ negation of the other, a form of rivalry in which they will fail to
recognise their common interests.
Strangely however, more than ever before, Ion echoes Creusa's rape as non
involvement in the sexual act, as being punished for not doing something. Though the
rape as such is refused, negated, it returns in Ion's own vocabulary as the punishment
of the innocent. The rape results in a freeze-frame, in a self-contradicting situation. It
is a traumatic encounter with an ugly truth, which has no other recipient, no other
participant than the present one. The rape is violently expelled, returned to the sender,
^' This time honoured scapegoating masks the nothing, what does not really work, the inconsistency
of the failed identification. In "The sublime object of ideology" [1989, pp. 124-9], Zizek gives
contemporary examples for a personal and social strategy that finds itself in its natural environment in
Greek drama.
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Creusa. Yet the expulsion comes only too late and this is what makes the present
meeting a real traumatic encounter as the subject once again fails to predict and fend
off what it has been fending off for a long time. As a pair, they are indeed in each
other's hands; sole witnesses and possible victims of this very knowledge of the
other's slip. And they have brought it upon themselves, the just-about-to-be-
eliminated, homeless and future-less who have so convincingly identified themselves
as such. This is why they will immediately see death in each other in the next scene52.
How does one go about finding the truth s/he cannot even define? The possibilities of
language are enormous. The suspicious lack of evidence about the rape and its
product, the child, opens up the world of 'belief and the un-seen and requires, more or
less, the exact opposite of Ion's shuttered faith. Ion, who is anxious to maintain the
relation with the father at any cost, refuses to help Creusa. The child is reluctant to
admit that the father could be anything different from what he wants him to be but
Creusa's argument cannot be dismissed with a simple yes or no. The same lack of
evidence opens up the world of deception and appearances. The secret possession of
knowledge, to which he binds himself prematurely, forces Ion to re-assume the lost
innocence in name only, to 'wear' it like a garment, a facade clothing nothing. Ion has
entered the world of appearances through maintaining the semblance of the purity he
has just lost.
Let us follow the consequences of Ion's entrapment in the promise to help Creusa. The
reaction to the renewed trauma is indicated by the humanisation of the father ('the god
is doing an injustice', 'the god is ashamed' 1. 354 and 367) and the interdiction of
speech, Ion telling Creusa, rather forcefully, not to pursue the issue any further.
Silence is re-established but it is already transformed: those who know will not speak,
neither the friend of Creusa nor Apollo. The meaning of secret is transformed too, it
signifies the willingly chosen reversal; it is a return to ignorance only this time it is
someone else's ignorance which eclipses one's own quest. The secret must remain a
secret. The child must remain obscure. The issue must be given up. The mediators
must resign. The general effect of these transformations/ regressions aims at
52 Ion and Creusa have located themselves at the margins of society, from where it is easier to expel
someone rather than from another solid social position. 'Unwittingly' they have given each other the
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repressing it. But since the acts of the god pass through language to the mortals and
transfer to them the shame and guilt he is not there to declare for himself, it is up to
the mortals to act on his behalf and in the name of reverence re-assume the role of the
representatives they have just denied: they must take upon themselves the knowledge
of the crime, keep it and live with the guilty consciousness. Once 'contaminated' with
the secret of the Other one leads a 'dangerous' life as the secret can be used against
oneself and the Other. But the god cannot be forced (raped) in any way and the rape
cannot be undone in real terms. It can be undone in language, it can be expelled by
duplicating it.53. So does Ion in threatening Creusa. In order to repel the threat to his
life he affirms the father's right to do as he pleases, he contradicts his ideals of purity,
the obligation of gods to set a moral example and his earlier admission that the whole
event was an injustice to the raped woman. In language Ion becomes the paradox he
supports: an akon rapist, a rapist-of-necessity.
Another option could be considered. If Ion is going to undo the harm done to Apollo
and his faith he must reverse the process of accusations or muddle it up until it
becomes meaningless. He must either go to Apollo or silence Creusa for ever. The
first possibility always encounters external difficulties and will not be considered
here54. The second, is even more difficult. Creusa has pronounced a blasphemy and
Ion must either live with it or erase it. If he decides to live with it he has no place at
Delphi because he in unclean. If he decides to 'clean' it he must either 'silence' Creusa
himself or make her (force her) retract her statement. Again, his purity is gone.
Whatever Ion chooses to do he must live with its consequences, and these
consequences are invariably polluting. The sacrifice of purity is unavoidable and if
Ion could really see beyond what meets the eye, he could have learned that it has
inspiration of'where to start' with one's defence.
53 The 'passive duplication' is taken from Bersani's "The Freudian Body" [1986, p. 53], In his example
Pasolini's cinematic rendering of de Sade's story adheres to the text and thus "duplicates that from
which he wants to separate himself". Ion is not so successful. He duplicates the interdiction of sexuality
and - partly - the rape in a verbal form but it returns.
54 That he will never reach Apollo is 'guaranteed' by the structure of the play. Every time he intends to
do so he is stopped, the first time by the arrival of Xuthus, the next time by the arrival of Pythia, then
by Athena and so on.
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already happened. We are reminded here of the ritual sacrifices and the willing
participation of the victim, the hekon of the victim55 that changes the killing into an
act of devotion. We see once again how similar Creusa and Ion are in refusing their
consent {hekon) and their sacrifice, to give in to the other's demand.
The 'flat refusal' is an elaborate form of resistance in which Ion and Creusa prefer to
chase the elusive implications of the hekon/akon death debate rather than give in to
the (admission of) the violence of the father. Just as they were implicated in the
development of desire in the Other, they are now trying to see their way out of it.
The Other's hekon is brought into the picture:
c \ ««- / t
"7rcoq o Geoq o XuGstv [kruAcxat pavxeoasxat;" [(how) is Apollo to reveal what he
intends should remain secret?] (1. 365).
Ignorance and doubt, their own ignorance and doubt, joins the questions of the Other's
intention and free will. Ion says 'suppose that...'
"Why, if- suppose something impossible, for the sake of the argument- if you,
Apollo..." (1. 444) and by this very reserved hypothesis he lays the ground for more
doubt in the future and for an awkward return of the repressed here and now. It returns
all the more menacing at this point and- just because they have admitted that they are
ignorant they must proceed with speculations and assumptions: 'if things were not like
they are...'. Because although Ion and Creusa can boast of their secret and special
relation to Apollo or any paternal figure they know absolutely nothing about it.
The limit is set at the consent of the Other, the willingness of the Other to reply, an
exact opposite of his habit to impose his will and of their own experience of his
silence. We begin to grasp the sheer 'enormity' of the task of restoring the Other's
honour or to make him speak. And because it is impossible to 'cause' the Other's will,
the entire issue deteriorates into an assumption of and about the Other will. This
double assumption resembles the double movement involved in the introjection of the
father's signifier in the dissolution of the Oedipus complex. But in our case it all
happens without the slightest involvement from Apollo, without a word, a signifier.
The 'return to Apollo' is then transformed into a new demand for love, in which, just
55 See Vernant [1991] and Foley [1985] for the consent of the victim in sacrifices.
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as in Ion's monologue, the child is trying to be love-worthy56. The child always tries to
construct the love of the Mother or the Father and locates its significance and its proof
in the return of love which it cannot take for granted. It is not difficult to imagine that
ifApollo had given a sign of love to Ion he would have eagerly died for him. Now he
must risk everything in order to merit this love.
At the same time, a game of appearances starts: the other (rival) seems to know more
than s/he is eager to disclose. In terms of desire, s/he has the phallus, the alienated
secret of my completion. At the level of appearances, Ion and Creusa can mean
anything and indeed, in the phallic discourse, everything to each other. But what
regulates the appearances? What endows appearances with stability? Stuck in parallel
worlds, Ion and Creusa reproduce not only their misery but what it wants to say (veut
dire) something parallel and opposite to the proud assumption of the ways of the
father. It manifests itself, in the middle of all impossibilities, in the impossibility of
either Ion or Creusa going beyond the frustration of desire and its repetition. It would
not be an exaggeration to say that Ion and Creusa cannot love, and cannot live in a
real world. Having the return to Athens in mind, it seems more distant than ever.
We could say that the 'archetype' of all appearances is this inter-play of assumptions
concerning both the Other and the other. The subject is unable to bear the other's
desire without betraying or contradicting the desire of the parent- which is difficult
anyway- and is therefore involved in a series of 'assumptions' (in both meanings)
which dedicate but in reality alienate him/her from paternal desire.57 Ion and Creusa
will enter the world of appearances in the name of reclaiming the symptom of
56 Dedicated to Apollo, Ion will not be able to separate himself from the god on account of Creusa's
word. According to the Oedipus complex the child assumes / internalises the signifier of the father, a
representative of the entire drama of incest and prohibition and gradually an identification with the
father settles in. In Ion's case there seems to be an identification with the father, on the grounds of the
restoration of truth and his good name that runs parallel with the rediscovery of purity by Ion. It is,
however, an identification based on an assumed lack and an assumed truth and cannot be considered an
adequate Oedipal identification. Thus, the entire adventure can be considered as a great show / project
of exhibiting commitment to the father-Apollo, which, just like the morning song, indicates a new
attempt to gain the love and the recognition of the indifferent father.
57 in simple Freudian terms this is as close as I can get to bringing together the demands of maturity as
external reality and the symptomatic fixation of the neurotic.
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suspension, of justifying themselves in the eyes of 'those who matter' and of chasing
the illusion of a return to purity. Blocked in real terms, it will take, instead, the form
of regression into earlier stages of'being'.
The chain reaction it causes is an amazing tour de force of purity and innocence. It is
supported by the idealism of adolescence but it is not sufficiently explained by it.
Purity/innocence can function only as missing, when 'it is not' anymore. Now that it
has suffered the terrible blow of castration it sustains two losses: one coming from
older times and concerning the desire of the Father and the shame of parentlessness
and one coming from the other's demand which annuls the good service to the god.
Now that the support of Ion's innocence is gone and the veil of propriety is shuttered,
he finds himself exposed to a gaping meaninglessness which threatens his entire life.
Let us keep our eyes fixed to the appearance(s) of death, from now on, at the point of
utter meaninglessness.
At the point where Ion was given the slightest chance of opening up his own desire he
is now obliged to take the imagined Other's desire literally upon himself, together
with the difficult futile task of informing all-knowing Apollo about the blasphemies of
the woman. Under the influence of lies or misconceptions or hidden motives there lies
the birth of the desire of the father who needs to be informed about what he has done.
Ion's refusal to believe Creusa's story dedicates his desire to the Other's lack: he will
be the phallus of the Father. At last there is a crack in the Father's wholeness.
Ion will keep shouting out his purity, keeping up the appearance of it, in the place of
the lost purity. Beyond appearances, death, castration and the phallus meet in the same
signifier. Ion's desire of purity is alienated in the agon of someone else's purity. His
desire is sacrificed for the Other's desire and the two are finally made to coincide upon
the signifier of the lost purity, upon what he and father Apollo have in common.
When loss 'materialises' in such a way it is difficult to lose sight of it. Fixed upon his
castration which Creusa brought about with "deception", Ion will reclaim - or should
we say invent - his masculinity by renouncing the feminine curiosity and by
appointing himself the saviour of the father. Finally ignorance returns in the form of
misunderstanding of one's own and the other's truth and solidifies in silent
renunciation.
80
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND SUMMARY
The Other's desire, which normally is of great importance for the subject, as man's
desire is the desire of the Other according to Lacan, is confused/ mixed with the
other's (fellow human being's) desire. Coming from the unconscious and filtered
through the resistance and the misrecognitions of the ego and its defences it invites the
subject to consent to its own death. Objectified in the form of an impossible polluting
inquiry, desire implicates Ion and Creusa into an agon for which they have no other
'weapons' but their refusal to die or go down quietly and the knowledge that there is
something beyond what meets the eye.
It is always a personal agon, what Lacan would call 'vicissitudes of subjectivity'
[Wilden 1968, p.26]. In classical Freudian terms it is the sum of all the movements in
which the crisis of 'being' is expressed (regressions, introjections, symbolisations,
misrecogntions, resistances etc.).
'Alienated' in the other's refusal, the impossibility of desire now becomes the 'tangible'
hatred of the obstacle. Ion and Creusa will hate each other as enemies. If they knew
better they would love each other for that same reason. In course of regaining access
to not-seeing its desire fading away, and to the illusion of desire-lying-in-waiting the
subject will have to erase / remove the other / obstacle. The enmity splits the
ambivalence towards the parent into two distinct trends: love (for the indifferent
parent) and hate (for the other). A fellow human being is hated, bearing the subject's
refusal of the Other's desire, another one is loved, bearing the subject's consent. And if
the Other (be it the ferocious Father or the almost indifferent Mother) is the only one
to support and authenticate the subject's desire then it will be considered- by the
subject- to be on his side.
In the beginning there was the persistent indifference of the father - love object and
source of impeded identification - who spoke nothing and wanted nothing. In the
beginning there was a clouded ignorance and attachment to the desire of the Father
that did not progress or move. But as always this bliss is disturbed by something that
could not have raised suspicion or resistance. Freud would locate it in the pressure of
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reality and approaching maturity. Lacan would locate it in the other's word, the very
demand of the other between the lines of which the subject catches a glimpse of the
desire satisfied, him being made significant, elevated (for the other) to the function of
the phallus - to what he cannot be for the Other. In a perfect world, the news about the
father's sexuality, would have caused a renunciation of the Other's desire and would
have led to the dissolution of the Oedipus complex and to the symbolic destruction of
the (imaginary) sanitised temple.
Ion and Creusa are uncanningly precise in reaching the other's 'vulnerable area' and in
order to do that they need nothing more than to speak the truth of their experience:
sexuality and prohibition, or, in the language of the body, castration and death.
I would characterise Creusa and Ion's first meeting as 'unlucky' encounter. They are so
much alike in their ignorance of the Other's (father) desire that they comfortably speak
and persuade the other about the fact that they speak on his behalf. Only an ignorant
person could have been fooled by that.
The early break of communication due to the refusal to face up to and deal with the
issue of the Other's desire will be refracted in the entire play: the deferred
interpretation will give direction to the entire peripeteia. Even when it appears that
everything starts later, when Apollo gives Ion to Xuthus, we can say that in a
metaphorical way, peripeteia always starts a from the Other's desire here and now.
In Scene One the refusal to address the issues of desire unfolds into endless
encounters with meaninglessness, Ion turning to an akon rapist and the whole world
taking on a 'strange' outlook. However, a point worth remembering is that little word
at the end of the scene: icq loyco xprjoopai, suppose that., for the sake of the argument,
which implants doubt in Ion's mind and ascertains the fact that Creusa's word has been
taking effect. It would not be an exaggeration to say that Creusa gives Ion's life
meaning, be it the 'project' to return to Apollo or the imaginary hunting of purity.
Either of them gives direction, albeit an imaginary one, as it creates an assumed
signifier of reparation-to-be-shared between father and son. This will be Ion's
'mission' and avpcpopa58 (hap according to Owen [1939]) from now on, the very lack
The word is used later by Ion to describe the mixed blessing of meeting his earthly father, Xuthus. I
think that the word is suitable for describing the mood of the first scenes. Xvjuipopa, according to Owen
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of their 'assumption' and the need for revision. Creusa's avjucpopa will be similar, as
she, all too eagerly, falls victim of Ion's assured manners and display of authority. But
having reached this complete misunderstanding they have only 'spoken the truth', their
private mixed up world of the displaced and mis-aligned Father and Law.
[1939, p. 108] means 'hap': "The word is neutral, and its meaning is determined by the context, though




FREUD: THE INSTINCT AND ITS VICISSITUDES
For the analysis of Scenes Two and Three we will introduce the Lacanian notion of
the Imaginary. Lacan develops it on the basis of the Freudian theory of narcissism. In
the previous chapter we introduced the notion of narcissism, some aspects of the ego
and an important instinctual vicissitude, repression. It would be difficult, however, to
present the concept of the Imaginary without adding to Freudian theory. We will
therefore introduce the notion of sadism-masochism, the relation of love and hate and
the death instinct. The first two add to the general picture of the vicissitudes of the
instinct and go further: the love/hate discussion ambitiously covers the transition from
the earliest moments of sexuality (autoerotism) to object relations. The sadism-
masochism opposition is a versatile tool which helps Freud locate, describe and
account for the death instinct by taking advantage of the structural character of the
particular vicissitude (turning upon oneself) and its participation in sexual
development or regression. Lacan expands on Freud but without always addressing a
particular Freudian grey area. He usually combines Freudian elements in such a way
that a global comprehension of the dynamics and correlation of certain notions is
better than an in depth analysis of some of them.
In the presentation of the Lacanian Imaginary we will proceed in the following way.
We will first introduce the fundamental notions Mirror stage, aggressivity, alienation
which concern the genesis and the development of the Imaginary. We will then turn to
a more practical and applicable aspect of the Imaginary: we will present the visual
representation of the concept, the optical schema. To this we will add the interaction
of the Imaginary and the Symbolic in desire, in the field of identifications and in
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analysis. Our aim is to compose the character of the Imaginary (with reference to the
Symbolic) by exploring different aspects of it.
As a bridge between the theory and the discussion of scenes Two and Three I include
two influences from the early stages of this project. The first is Lacan's own analysis
of Poe's "The purloined letter" which also serves as an illustration of the Imaginary in
practice. The second is a structuralist presentation of the play from a point of view
similar to the circulation of the letter in Poe's story. It organises the succession of
events and the main vocabulary of the play in fields and groups. The aim is to
autonomise the text, to describe it as a network of signifiers that support and define
one other. This structuralist account is also a first reading of scenes Two and Three.
We will try to show where and how the Imaginary 'appears' in relation to an abstract
chain of (symbolic) changes.
Sadism-masochism, love-hate the death instinct
Freud [1915, p. 123] defines the following vicissitudes of the instinct: Reversal into
its opposite; Turning around upon the subject's own self; Repression; Sublimation.
We will focus on the first two. We are again in the domain of the instinct, the
components of which are: the pressure, the aim, the source, and the object (see chapter
1 of this thesis).
Sadomasochism combines both reversal into the opposite and turning upon the
subject's own self. It mainly affects the aim of the instinct. The change is
accomplished in three moves. Freud observes: "In the case of the pair of opposites
sadism-masochism, the process may be represented as follows:
(a) Sadism consists in the exercise of violence or power upon some other person as
object.
(b) This object is given up and replaced by the subject's self. With the turning round
upon the self the change from an active to a passive instinctual aim is also effected"
[Freud 1915, p. 125],
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Masochism appears at the last turn: "(c) An extraneous person is once more sought as
object; this person, in consequence of the alteration which has taken place in the
instinctual aim, has to take over the role of the subject"59 (ibid).
Freud explains that the phenomenon of sadism-masochism throws new light on our
understanding of (early) sexuality.60 We are not interested in the particulars of the
discussion. We highlight the stages of sadism-masochism and we reserve it for future
reference.
The reversal of love into hate, which Freud characterises as one of 'content', involves
the entire sexuality, starting from the auto-erotic ego and arriving at the total ego.
Freud's account is a short history of development.
In order to define love and hate he resorts to a full set of opposites that includes not
only loving-hating but also loving - being loved, loving / hating - indifference [Freud
1915, p. 131] and to the polarities of mind, ego / object, pleasure / unpleasure, active
/passive61.
The history of development starts with the autoerotic period when the external world
is still indifferent for sexual purposes. During this period, the dominant opposition is
59 See [Freud 1915, editor's footnote p. 125] "As a rule 'subject' and 'object' are used respectively for
the person in whom an instinct ... originates, and the person or thing to which it is directed. Here,
however, 'subject' seems to be used for the person who plays the active part in the relationship - the
agent."
60 The possibility of the third move as change and internalisation basically serves a classic purpose,
the continuation of narcissistic pleasure in absence or withdrawal of an object. At the same time
external objects are brought into the equation by the passive turn in which the subject 'is replaced' by
the other [Freud 1915, p. 129]
6' Freud defines their meaning here: "The antithesis ego- non-ego (external), i.e. subject-object,
is...thrust upon the individual organism at an early stage, by the experience that it can silence external
stimuli by means of muscular action but is defenceless against internal stimuli... The polarity of
pleasure-unpleasure is attached to a scale of feelings, whose paramount importance in determining our
actions (our will) has already been emphasised. The antithesis active-passive must not be confused
with the antithesis ego - subject - external world - object. The relation of the ego to the external world
is passive in so far as it receives stimuli from it and active when it reacts to these...the ego-subject is
passive in respect of external stimuli but active through its own instincts. The antithesis active-passive
coalesces later with the antithesis masculine-feminine, which, until this has taken place, has no
psychological meaning..." [Freud 1915, p. 132],
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that between the ego loving itself and indifference. Gradually, some objects are
introduced. If they are pleasurable they are introjected (incorporated in the ego). If
not, they are expelled. This early pleasure-ego maintains its relation to the world on a
very simple basis: "the external world is divided into a part that is pleasurable, which
it has incorporated into itself, and a remainder that is extraneous to it. It has separated
off a part of its own self, which it projects into the external world and feels as hostile"
[Freud 1915, p. 134].
In the next phase (primary narcissism) the possibility of hating appears to replace
indifference although the attitude to the external world largely remains the same.
Freud notes: "If later on an object turns out to be a source of pleasure, it is loved, but
it is also incorporated in the ego; ...for the purified pleasure-ego once again objects
coincide with what is extraneous and hated" (ibid, emphasis added).
When narcissism is overcome and the interest in external objects is established a new
shift of emphasis occurs. Pleasure and unpleasure are now located in the relation of
the ego and its object, whereas previously love-indifference reflected the ego-external
world relationship and love-hate the pleasure-unpleasure pair. Despite the shift of
emphasis the processs retains something of its old character: "If the object becomes a
source of pleasurable feelings, a motor urge is set up which seeks to bring it closer to
the ego and to incorporate it into the ego. We then speak of the 'attraction' exercised
by the pleasure-giving object, and say that we 'love' that object...if the object is a
source of unpleasure, there is an urge which endeavours to increase the distance
between the object and the ego...We feel the 'repulsion' of the object, and hate it..."
[Freud 1915, p. 135],
With this series of changes Freud emphasises the long journey of love and hate from
the instinct to the total ego. No one, observes Freud, says that a sexual instinct 'loves'
its object. It is the ego that does. The more we get away from the instinct and into the
domain of the integrated ego the more we begin to understand that to employ the word
love we need to refer to it "after there has been a synthesis of all the component
instincts of sexuality under the primacy of the genitals and in the service of the
reproductive function" (ibid). Having thus inter-woven the polarities of psychical life
with the emergence of the object in the mature/genital sexual phase, Freud proceeds to
the final definition of love, hate and ambivalence (the shift from one to the other) via
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their historical development: "Preliminary stages of love emerge as provisional sexual
aims while the sexual instincts are passing through their complicated development. As
the first of these aims we recognise the phase of incorporating or devouring- a type of
love which is consistent with abolishing the object's separate existence...At a higher
stage of the pregenital sadistic-anal organisation, the striving for the object appears in
the form of an urge for mastery, to which injury or annihilation of the object is a
matter of indifference. Love in this form and at this preliminary stage is hardly to be
distinguished from hate in its attitude towards the object. Not until the genital
organisation is established does love become the opposite of hate" [Freud 1915, p.
137], Hate in this sense is older than (genital) love. It comes from earlier phases, as a
basic reaction to stimuli of unpleasure. As Freud suggests: "it remains in an intimate
relation with the self-preservative instincts" (ibid) and enters sexuality via the ego-
instincts, when the latter dominate the sexual function as in the case of sadistic-anal
organisation. Ambivalence, therefore, will be the 'admixture' of love and hate and has
its origins in earlier phases which are not fully surmounted.
In "Beyond the pleasure principle" Freud [1920] introduces the death instinct with
reference to sexuality, sadism-masochism and the role of the ego in the narcissistic
economy. He develops the concept in order to account for phenomena that do not
conform to the general rule of the pleasure principle.62 Freud starts by revising a
62 The present account of the 'death instinct' follows the structure of the "Beyond the pleasure
principle" article and is in fact an extended version of this footnote! But with Freud continuously
revising the principles of his theory it was the only possible way of putting it in context. The "Beyond
the pleasure principle" and the notion of the death instinct are landmarks of Freudian thought and later
became more influential that the Oedipus complex itself. For me, the "Beyond the pleasure principle"
is also the best example of Freudian/psychoanalytic method ofwriting.
According to the pleasure principle one of the ego's tasks is to avoid or fend off feelings of unpleasure
from consciousness, but the validity of rule is threatened by a variety of 'unexplained' phenomena.
Freud observed cases of neuroses where unpleasure has substituted pleasure [Freud 1920, p. 279],
cases of "mysterious masochistic trends of the ego" (p. 283) inferred from anxiety dreams that do not
seem to fulfd any wish, "compulsion to repeat" (p. 289) observed in the actions of patients and in
transference neurosis, 'narcissistic scars' left upon the ego by the withdrawal of love or the abrupt end
to early sexual explorations (p. 291), examples of cruel fate and destiny from literature (p. 293) and, of
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previous polarity between life-preservative instincts which are 'seated' in the ego and
sexual instincts and by incorporating into his theory contemporary ideas about the
death and procreation of living organisms. "The instinct" in general is defined as "an
urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things" [Freud 1920, p. 308],
This restoration is actually death, a return to an inorganic state, an absolute and final
removal of all tensions. Life serves death, says Freud, along with his contemporaries.
Self-preservative instincts do no more that ultimately serve death by a long detour.
They do not precipitate death but they make sure that the organism dies of its own
internal causes and not due to external ones [Freud 1920, p. 311]. Sexual instincts, on
the other hand, preserve and renew life. They aim at continuing life by synthesis (of
cells). The two sets of instincts work together in a see-saw fashion: "It is as though the
life of the organism moved with a vacillating rhythm. One group of instincts rushes
forward so to reach the final aim of life as swiftly as possible; but when a particular
stage in the advance has been reached, the other group jerks back to a certain point to
make a fresh start and so prolong the journey" [Freud 1920, 313].
course, the (famous) fort / da game, Freud's own grandson articulating the sounds a/o while play-acting
the painful experience of his mother's departure and return (pp. 283-7).
Failure to account for such phenomena threatened the value of the entire theory since the pleasure
principle was one of its basic postulates.
There was also another reason for developing the 'death instinct', Freud's insistence on a 'matter of
principle': the dualism that underlined his entire theory. At the time Freud was developing his theory
other psychoanlysts, Jung most notably, were blunting the differences between certain oppositions in
their effort to settle theoretical issues concerning sexuality. Freud had initially postulated a class of life
preservative instincts as different and distinct from sexual instincts. Jung was moving towards merging
the two. Freud's reply, the paper 'Beyond the pleasure principle', is written in such a way that it
proceeds by displacing the opposition of life and sexuality is such a way that it does not consist an
opposition any more. Freud then asserts his faith in dualism and introduces the death instinct in order
to renew and strengthen the opposition. Life and sexuality end up on the same side. Life and death,
Eros and Thanatos, are the new polar terms. But how is this death (instinct) satisfied? By merging with
sexuality. Sexuality, as we know, concerns the ego (narcissism) and the external world (objects). The
death instinct is either driven out, towards the objects, or driven in, towards the ego itself. The sadism-
masochism comes in handy at this point: it is the mechanism that allows a certain 'cruelty' or
aggression to be directed outwards or inwards. In sadism-masochism Freud now sees the death instinct
at work.
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Having thus concluded that the sexual instincts are indeed life preservative Freud had
to amend the earlier distinction. That would agree with the sexual function of the ego,
which was necessarily brought into the discussion both as object (of love in cases of
narcissism) and as co-ordinator of the life supporting instincts. Freud observes: "The
ego now found its position among the sexual objects and was at once given the
foremost place among them. Libido which was in this way lodged in the ego was
described as 'narcissistic'. This narcissistic libido was of course also the manifestation
of the force of the sexual instinct in the analytical sense of these words, and it had
necessarily to be identified with the 'self-preservative instincts' whose existence had
been recognised from the first. Thus the original opposition between the ego-instincts
and the sexual instincts proved inadequate" [Freud 1920, p. 325], At this point Freud
faces the possibility of only one libido and asks: "If the self-preservative instincts too
are of a libidinal nature, are there perhaps no other instincts whatever but the libidinal
ones?" The 'death instinct' is offered as the other pole in order to maintain the dualism.
Freud claims: "Our views have from the very first been dualistic, and to-day they are
even more definitely dualistic than before-now that we describe the opposition as
being not between ego-instincts and sexual instincts but between life instincts and
death instincts" (ibid).
Suspending the theoretical discussion, looking for examples for the death instinct,
citing the lack of theoretical clarity on the related areas, Freud suggests that the
sadistic and the masochistic components can be considered as manifestations of the
elusive death instinct. This brings 'death' in direct relation to ego and sexuality. He
notes: "We started out from the great opposition between the life and death instincts.
Now object-love itself presents us with a second example of a similar polarity- that
between love (or affection) and hate (or aggressiveness). If only we could succeed in
relating these two polarities to each other and in deriving one from the other! From the
very first we recognised the presence of a sadistic component in the sexual instinct. As
we know, it can make itself independent and can, in the form of a perversion,
dominate an individual's entire sexual activity. It also emerges as a predominant
component instinct in one of the 'pregenital organisations' as I have named them. But
how can the sadistic instinct, whose aim it is to injure the object, be derived from
Eros, the preserver of life? Is it not plausible to suppose that this sadism is in fact a
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death instinct which, under the influence of the narcissistic libido, has been forced
away from the ego and has consequently only emerged in relation to the object?"
[Freud 1920, p. 327]. This, in fact, is what Freud proceeds to prove as best as he can.
He traces the evidence for his case not in the 'mitigated' forms of sadism, that is,
sadism fused with sexuality, but in cases where this has not happened, in the 'familiar
ambivalence of love and hate in erotic life' (ibid). Freud's argument draws on libidinal
development starting from the oral stage and the incorporation of the object, moving
on to the anal-sadistic phase with the separation of the object, and finally to the genital
stage with the return of the object and the redirection of sadism onto it. He further
supports the scanty evidence by referring to clinical observations concerning
masochism and in fact reverses the order of the stages of sadism and masochism:
"there is no difference in principle" says Freud "between an instinct turning from an
object to the ego and its turning from the ego to an object- which is the new point now
under discussion. Masochism, the turning round of the instinct upon the subject's own
ego would in that case be the return to an earlier phase of the instinct's history, a
regression. The account that was formerly given of masochism requires emendation as
being too sweeping in one respect: there might be such a thing as primary masochism-
a possibility which I had contested at that time" [Freud 1920, p. 328],
This is how Freud accounts for life, death and sexuality, arranging the components in
such a way as to allow the death instinct to 'tint' the erotic life in normal
circumstances and be satisfied without causing too many problems. In "The ego and
the id" [Freud 1923, p. 398] he synthesises the main elements of the theory, the
position of the ego in relation to life and death instincts and the other two agencies,
the id and the superego in the following way: "Towards the two classes of instincts the
ego's attitude is not impartial. Through its work of identification and sublimation it
gives the death instincts in the id assistance in gaining control over the libido, but in
so doing it runs the risk of becoming the object of the death instinct and of itself
perishing. In order to be able to help in this way it has had itself to become filled with
libido; it thus becomes the representative of Eros and thenceforward desires to live
and to be loved".
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THE IMAGINARY
The Mirror Stage, the Ego, Aggressivity and Alienation
The Lacanian Imaginary is based on narcissism, the ego and sexuality. Some of
Freud's terms are transposed into the new theory but the perspective is considerably
different. Consider the ego for instance. In Freud's theory it appears as co-ordinator of
various forces and with an almost 'benevolent' function. Freud, however, had also
demonstrated that in analysis the ego was the main factor of resistance, since it was
among its functions to deny unconscious material access to consciousness. Lacan
emphasises the obscure/obscuring character of the ego. Historically, this emphasis is
explained as part of Lacan's heavy criticism of all ego-boosting branches of
psychoanalysis. For Lacan, the ego is an obstacle in reaching the truth of the subject,
and by reinforcing it in analysis one does nothing more than make truth of the
unconscious even more inaccessible.
The Mirror stage, Lacan's version of the genesis of the ego and the Imaginary, has
been considered as one of the most original contributions in psychoanalysis. It recasts
the Freudian primary narcissism and evokes the myth of Narcissus looking at his
reflection on the surface of the water. Lacan 'borrows' an observation from the natural
world: for each member of a species, sexuality is triggered only by members of the
same species; even a simulation of the sexual characteristics of the species (in an
experiment) can deceive the eye of an individual and trigger sexuality. Human
sexuality appears to obey the same rule. It, too, depends on seeing. But it is also
different from the sexuality of other species: it appears early in life, when the human
being is still very dependent on others and incapable of perfectly controlling its own
body. It undergoes a period of latency for most of the childhood, and then re-emerges
and is completed in adolescence. In the mirror stage the child sees, observes, its own
reflection (or the mother's) in the mirror and rejoices at the perfection of the
reflection: it appears co-ordinated and complete and very different from what the child
currently experiences: its incapacity, poor motor co-ordination and dependence. The
image (imago) captivates and fascinates the child. To reach it becomes a goal, an
ideal; a deceptive ideal, nevertheless, since the distance between the child and the
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reflection is irreducible. This primary relationship with the image of oneself or the
mother is interrupted by the intervention of the father and the advent of language
(Oedipus complex). The seeking of the image, however, continues in the domain of
sexuality. Re-discovering it in (sexual) objects defines the imaginary character of
sexuality. Sexuality is closely related to narcissism and the senses, vision in particular.
In the "Language of psychoanalysis" [LP, p. 251] the Mirror Stage is defined in the
following way: "a phase in the constitution of the human individual located between
the ages of six and eighteen months. Though still in a state of powerlessness and
motor incoordination, the infant anticipates on an imaginary plane the apprehension
and mastery of its own bodily unity. This imaginary unification comes about by
means of identification with the image of the counterpart at total Gestalt [form]; it is
exemplified concretely by the experience in which the child perceives its own
reflection in the mirror. The mirror phase is said to constitute the matrix and first
outline ofwhat is to become the ego".
Lacan speaks of a 'jubilant assumption' of the specular image by the child. This
peculiar enchantment with the mirror image allows the child to 'imagine' itselfmaster
of its body, autonomous and complete by ignoring the important fact that the image is
and will always remain external. The identification, therefore, is alienating, making
the child rival with himself [Lacan 1948, p. 22] before anything else.
A second rivalry and a second identification will compete the picture and rectify the
alienating effect of the previous one. In the following quotation Lacan reviews the
situation combining his and Freud's terminology (ideal-ego or ideal I or ideal-Ich, and
ego-Ideal, or Ich-ideaT). The key term is 'identification': "We have only to understand
the mirror stage as an identification, in the full sense that analysis gives to the term:
namely, the transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes an image-
whose predestination to this phase-effect is sufficiently indicated by the use, in
analytic theory of the ancient term imago. This jubilant assumption of his specular
image by the child at the infans stage, still sunk in his motor incapacity and nurseling
dependence, would seem to exhibit in an exemplary situation the symbolic matrix in
which the / is precipitated in a primordial form, before it is objectified in the dialectic
of identification with the other, and before language restores to it, in the universal, its
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function as subject. This form would have to be called the Ideal-I, if we wished to
incorporate it into our usual register, in the sense that it will also be the source of
secondary identifications, under which term I would also place the functions of
libidinal normalisation. But the important point is that this form situates the agency of
the ego, before its social determination, in a fictional direction, which will always
remain irreducible for the individual alone, or rather, which will rejoin the coming-
into-being (le devenir) of the subject asymptotically63, whatever the success of the
dialectical synthesis by which he must resolve as I his discordance with his own
reality" [Lacan 1949, p. 2, emphasis added].
What is the role of the fictional ego? It is a mixed blessing. Boothby [1991, pp. 31-2]
summarises its properties: 1) its relation to the perceptual Gestalt and its fascinating
influence; 2) its value as an object due to the fact that its imaginary origin endows it
with the stability of objects; 3) its capacity to provide unity and stability of form; 4)
its close link to the libidinal drives which it unites upon the image; 5) its tendency to
temporal fixity: 'the ego strives to retain its structure intact in diverse relations and
over the course of various developmental transformations". In all these senses it is a
factor of stability.
But fixity and permanence and capacity to concentrate on a singular form also imply
inflexibility, arrested development, ossification. The ego is the seat of defences and
misrecognitions64. Lacan notes: "...In short, we call ego that nucleus given to
consciousness, but opaque to reflection, marked by all the ambiguities which, from
self-satisfaction to 'bad faith' (mauvaise foi), structure the experience of the passions
in the human subject; (we call ego) this T who, in order to admit its facticity to
existential criticism, opposes its irreducible inertia of pretences and meconnaissances
(misrecognitions) to the concrete problematic of the realisation of the subject" [Lacan
1948, p. 15]. Concerning the process of analysis, Lacan separates the ego from any
63 Asymptotic lines in Euclidean geometry are defined on two parallel levels. On the same plane they
would intersect, on the parallel planes they never do.
64 The term 'misrecogntion' is usually misrecognised itself. I will not attempt to define it. It is for the
moment sufficient to say is that it belongs to the properties of the ego. The contexts in which the word
appears are perhaps better to illustrate its meaning.
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'benevolent function': "I am not talking about the ego in psychology, where it
performs a synthetic function, but the ego in analysis, a dynamic function. The ego
makes itself manifest there as defence, as refusal. Inscribed in it is the entire history of
successive oppositions which the subject manifested to the integration of what will
subsequently be called within the theory, but only subsequently, his deepest and most
misunderstood drives. In other words, in these moments of resistance...we gain a sense
of the means by which the very movement of the analytic experience isolates the
fundamental function of the ego- misunderstanding (meconnaissance)" [Lacan:Miller
1975, p. 53],
Two terms closely associated with the imaginary function of the ego are 'aggressivity'
and 'alienation'. Both of them carry the connotation of 'tension' in their meaning, as
they border on the one hand with the subject of the unconscious and on the other with
the other (fellow man or object of love). We will introduce aggressivity first, drawing
on Lacan and Boothby. We will then give two aspects/defmtions of alienation, a
focused one by Boothby [1991] and a spectacular all-encompassing one by Bowie
[1991],
In the opening lines of the paper on 'Aggressivity in psychoanalysis' Lacan relates
aggressivity to the death instinct. Aggressivity is not aggression to others (though the
latter is essentially a derivative of the former) but a disposition of the ego and a mode
of behaviour that concerns the individual only. In analysis aggressivity gives rise to
several expressions (ex: dreams, phantasies) of an ego in danger. Lacan gives various
examples which culminate in the so called 'images of the fragmented body': "These
are images of castration, mutilation, dismemberment, dislocation, evisceration,
devouring, bursting open of the body..." [Lacan 1948, p. 11], It appears to raise the
alarm when the ego's unity is under threat. Despite appearances, Boothby [1991, p.
39] claims that "The aggressivity that interests Lacan is not a defence of an ideal unity
of the self but a rebellion against it. (It) is a drive toward violation of the imaginary
form of the body that models the ego". "Aggressivity", he continues, "is tied to death
but not someone else's death" (ibid) in the same way that the Freudian 'death instinct'
does not involve actual death but the internalisation (turning around) of that
'mysterious' instinct which is linked with sexuality.
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The theoretical merit of the notion is accounted for in the following way: by
developing it, Lacan was able to draw under the same umbrella all deviations from the
normalising process that Freud had examined under different labels (ex: neurosis,
perversion, scopophilia, sadomasochism, homosexuality etc. [Lacan 1948, p. 25]).
Due to its close relation to the ego and what is excluded from it, aggressivity becomes
a valuable indicator in analysis. Analysis, in its most general conception, deals with
the failure of the Oedipus complex to effect the normalisation of sexuality.
Aggressivity emerges when analysis draws closer to discovering what has been
excluded from the ego, the rediscovery of which would, in a sense, threaten its unity:
"This conception" says Lacan, "allows us to understand the aggressivity involved in
the effects of all regression, all arrested development, all rejection of typical
development in the subject, especially on the plane of sexual realisation and more
specifically with each of the great phases that the libidinal transformations determine
in human life..." [Lacan 1948, p. 24],
Alienation will help us understand what is left out of the ego. The term maintains its
close links with the unconscious- it is actually one of the two operations which
engender it, bearing upon the repression of the instinctual representative. It is
therefore closely related to the accession to language, by which, strictly speaking, the
subject looses the imaginary unity and is condemned never to rediscover it. Lacanians
sometimes emphasise the mechanism of alienation and sometimes the 'wondering' in
language ever after, especially since the term did not originate in psychoanalysis but
in philosophy. We present both approaches here.
Boothby [1991, p. 42] employs the terms subject of the unconscious and ego in his
discussion of alienation and attempts to pinpoint their exact relationship to it. He
stresses that alienation concerns the subject. He points out that the term is not
adequately explained by the proposition (Lemaire's [1970] interpretation) according to
which it is the 'giving up part of oneself to the other'. He disengages the issue of
alienation from the conflict between two individuals and locates it in the relation of
oneself to oneself: "what is alienating is not a relation of the nascent ego to another
ego, but of the inchoate subject to its own ego" he says [Boothby 1991, p. 45], The
ego is essentially frustrating and limiting, and that is to be understood in its libidinal
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dimension. Boothby goes back to the limitations inherent in the imago and to the
miracle of unity that is achieved at the expense of leaving something out. From it, the
ego will inherit the disposition to include and exclude. Thus, from the primordial
Urbilt (imago) to the ego the same principle applies: limitation, inclusion and
exclusion: "What is 'excluded' by the imago can therefore be viewed from either of
two angles: in analogy to the intrinsic selectivity of the perceptual Gestalt, the imago
entrains certain potential impulses and excludes others; owing to the temporal fixity of
the imago, it excludes new forms of impulse arising in the course of natural
development" [Boothby 1991, p. 59], According to Boothby, alienation, is, so to
speak, an internal affair.
Bowie [1991, p. 24] adopts a more 'extrovert' aspect. He describes alienation by "the
various meanings played off against each other" and states: "The mirror-bemused
infant, setting forth on his career of delusional ego-building, is condemned to the
madness of the madhouse (alienation). But the Entfremdung of Hegel and Marx,
familiarly translated into French as alienation, provides the infant's wretchedness with
a certain philosophical dignity, just as alienation in its legal sense (as used or rights or
property) gives it a faint air of juridical procedure". And after reminding us of the
internal discord inherent in the term he turns to society: "For Lacan...the prototypical
alienation that occurs at the mirror stage is seen weaving its way haphazardly through
society...the 'I' is tirelessly intent upon freezing a subjective process that cannot be
frozen, introducing stagnation into the mobile field of human desire. The inalienable
alienation of the human species is, however, recounted not just in a hybrid
philosophical language but in tones reminiscent of the Gothic tale" (ibid). He then
return to the 'child' via literature: "The child, itself so recently born, gives birth to a
monster: a statue, an automaton, a fabricated thing. Freudian theory had already talked
at length about the 'constructedness' of the ego...but here such talk is recast in terms
that Dr Frankenstein would have found familiar. From spare parts, an armoured
mechanical creature is being produced within the human subject, and developing
unwholesome habits and destructive appetites of its own. The self-division of the
subject, first revealed to Freud by dreams, is here being re-imagined by Lacan as
nightmare" [Bowie 1991, p. 26],
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Mirror stage, alienation, aggressivity and the real nature of the ego are all
foregrounded by psychoanalysis. Other disciplines, philosophy for instance, have
chosen to emphasise consciousness, the self-awareness of the ego, which is of little
interest to psychoanlysis and which, as we now know, stands on 'peculiar' ground.
The optical schema; the investment of the Image with Libido
We will now discuss the visual representation of the Imaginary and sexuality and we
will try to see how desire (a state of loss of object) relates to sexuality and the
Imaginary in Lacan. We will also complete the picture of the individual's relation to
others in identification and we will end this presentation with a reference to the
treatment of the ego in analysis.
In his seminars between 1953 and 1955 [Lacan:Miller 1975 and 1978], Lacan lectures
on the idea of the Imaginary and the Symbolic in analysis and in relation to Freud's
psychoanalytic technique65. The ideas of the mirror stage, the libidinal investment of
an image and the imaginary function of the ego appear in the form of the optical
schema below66. We will be using the schema for its self-explanatory neatness. It both
contributes to the understanding of the Imaginary and allows us to introduce and
illustrate concepts significant for our discussion of Scenes Two and Three, such as
'identification' 'form', 'recognition'. The optical schema merges the early concentration
of the sexual instinct upon a particular image with the later dynamic of the choice of
sexual objects. I must point out that the optical schema is considered largely
inadequate for more demanding aspects of the theory (e.g. relation to Other and object
a - see Rose [1975, p. 146]) but we will use it in so far as it covers identification and
in so far as its vocabulary can be used as a link and a metaphor for our analysis.
65 For an introduction-and-more on the two-year Seminar, see Forrester [1990, pp. 102-140]"The
seductions of psychoanalysis"
66 Schema taken from [Lacan:Miller 1975, p. 139],
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The apparatus consists of a concave reflector, a vase concealed inside a box, a bouquet
of flowers and a mirror. The flowers represent the sexual instinct which is 'destined' to
be 'contained' by a vase but only in so far as we are prepared to consent to the illusory
character of the operation. The eye/subject is located within the field of the apparatus.
Lacan's intention is to demonstrate the dependence of sexuality upon vision and the
visible. What makes the optical model suitable for the representation of the Imaginary
is, on the one hand, the eye and on the other, and equally importantly, the geometrical
straight-line properties of the transmission of light. The emphasis here is on symmetry
and illusion: The eye can see both a real image (the flowers) and a virtual image (the
vase) as reflections of/from the mirror67. In Lacanian terms the conjunction of real
images and virtual images represents the free play of imaginary and real objects
[Lacan:Miller 1975, p. 82], in other words the way in which sexuality is directed from
the instinct to the external world as the primordial imago the first 'merging' is defused,
perpetuated and will be sought in a long line of different real objects. It is due to this
image that the possibilities of counteless objects 'open up'. Man invests the Umwelt
(as Lacan calls the external world) with libido by virtue of this imago. 'It gives the
67 The term projection is significant in the imaginary. It has its origin in archaic modes of responding
to the world by expelling or excluding bad or unwanted objects. It appears together with introjection,
the taking in or incorporation of objects and both terms receive their meaning by reference to
identification which concerns characteristics, traits and relations rather than entire objects. For
introjection, identification and their relation see [LP pp. 229-31 and 205-208],
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Umwelt its form', says Lacan, 'in so much as he is a man and not a horse'
[Lacan:Miller 1975, p. 125] thus stressing that it is not any image but an image of the
same species that triggers sexuality and fixes the form of the Umwelt. The practical
implications are significant: the imago will always work as the prototype for the
approximation of the narcissistic libido and the object libido despite the essential
inadequacy of the imaginary captation (despite, that is, their non-coincidence). "For
man", says Lacan, "the other has a captivating value, on account of the anticipation
that is represented by the unitary image as it is perceived either in the mirror or in the
entire reality of the fellow being. The other, the alter-ego, is more or less confused,
according to the stage in life, with the Ichideal, this ego-ideal invoked throughout
Freud's article. Narcissistic identification - the world identification, without
differentiation, is unusable - that of the second narcissism, is identification with the
other which, under normal circumstances, enables man to locate precisely his
imaginary and libidinal relation to the world in general. That is what enables him to
see in its place and to structure, as a function of this place and of his world, his
being... The subject sees his being in a reflection in relation to the other, that is to say
in relation to the Ichideal" [Lacan:Miller 1975, p. 126, emphasis added].
The same 'conjunction' is echoed in the discussion of the function of the mirror in the
middle of the apparatus. The ideal-ich / ich-ideal is also echoed. Lacan explains that
the basic ego-other-object relationship is formed by the mirror. Think of the mirror as
a pane of glass, he says, on which we can see both your face and the image of the
objects beyond you. There will coincide our image with the images. This is a very
important process, the hominisation of the world: "The real objects, which pass via the
mirror, and through it, are in the same place as the imaginary object. The essence of
the image is to be invested with libido. What we call libidinal investment is what
makes an object become desirable, that is to say how it becomes confused with this
more or less structured image which, in diverse ways, we carry with us" [Lacan:Miller
1975, p. 141, emphasis added]. The inclination of the mirror is governed by the voice
of the other, thus inserting the symbolic relation into the apparatus. The 'symbolic'
here is both the ego-ideal (oedipal super-ego) that brings an end to the mirror
identification and the subject's symbolic connection to other human beings, the
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socially/structurally defined relations. Both senses of the term affect our ways towards
the Imaginary and Lacan stresses that in every possible occasion.
Desire, Identification, and the Ego in Analysis
An interesting account is given by Lacan for the relation of desire to (sexual) objects.
"What is my desire?" he asks. "What is my position in the imaginary structuration?
This position is only conceivable in so far as one finds a guide beyond the imaginary,
on the level of the symbolic plane, of the legal exchange which can only be embodied
in the verbal exchange between human beings" [Lacan:Miller 1975, p. 141].
With the emphasis on the symbolic position, Lacan is able to talk about the see-saw of
desire, the perpetual reversion of desire into form and of form into desire
[Lacan:Miller 1975, p. 171]. The secret between form and desire must be understood
with reference to all the notions we have so far developed. Lacan insists on two
words: 'empty' and 'form' on a number of occasions. The image is an empty form that
man assumes in the attempt at self-mastery [Lacan:Miller 1975, p. 169], it is the
image of the other's form that it is assumed by the subject later again and it is of
himself as body, as the empty form of the body, that one becomes aware in that
exchange (ibid). The trajectory from desire to the other and to sexuality is sustained
by this basic illusion, an illusion of wholeness which is central to the function of the
'form'. The fact that the other, upon whom the libidinal investment is concentrated, is
also subject to the illusion of wholeness does not affect the subject. In the other the
subject sees its completion like it once saw it in the imago. Lacan observes: "The
perpetual reversion of desire to form and of form to desire, in other words of
consciousness and body, of desire in so far as it is a part ofthe loved object, in which
the subject literally loses himself, and with which he is identified, is the fundamental
mechanism around which everything relating to the ego turns" [Lacan:Miller 1975, p.
171, emphasis added].
The ultimate example is, for Lacan, the example of falling in love, a captation in
which the narcissistic ideal-ego and the Oedipal ego-ideal merge. Being in love
concerns a 'transformation' of the other as speaking subject , with whom the subject
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has a symbolic relation, into an object: "The Ichideal, considered as speaking, can
come to be placed in the world of objects on the level of the Idealich...you can rest
assured that when this confusion occurs, the apparatus can't be regulated any longer.
In other words, when you are in love, you are mad, as ordinary language goes"
[LacamMiller 1975, p. 142],
Desire, Imaginary, Symbolic and Real also appear in relation to identification with
other human beings without necessarily implying 'falling in love'. In 'The Imaginary'
Rose starts from the ego-ideal to illustrate and explain how it intrudes upon the axis of
identification, which is supposed to sustain the fascination and create an illusion of
plenitude. This is the way she explains it: "The power of the ego ideal (Ich-ideal) to
propel the subject into a position of dual submission to the master image introjected as
ego ideal, and to those egos with which it posits itself as equivalent, becomes the
starting-point for a second set of questions about the effective modes of identification,
and their relationship to a demand which attempts to posit its own sufficiency, to
retrieve or reconstitute a position of plenitude" [Rose 1975, p. 143], Rose starts by
adapting Freud's three modes of identification to Lacan's Real, Imaginary and
Symbolic.
Freud [1921, p. 137] had specified the following types of identification: "(a)
identification as the original form of emotional tie with an object; (b) regressive
identification as a substitute for a libidinal object-tie by means of introjection of the
object on to the ego'; (c) identification which arises with a new perception of a
(repressed) common quality shared with some other person who is not the object of
the sexual instinct.
In terms of the Real, the Imaginary and the Symbolic these are: (a) privation (demand
directed to a lost object); (b) frustration (demand which cannot be given its object); (c)
castration (demand for which there is no object). [Rose 1975, p. 145]. We notice that
demand, which is directed to the external world, is aligned to "the place of the object
it claims" and this, says Rose, defines the mode of identification (ibid). In other words
it is always the insufficiency that codetermines, not to say primarily determines, the
mode of identification: "Each type of identification is thus taken as the model of a
mode of relation (primary object-relation, regressive identification with libidinal
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object, identification between egos), a structure of insufficiency (privation, frustration,
castration), and a tension between demand and desire with a corresponding set of
alternative drives" (ibid).
We will end the presentation with a reference to the experience and the principles of
analysis in relation to the ego. Up to now we discussed the constitution of the ego. In
analysis its demolition takes place. The ego's identity is determined by its nature. It
bears traces of its history of investment of objects and of identifications. The history
of the ego's loves and identifications, of abandoned cathexes that have left their mark
on it, can be followed backwards. 'Peeling its layers off as Lacan suggests
[LacamMiller 1975, p. 171] will be the necessary preparatory task for 'unearthing' the
subject's unrecognised desire. The process of analysis aims at achieving cure,
alleviation or elimination of the symptom(s) by achieving the recognition of desire in
language. Lacan has earlier asked rhetorically: 'what is my desire?' and had indicated
that the answer depends as much on the Imaginary as on the Symbolic: "how could he
[the subject] achieve recognition for his desires? He hasn't got a clue about them...in
fact, he has to search out his desires. Otherwise he wouldn't need analysis. Which is
enough to show us that he is cut off from what's related to his ego, namely from what
of himself he is capable of securing recognition for" [LacamMiller 1975, p. 167].
Relating the subject to this knowledge of what seeks and must achieve recognition,
initially involves the removal of the ego's misrecogntions and obstacles. The subject's
history is reconstituted: "so that he can recognise all the stages of his desire, all the
objects which have given constancy, nourishment and body to this image"
[LacamMiller 1975, p. 182] and must go as far as the discovery of the Imago that
governs and conditions the investments: "The first phase of analysis is accomplished
in the passage from...what, in the ego, is unknown to the subject to this image in
which he recognises his imaginary investments" [LacamMiller 1975, p. 186].
Rediscovering the imago is not the end. If analysis were to stop at this point, the
subject would be left in a state of narcissistic love (Verliebtheit) encouraged by the
recapturing of the image. This would be no different in essence from the constitution
of all loves and all object investments to be found in the ego's history. The analyst's
intervention would have assisted the Imaginary. And because the speaking subjects'
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relation always evolves around the ideal-ego and the ego-ideal (super-ego) it would
have been the analyst from the latter position, as voice shifting the mirror, that would
have brought about the revival of narcissism.
TWO INFLUENCES
The Purloined Letter
In his 1954-55 seminars [Lacan:Miller 1978, pp. 191-205] Lacan discusses E A Poe's
"The Purloined Letter"68. It is a beautiful illustration of the workings of the imaginary
and the symbolic. Moreover it is an application of theory on a literary text.
"The Purloined Letter" is the story of fascination and language. The catastrophic
results of copying the moves of the other and falling a victim of the imaginary
symmetry of form is brought to light by the circulation of a letter, a moving signifier
that changes the symbolic position if its successive holders. The story's Queen
receives the letter. As she is reading it the King and the Minister arrive and she places
it 'innocently' face down on the table. The Minister immediately recognises the
significance of the letter and steals it while the Queen, unable to do anything in the
king's presence, watches passively. The police are asked to retrieve the letter on her
behalf. The Minister's house is secretly searched but nothing is found. Enter the clever
detective, Dupin, who is called to assist the police. He visits the Minister's house and
immediately spots the letter. He organises a street disturbance in front of the
Minister's house and while the latter is distracted by the incident he steals the letter
and replaces it with a note. Dupin was able to locate the letter because he could see
through the Minister's tactics, the fact that he, being clever, would never have hidden
it in any place that the police could reach. The Minister's trick was simple: he turned
the letter inside out, addressed it to himself with a feminine handwriting and replaced
the seal with his own.
The story is analytically interesting for two reasons. First, for the symmetry of its
main parts, second, for exemplifying the analytic fact that signification, the ever-
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changing relation of the characters, is never where one thinks it is [Lacan:Miller 1978,
p. 187]. In other words it is the dialectical game that interest Lacan-the-analyst in
Poe's story beyond the plane of anticipating the other's action which defines the
limitations of the imaginary.
In his reading Lacan attempts to show that the letter is the unconscious of its
successive holders: "it is his [holder's] unconscious with all of its consequences, that
is to say that at each point in the symbolic circuit, each of them becomes someone
else" [LacamMiller 1978, p. 197]. The symbolic defines the subject. There are no
characters in the traditional sense. They are defined by the relation "determined by the
aspiration of the real subject through the necessity of the symbolic linking process". In
this sense the letter is a character, synonymous, according to Lacan, with 'the original,
radical subject' (ibid). Due to the significance of its uncommunicated content the letter
is a pure symbol that affects anyone of its holders. "This position" notes Lacan "isn't
fixed. In so far as they have entered into the necessity, into the movement peculiar to
the letter, they each become, in the course of successive scenes, functionally different
in relation to the essential reality which it constitutes" (ibid). The letter itself has value
only in relation to what it threatens, violates, flouts and places in danger (LacamMiller
1978, p. 198] but it also seems vulnerable and unprotected as it falls pray to the
intentions of its holder and loses its power when used once [LacamMiller 1978, p.
201],
Lacan stresses two important features of the story, the significance of the symbolic
relations represented by the pacts of 'marriage' and 'royalty' and the unconscious-like
flying quality of the letter whose addressee is only specified by the fact that a letter
always reaches its destination.
The minister and the police are perfect examples of the imaginary, both towards each
other and to others. The minister is by far the most interesting figure. In order to hide
the letter he addresses it to himself with the signature of a woman: "...this is a curious
relation to oneself. The letter undergoes a sudden feminisation, and at the same time it
enters into a narcissistic relation- since it is now addressed in this sophisticated
feminine hand, and bears his own seal" [LacamMiller 1978, p. 199], The minister
68 See also Lacan [1972].
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does not use the letter. He remains silent, knowing that Queen knows about it and,
according to Lacan, it is as if the minister remains silent about a repressed disorder.
The real significance of his silence is clearly seen in the lack in the symbolic: "He
suspends the power conferred on him by the letter in indeterminacy, he gives it no
symbolic meaning" and the imaginary dependence: "all he plays on is the fact that this
mirage, this reciprocal fascination is established between himself and the Queen,
which is what I told you about earlier on, in speaking of the narcissistic relation. The
dual relation between master and slave, founded in the last resort on the indeterminate
threat of death, but on this occasion on the fears of the Queen" (ibid). Thus the
minister will find himself in the same position as the Queen when he will be
dispossessed of the letter by Dupin. Here Lacan notes: "This is not due to the
ingenuity of Dupin, but to the structure of things" [LacamMiller, p. 201, emphasis
added]. When in the same position as the queen the minister will fall victim of the
same trick.
The police as imaginary are defined by their relation to power and to the minister. In
the former sense are victims of the power itself: "[they] have been persuaded that
their efficacity rests on force- not so as to put trust in them, but on the contrary to curb
their functions. And thanks to the fact that the police think that they are able to
exercise their functions through force, they are as powerless as one could wish" (ibid).
This absolutely imaginary police is the guarantee of the minister's own power. For
him, if they, the representatives of power, cannot find the latter no one can. This is the
minister's mistake: "It is having forgotten that if the police haven't found the letter, it
isn't that the letter can't be found, but rather that the police were looking for
something else. The ostrich feels secure because its head is buried in the sand- he's the
perfect ostrich, who would think itself safe because another ostrich [autre autruche] -
other-ich [autrui-che]- has its head buried in the sand. And it leaves its behind to be
plucked by a third, who takes possession of its feathers and makes a panache of them"
[LacamMiller 1978, p. 203].
The triumph of the clever detective is based on avoiding the traps of the imaginary.
He does not look for what the police have been looking for and he finds the letter. He
avoids the effeminating silencing effects of having the letter by extricating himself
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from its circuit: he demands a fee for his work and he retires from the scene. That is
why Dupin is successful.
The circulation of the letter and the step-by-step displacement of the characters from
scene to scene make it certain that the letter 'reaches its destination'. The structural
positions remain the same but they are occupied by different persons.
Dupin's arrival has the following effect: "It [the letter] really reaches the King, a King
who still doesn't know anything. But the character of the King has changed in the
meanwhile, having shifted one notch along, and become the Queen, it is now the
minister who is the King. In the third stage, he [Dupin] has taken the place of the
King, and he has the letter" [LacamMiller 1978, p. 204]. As for the final blow,
Dupin's ridiculing of the Minister, the letter he substitutes for the original allowing
him to believe for an indefinite time that he has the real item, falls perfectly within the
eye-catching powers of the imaginary. Dupin's new letter is actually a new form of the
letter to which the minister remains attached and which he might have to account for
in the future.
Lacan ends the seminar with a reminder of the key point of his account: "Everything
which could serve to define the characters as real- qualities, temperament, heredity,
nobility- has nothing to do with the story. At every moment each of them, even their
sexual attitude, is defined by the fact that a letter always reaches its destination" (ibid).
"Ion" is similar to the "Purloined letter" in many respects. The letter is a child, the
mirage of which passes in front of each character and awakens deep emotions, not
only in relation to other human beings but in relation to unacknowledged and
repressed desires. But there is no clever detective. Instead of this, we have two big
camps, Ion and Xuthus on one side, Creusa and her friends on the other. They are
consumed by passion and mainly waste themselves in completely erroneous
anticipations of imaginary, narcissistic passions, envy and hostility.
A Structuralist Influence
The second influence is structuralist. It systematises the passing down-the line of the
child / message from the lips of Apollo to Creusa.
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I use a quasi-structuralist model inspired by Greimas [1983] for two purposes: a) to
introduce the vocabulary of the play69 and b) to sketch the linear movement of the
progressing unravelling plot, the merciless forward-moving linear plot that introduces
'a child', a strange object, in the discourse and addresses it 'to whom it may concern'.
The following topography is based on two ideas: Bremond's [1980] notion of
contractual relations70, according to which a narrative is a succession of engagements
of interest, and Greimas's semiotic theory. Greimas's most popular idea, the 'logical
square', allows for a semiotic reduction of a text to a series of two-pair opposites
bound together by relations of contrariety and contiguity. The logical square exhausts
the semantic combinations of two pairs of opposite terms. Thus two terms (a) and (b),
black and white, for instance, can be conjoined in a third term (a and b) 'grey', or
disjoined (neither a nor b), 'colour' in general.
The vocabulary is organised in four cornered schemata.71 They fall short of Greimas'
structuralist rigour and I only use them for their expository clarity72. Scenes Two and
Three are mirrors of each other and I believe it is essential to know from the
beginning what are the common terms of interest, the options available, the tensions
and the limits of action. Inspired by the symbolic, the ultimate referent of human
action-thought, my intention is to demonstrate the economic simplicity of the
possibilities common to all sides. In our play the unravelling of meaning concerns the
following elements: a. the structure of communication: Sender-Message-Receiver; b.
the structure of exchange; c. the object; d. the organisation of the intellect.
69 We are interested specifically in the language of the play not in the Greek language in general. For
instance, we refer to 'knowledge' not as 'knowledge in the Greek throught' but as knowledge in Ion, that
appears with other terms in the field of the intellect such as 'ignorance', belief, speculation etc.
70 According to Bremond [1980] a story is a process of modifications or preservations of a given
situation. Modifications can be favourable or unfavourable, further divided into
amelioration/protection or degradation/frustration. Actions, intentions and motivations can be
described with reference to these standards. 1 found the exercise in Greimas [1983] and Bremond both
interesting and useful in distancing myself from the emotional appeal of the drama.
7' The four-cornered schema according to Greimas has nothing to do with the four-cornered schema
according to Lacan, at least for the purposes of our exposition, (see Schleifer [1987, chapter 5 and
pp. 182-201] for a discussion of the similarities and differences between Greimas and Lacan).
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The plot is presented as a series of repeated loops or movements. Thus apart form the
symbolic framework such an un-sentimental approach to drama can provide us with a
first approximation of the imaginary as emotional investment of a situation73.
The circulation of the 'child' begins with Apollo as the original Sender. In
psychoanalysis a beginning is grounded in language, so Apollo is the first sender not
because he is a god but because he speaks first about the child. Like another 'in the
beginning it was the word' the absolute beginning is only possible in the symbolic
where the subject names and is named, recognises and is recognised, makes a new
start and assumes a role, announces his intentions and is called to assume
responsibility for his acts.
The Form ofCommunication
For any act of communication Greimas proposes the basic schema:
Sender - Object ofcommunication - Receiver.
We modify it in the following way: a. In place of 'object of communication' we
propose 'message/object', in order to account for the fact that between the sender and
the receiver both words and things can be exchanged, b. There are two receivers for
the same message, a direct and an indirect one. The indirect receiver is either the
representative of someone who is not present or a mediator. The positions Sender and
Receiver can be held by anyone. The circulation of information is accomplished as the
Receiver of the previous sequence is raised to a Sender in the next sequence.
72 An application of Greimas' model on Ancient Greek drama can be found in Moudatsakis [1986].
73 I would say that it can provide us with an almost 'objective' insight into destiny, not the superior
dark forces that guide the world but the implications of being born into an organised system, playing
by its rules and having to face the inevitable of taking a position in it. This definition fits the
description of the symbolic according to Lacan. Is destiny symbolic then? It is. But it is more if one
considers the fact that the adjustment to the symbolic is not an act of obedience by anyone. Most of the
times it is exactly the opposite. It is rebellion against the one who represents it, against the fellow
human being who seems to govern rather than be governed by it. To resist means to anticipate, to plot,
to make plans, to enter an imaginary rivalry with the other. Destiny is imaginary too. It is the junction
of the symbolic and the imaginary -the edge at which analysis is conducted. What does it mean 'to meet




both to be and represent
to represent
neither to be nor represent
When Apollo gives Ion to Xuthus he introduces a problem much bigger than the lack
satisfied by his 'generosity'. A tension develops between the four corners of 'being'
and the subject, any subject, is left to account for its existence, fundamentally
unsatisfied by the 'neatness' of the divine solution.
'To be' implies a permanence and a continuity which is mainly supported by the
personal account of who I have been that far and a narcissistic desire to reach a 'will
be' or a 'would be' in the future.
To locate the question of being in the circulation of communication means that any
issue of identity or lack is only meaningfully addressed in language. On "the wall of
language" says Lacan, are projected both the imaginary and the symbolic, and this is
exactly the case here, even when 'silence' carries the main burden of communication.
In language, it is the other who gives you a precise definition of who you are by
resorting to what you represent for him: 'my son', 'my daughter', 'my slave'. This
symbolic nomination calls for a recognition, acceptance or refusal of the proposed
relation. To accept means to be able to account for it. To refuse means to fall out at
the margins of society. Acceptance of the other's nomination means bringing being
and representing together, examining their compatibility, recognising the one in the
other. Refusing means flirting with death, running the risk of being excluded from
meaningful social relations.
However appealing, accepting divine solutions or the bestowed meaning is never a
simple task. Difficulties arise when one tries to account for events and choices. Even
if there is no free choice and no free will in the strict sense of the term any meaningful
account of being is necessarily inspired by (the fear of) death, the non-meaning
lurking behind every good choice and every act of belief. If the Greeks managed to
project their gods outside themselves and rid those images with the responsibility of
choices they would rather not make they never managed to get rid of the return of this
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responsibility in the form of aporia. Consider, for instance, Ion's aporia in the face of
the history of his life as he attempts to account for the apparent discontinuity of being
the foundling, the natural son of Xuthus, both and none, a nameless servant who
landed in the best lack he could ever have imagined. One can live, perhaps, with the
illusion of no choice but no one can live with gaps and fragments of identity and fears.
As for the knowledge that there is someone out there who knows it offers no
consolation, it just makes things worse. Like another Oedipus Rex one, anyone, can
never resist the desire to know.
The Structure ofExchange
give: favour take: appropriation
give and take: exchange neither: gift
Exchange is a basic law of society. It can be considered as a regulated and recognised
give and take (as opposed to theft, for instance). The legal and regulatory aspect of its
meaning is always present in the background of our play but it is the pairing of
exchange with the other three terms that interests us here. These are: favour, gift and
appropriation. It is the inability to establish exchange proper, legal and regulated, that
diverts the account about the 'child' to other terms.
Favour (as 'give' only) carries the idea of exchange one step beyond since it suspends
the completion of give and take and introduces the goodwill necessary for the future
reciprocation or completion of the act. In this sense one expects to be given later what
is due to one. Therefore one expects to be the receiver of a second move by which the
suspended transaction will be completed. This would be the case of Creusa and
Xuthus who expect or believe to be given back what belongs to them. Ion, too,
expects something in return to his services, either a better lack or license to use the
name of Apollo. Creusa' s servant is not very far from that either. A closer
examination of 'favour' shows that it is a difficult relationship, open to
misinterpretation, laden with 'debt', unfinished or even totally unsupported in the
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symbolic74. Why, for instance, should a servant be included in a circuit of favours
since his entire existence is defined by his obligatory labour? Why should any one's
self-appointed task of glory or destruction be rewarded eventually?
On the other hand favour has a flavour of divine inspiration that transcends the vulgar
commercialism of give and take. Hermes announces that he did a favour to his brother
when he brought his child to Delphi (1. 36-7) and there emerges a sense of honour-to-
be-saved, a matter too delicate to be resolved by socially prescribed rules. Favour will
be an all important register in the next scenes, and more than any other term will
underline the debate of give and take and responsibility.
Appropriation is the least controversial term. It contravenes all the rules of society
apart from 'power'75. It opens up the possibility of enmity and hatred.
To complete the relations of exchange there is the 'gift'. It implies an object changing
hands but not in terms of exchange or favour. It may be a ritual gift, a token of
agreement, or an heirloom which like a ritual gift has no practical use but is passed on
from generation to generation.
The object
In view of childlessness, the lack manifested in the play, the missing object is the
child. In view of ignorance about the child the object is knowledge. Acquisition of
knowledge and the child converge at a certain point:
animate (child) inanimate (knowledge)
both animate and inanimate neither animate nor inanimate
At times knowledge figures as the intermediate object leading to the child. In order to
find one needs to know. At times it substitutes the child and seems to take its place,
when, for instance, Creusa claims that she only wants to know that her child is dead.
74 Unsupported in the sense that 'unfinished business' usually is. One may think that he owes or should
receive a favour back and may act accordingly. Thus the action, that has symbolic consequences is
actually grounded in the grey area between the symbolic and the imaginary.
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At another point it coincides with the child and the one justifies the other: if you have
the child you have knowledge and vice versa. By having the first Xuthus can further
the second. At every turn knowledge- or the lack of it- 'summarises' the position of the
subject relative to its immediate need, the quest for the child or identity, and to the
other.
Intellect: Knowing and believing:
I call intellect the general field of employment of the intellectual faculty76. I have not
chosen the term reason, though from the point of view of consciousness it would have
been equivalent. Examining the thinking mechanisms of the play one realises that
believing, which seems more like a suspension of knowing or wanting to know, is as
valid a mechanism of proceeding with reality or action as a rigorous logical argument.
None, however, is error-proof. Examining the attitudes to knowledge one soon comes
across a major inconsistency: everyone wants to know and declares it vehemently, but
then every one is ready to put reason aside if it leads nowhere. Everyone can offer a
well built argument but without noticing that something important has been left out.
At times the demonstration of reason seems mechanistic, not to say childish. Yet,
excluding the initial erroneous assumption, arguments can be impeccable.
The intellect spreads along the four corners of:
knowledge ignorance
belief deduction / anticipation / doubt
75 The vocabulary of force and violence is included here.
76 in 'Intimations of the Will in Greek Tragedy' Vernant [1972] claims that the term 'will' as we
understand it today is missing from the Greek vocabulary. He organises the field of thought in a
brilliant way around the missing category. We claim knowledge of it and continue to use the term 'will'
aware of the difference. In our account the missing term can join a long line of missing of miss-used
terms and lost and missing causes. Will is not named but is evoked, and if the loss of will appears to
culminate with the acceptance of the god's orders (someone else's will?) the play affords us the luxury
of a denouement structured around an il-lose-ion: one is saved by losing what one never had.
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Knowledge concerns the known and the know-able, something to be remembered and
something to be worked out rationally. Ignorance and belief mark the end of the
individual and the beginning of the volition of the other who owns and commands the
missing information. To believe the other, be it the god or the fellow human being,
means to accept its reasoning. 'Ignorance' hides a secret which still lurks in the
English words ignorant and to ignore. 'To ignore' is both not-to-know and to leave
outside deliberately. Deduction, anticipation and doubt cover the field of producing
knowledge out of nothing or next to nothing, advancing the mental process by
speculating on the other's move, and one's assumptions about how the other is
reasoning.
We might ask what is it all about? Truth? Deciphering the mysterious object, the
unknown child that comes from Apollo? There is indeed an intellectual attempt to
grasp what comes from beyond reason and memory. Notice however, that while
'knowledge' will question everything and everyone in its course it will not question
itself. In very simple terms 'What if I am wrong?' is never taken into account when
one is under pressure to produce certainties and hold on to them. Its course is
regressive. It aims at 'bracketing out' the present and re-instituting a 'bracketed out'
past in its place. Xuthus, for instance, wants to bring back his only son and Creusa
wants to reinstate the order of things to what they were before his appearance. Old
knowledge, obsolete repressed knowledge, is re-employed. The data of memory are
revised in the light of the present circumstances.
Once self-questioning is excluded, the aspirations of the subject, which are essentially
limitless, can only take their measure from the other. The comic and at the same time
serious attempt of the subject-in-panic resembles an assault and reliance on mortals
and immortals in doing what the other does, anticipating what the other is going to do,
exceeding the cunning or the cruelty of the other. The other inspires. Excess and lack
of proportion inspires. The subject's route to its aim, passes through reflection in both
senses of the term.
The circulation of the 'child'
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The oracle is a linguistic message. Its meaning might be literal or metaphorical. It is
always addressed 'to whom it may concern' and as such it never fails to reach its
destination. Here we have no clever detective to tell us who the real receiver is and
everyone assumes it is himself. Inversely, in order to appreciate what is involved, we
could imagine this "passing-of-the buck" going on for ever and Apollo's gift being
wasted like a letter really purloined which is condemned to pass back and forth via the
same temporary holders. This would be the real disaster, which would only end in the
destruction of the unwanted 'child'/ message77.
Considering the scenes as successive loops of action we clearly see that the plot is
governed by the following law: receive and pass on. In the same sequences we can
also locate the place(s) where emotional or imaginary investment will intrude.
First sequence
Sender: Apollo / Message: the first man you see is your son / Receiver: Xuthus
(direct).
If Apollo expects something in return from Xuthus then this is the first part of an
exchange, if not, it is a favour. But it is not Apollo's intention that matters but the
king's interpretation. He chooses the literal meaning according to which 'is' equals 'has
always been'. In the same way he considers the offer as a return of what belongs to
him, while the oracle only grants him two separate things, an object and the
knowledge that there is now a son for him. In other words it recognises Xuthus' desire
to have a son but nothing more. It is Xuthus who establishes Apollo's truth half way
between his own understanding and the unexpected satisfaction of his wish, invests it
with reality and makes it imaginary78.
Second sequence
77 Which, being a modern reader, I consider far more important than Apollo's dignity.
7% We do not even need the technical sense of the word here. Ion is imaginary to the extend that
Xuthus account of his birth and life is.
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Sender: Xuthus/ Message: you are/he is my son/ Receiver: Ion (direct) and chorus
(indirect)
To recognise has two meanings, to identify a familiar form and 'to accept as one's
own'. Ion's recognition cannot be an identification but it is made to resemble one.
Xuthus proposes a mutual recognition. He offers the certainty of his recollection and
the infallibility of the oracle as evidence. Ion is confronted with an irresistible
combination of knowing and believing, the already established deal between the god
and the king. He cannot escape Xuthus' certainty, his own lack (parentlessness) and
his devotion to the god. The proposed agreement is based on mutual need and the tacit
understanding and consent of a third party who is deliberately ignored for the
moment79. The recognition of the father is nothing more that a recognition of a deal, a
symbolic recognition from which the corresponding natural bond is missing. And it
will be missing till the moment they begin to invest the pact with emotion. Reality is
constructed in a make-believe way.
The second receiver of the message is the chorus. They are persuaded by Xuthus as
much as Ion is. They are assigned a piece of knowledge and are forced to consent to
something which contradicts what they represent, loyalty to Athenian tradition. Their
decision to intervene is always a structural necessity. They rely on the first meaning of
recognition, that is, they identify the king's son but do not recognise him. They re¬
open the gap between the two meanings and then transcend it by pairing it with
death80.
Third sequence
Sender: chorus/ Message: you will not have a son/ the god gave a son to Xuthus.
Receiver: Creusa (direct), Creusa's servant (indirect).
79 In order to recognise each other and father and son Xuthus and Ion have to put both Apollo and
Creusa aside- we will discuss this extensively in the next reading.
Choosing between the literal and the metaphorical and investing the chosen term with
emotion/death duplicates the king's act.
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The chorus is a mirror. They reflect the image of the king/husband to Creusa. They
reflect his certainty, the form of it, but over a different content. Just like Xuthus they
have been there, they have seen and they can interpret.
The content of their intervention can always be dismissed as a lie. But if we assume
that they are not exempt from the observable tendency of all characters to be self-
deceived at some point, we could say that the chorus illustrates the maximum distance
between perception and consciousness which allows for the (unconscious) fear to rush
forth in the shape of death. The chorus' own intentions soon become irrelevant as
Creusa is not misled by their 'lie' but by her own interpretation.
Fourth sequence
Sender: Creusa/ Message: Recognition, he is not my son- murder attempt/ Receiver
Ion andApollo.
Creusa locates herself in a position of lack, neither being nor representing the mother
of the child, and plans to extend her decision to a persuasive action. The only line of
action consistent with the double refusal is one which returns the gift to its sender, in a
move that duplicates ignorance (being ignored by the other). Creusa does not return
the mental equivalent of the gift, the knowledge of her dissatisfaction, but the object
itself. This intervention aims at restoring her to a permanent state of lack and
paradoxically to a permanent 'freezing' of communication with Apollo. Creusa passes
back her version of the reversal of fortune as it affects her and in the sense that she
faithfully follows the pattern of the entire play. In the same way as Xuthus and the
chorus pass their ignorance on to the other person and therefore get rid of it, Creusa
passes her ignorance on to the next receiver(s).
In the position of indirect receiver Apollo would find himself the receiver of his own
gift. The dissemination of his gift/message through a series of mediators reaches
Creusa in reverse form and Apollo on its way back. The human object is 'swallowed
up' in failed 'communication', a situation that threatens to deteriorate into a never
ending exchange of 'nothing' between two parties which would be handing each other
the same gift.
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Ion, the direct receiver of the murderous act, must bear the responsibility of someone
else's faults. Indeed the child is branded for life by his parents' mistakes.
Fifth sequence
Sender: Apollo (Pythia)/Message: Box/Receiver: Ion (direct), Creusa (indirect).
Last in the line of receivers Creusa and Ion are left with father's mistake to live or die
for. The necessity to recognise it, to assume responsibility for it and for oneself and
also to take death into account emerges from the structure itself: the buck goes no
further. The last receiver must know what to do with it.
Creusa and Ion's second meeting compacts the present, the past and the future, the
message, the sender and the receiver in a confrontation which metaphorically 'freezes'
the circulation ofmeaning in the face to face symmetry of the opponents.
However, the next move will emerge from the same structural properties: even if you
hold your truth of your existence in a box you have to pass it on. It is always the other
that will tell you who you are.
I have tried to represent the plot of the play up to Creusa and Ion's second meeting as
a series of message communications and (partial) emotional investments. This is the
linear progress of the play to which we must fix our attention in order not fall victim
to the fascinations of human drama, in order avoid an emotional response to the play.
Let us keep in mind the relentless structural necessity behind the blindness of the
protagonists, behind the lies of the chorus and the happiness of recognition all round.
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PART 2 TOWARDS THE IMAGINARY
In the beginning there was the father. The social rebirth of the child and the parent
derives its authority from the symbolic importance of the act and the appeal of the
emotional value of the bond. The ego is built here. Aided by the other's love and
presence, it is firmly grounded in the visible and the obvious, the input of the senses
and the infallibility of reason. When everything is obvious, transparent and easy to
explain, when anyone can call the other's bluff, the traumatic encounter with
nothingness, the shocking first scene, is eclipsed by the abundance of love offered by
the fellow human being.
Scenes Two and Three are full of honest mistakes and subtle deceptions, full of
passionate declarations of devotion and seemingly persuasive arguments of pure
reason. They are full of emotional traps meant to balance their lame logic with an
appeal founded on a familiar theme: the evils of old age and childlessness.
For us scenes two and three are arrangements ofmirrors. They reflect each other, they
engage in an imaginary dialogue with each other, they display rigorous knowledge in
such an extraordinarily faulty way that in the end the error that sparks them off does
not seem important any more. But they do not fail entirely. Two scenes of human folly
are not there just to destroy 'our confidence' in reason and to excite some unspecified
religious feeling. They open up the dialectic of the ego and the object in language.
They allow the play ofform and desire to begin and to reflect its very beginning.
Starting with the divine imperative 'thou shall be...' and the unquestionable necessity
of obeying it, the stereoscopic geometry of the two scenes evolves around the voice of
the other. No one goes beyond the message/child introduced by divine decree and no
one ignores it. This act of reverence defines the junction of the imaginary and the
symbolic, the attraction towards the verbal destiny, the vague super-egoic speech of
the father that orders: enjoy, satisfy your desire, do as I say. Ultimately scenes two and
three are efforts to adapt to the voice of the other, the first swing of the mirror and the
most influential one.
The effect of these scenes lies beyond their linear plot. No matter how ridiculous
Xuthus is, no matter how blind the servant proves, their imaginary solutions have
crossed the threshold of the symbolic. And vice versa, no matter how wise or
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symbolically equipped they are they will always depend on the support of the
appearances established in the imaginary. So the vocabulary of the scenes involves us
in an exercise of intelligence, senses and established values, the objective of which is
not the integrity of the one or the other but the achievement of a 'proficiency' in
focusing on separate issues for which cross-eyed-ness is sometimes an advantage. It
prepares the ground for the resolution of the drama. It obeys the basic rule of the
imaginary: what you see depends on where you are looking from and what you expect
to see.
I will discuss two symmetrical situations. The first one concerns the pair Xuthus-Ion
anticipating Creusa's reaction. The second concerns the group Creusa-old servant-
chorus anticipating the previous pair's actions. The two pairs are engaged in an
ongoing imaginary dialogue in which we discern an infinite number of similarities
between 'characters', words, structural positions, potentials. There is also an
equivalence of roles and polarities (parent-child, master-servant, man-woman etc.) and
modes of talking (e.g., persuasion) and styles, all of which we could describe as an
extensive copying going back and forth or round and round. The key secret of the
structure of scenes two and three is fascination in the most analytic sense of the term.
It is the connotative, evocative similarity of the poetry that only realises a fraction of
its promising lines and lets the other run parallel ad infinitum.
The common basis of the two scenes is the intersubjective relationship: me-other. The
intended destruction of the other via/ because of the fascinating similarity (perhaps
this touches upon the nature of signification here) only conceals the fact that friend
and enemy share terrifying similarities. We will only select a limited number of
mirrorings, mainly those that exemplify the ego - other dialectic, the logic of the
imaginary, the power of anticipation in the two scenes and the limitations of the
imaginary.
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Father and Son: A New Beginning
Swing of the mirror: the first man you see is you son81. The closed world of two, the
self-sufficient universe of the parent and the child is constructed before our eyes.
Freud spoke of the narcissism of the parent born again with the child [Freud 1914. p.
85], Usually it is the mother we are thinking of when we are referring to that pair. In
this scene the natural mother-child relationship is imitated by the king who goes
beyond the absolutely necessary recognition of a symbolic pact. Like the Minister in
Poe's story Xuthus adopts a feminine position. Fie hides his gift, anticipates his wife's
reaction and misuses the privilege of the ruler to nominate in the symbolic, to create
by law. He is drawn into a complicated account of the past and defends his secret as if
to safeguard an illicit satisfaction of an immediate desire in the present.
Xuthus and Ion are left to deal with necessity: Apollo's oracle brings together a master
and a slave who must agree upon a relation that satisfies a god's desire and must
accommodate their new roles and their identity to that desire. The pair will drag the
explanations of a natural relationship out of their obscure past, the imaginary space
available for innovation. Thus they produce their own certainties to the point of
dissociating them from their real source, obedience to the voice of the Other82.
Xuthus and Ion are faced with an unaccounted (occulted) transformation and with the
order to interpret it:
slave—> receiver oforacle—> child ofking
childless king—> receiver oforacle—> father ofchild
Mutual recognition is appealing for its immediacy. It concerns the fulfilment of desire
suddenly made present, touch-able. The embrace of the father and the son is the proof
of it. Beyond the divine imperative the agreement to be father-son emerges as a kind
of panacea for all worries. It enables them to remedy a prior error, each one his own,
Xuthus paternity is mostly dismissed by scholars in view of the last settlement of the truth of
Apollo's paternity. Echoing Ferguson [1969] seems to take Euripides' rationality for granted and claims
that Xuthus is a more possible father than Apollo: of course Ion is the spiritual child of Apollo but that's
as far as their relationship goes. I mention this 'maverick' article for seeing something there, the very
fact that the symbolic status of paternity will never be challenged.
The symbolic necessity, that is, for a child and an heir.
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Xuthus the folly of youth and Ion the loss of purity and innocence from the previous
encounter with Creusa. The new beginning is a plunge in naiveti, the undoing of the
past. This is, I believe, the most outstanding and spectacular achievement of the pact.
It allows two different people's losses to be placed one upon the other and vanish. The
rite of passage, a celebration of coming into adulthood and the acceptance by the male
society will be built on the ignorance/ repression of the only thing that could possibly
sustain it, sexuality. Xuthus does not explain how one is borne or becomes a man or
an Athenian. When Ion's questions about his place in the adult world become too
pressing, Xuthus gives him another aspect of the imaginary, a unique show ofpower
concentrated in a single masterful line:
7tanaai koycov xcbvt?, sftxuxeiv <? sTciaxaao (1. 650) [stop it, learn to be happy] which
will fix the child for ever in an attempt to comply to the father's83 desire.
The gains of the new order are indisputably appealing. The risks are worth taking.
Xuthus and Ion construct a thousand and one lies to convince each other that this is a
genuine one in a million coming together of a lost father and son while ignoring the
fact that it is not to each other but to the world that they should account for their
relationship. Closed in a narcissistic world of two the father and the son will invent
myths and persuasions.
Two myths for Ion
Xuthus' opening appeal accomplishes a difficult task. It evokes the 'mother' and the
'father' for as long as it is necessary to capture Ion's desire. He then represses both
parents and takes their place.
If images have power84 then Ion's enchantment depends entirely on the success of
Xuthus' gestures. He enters the scene jubilant, confident, arms spread to embrace the
83 The figure Xuthus the stupid king is fascinating. There are times when I think that he might actually
be the ultra-clever king who has it all worked out and knows that the best way to play the game of the
throne of Athens is to pretend to be a complete fool. A line like 'stop it, learn to be happy' at least
deserves such a thought.
84 We are talking power in the imaginary of course, the reawakening of the expected image. Lacan
gives a nice example of 'love at first sight' right after explaining 'being in love': "Remember the first
122
first man who was never embraced by a mother. The double imaginary captation, like
love at first sight, guarantees in advance the success of his speech which will only
elaborate on the key issues of the opening (primordial) image. We usually refer to
Xuthus' speech as persuasion. It is not. It is a mutual seduction85 between two
consenting parties in which each seduces the other and himself, each contributing his
own image to the world of two.
Motherless birth
Xuthus' appeal responds to Ion's expectations and fears. It evokes the maternal
embrace, the order of the god and the abomination of patricide wrapped around
Xuthus' storming entry:
co tskvov, p'yap apyfj tod koyou 7tp87tonod pen [Hail my son, the beginning of
speech is fitting] (1. 517); 5oq (plAppa pot ope; ocopaxoq f" apcpurxDxaq [Let me
kiss you and embrace you; or as Way suggests: let me fold thy form in mine embrace]
(1. 519); coq xi 5p cpsbystq ps; [Why do you run away from me having recognised me?"
[trans. Owen 1939] or, more colourfully: "Doesn't instinct tell you to love me? (1.
525); And to Ion's hostile reception he replies: ktsivs kou 7up7tpr|; 7rapxoq yap, pv
Kxavpq^sasi cpovsbq, [Do your worst, you will have been the murderer of your father
[trans. Owen 1939] or, according to Vellacott [trans., 1954]: Very well, kill me - but
you will have to bury me too: I am your father (1. 527).
The appeal is a mixture of power and resignation. The king makes himself vulnerable.
He runs the risk of making himself ridiculous by surrendering to a young slave. He
gives himself up but the force of his argument is the silent implication of certainty:
would I be making myself a fool if I was not sure about it?
time Werther sees Lotte, as she is cuddling a child. It's an entirely satisfying image from the
Anlehnungstypus on the anaclitic plane [form of narcissistic choice]. It is the way the object coincides
with Goethe's hero's fundamental image that triggers off his fatal attachment..." [LacamMiller 1975, p.
142],
Seduction is actually a term Lacan uses in relation to narcissism [LacamMiller, p. 132].
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Ion responds to the mixture of power and vulnerability, the contingent similarity86 of
the present situation with what he expects parental affection to be like. He is caught in
the meshes of an anticipated image which he himself has created.
Xuthus responds to the reawakening of his own narcissism. It is a state of creative
omnipotence half way between the inimitable female childbirth and Zeus's producing
offspring out of his head. For the sake of acquiring a child Xuthus will go through the
'labour' of persuading/seducing Ion and will give himself the opportunity to realise the
dream of creating 'out of nothing'. In creating Ion, Xuthus is fascinated by his own
power. The king can do what he likes and what he would have liked. He can change
his past as well as the future. He can hope for the symbolic eternity of procreation and
the imaginary reparation of the follies of the past. But when he recognises the temple
slave as his son he recognises nothing but the form of the son. The jubilation of the
recognition conceals the truth behind it, the very fact that it could have been any slave
and any king in their place.
The fragility of the imaginary returns every time the issue of Ion's real mother is
brought up. The unknown woman is banished in the sphere of myth- myth being an
imaginative description of a situation but not an explanation. So when Ion insists:
xtvoq 5s aoi jrscpuKa ppxpoq-fwho is my mother] (1. 538)
Xuthus can only offer a variety of excuses. One dragged out of the loss of memory: I
do not remember, I was drunk; another supported by the far more interesting
satisfaction of his need: " I have no idea" / "Apollo said nothing?" / "I didn't ask, I
was so delighted" (1. 539-41).
But for 'common' reason birth is the beginning of things 'out of something', a maternal
womb and before that a union. Inadvertedly Xuthus puts himself in a difficult position
by insisting on the naturalness of their bond. When Ion insists 'who is my mother, did I
spring out of the earth?' the limits of reason are stretched so much that Xuthus is
^ |
forced almost to admit that Ion came from nowhere: on 7tc5ov xikxci tskvcx [the earth
does not bear children] (1. 542). In face of Xuthus' apparent difficulty to establish the
facts we can always consider Ion's 'did I spring from the earth?' as the return of the
The new father is graceful and strong- like Apollo; he appears to be the union of opposites that Ion
expects to find in a father.
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sexual repressed, the sneering reproach that logically follows : 'Xuthus fertilised the
earth'.
But Xuthus is determined to ignore his ignorance and the difficulties of presenting Ion
with an unusual birth. He defines a territory in which reason applies. Everything that
matters falls within it. Outside it is 'nothing' and 'nothing' cannot be taken into
account, even when it is Ion's mother. Scornful and optimistic, he rejects the
'casualties' of reason with devastating simplicity: if it does not fit in, reject it, ignore it,
repress it: xeptpGstq xonxo, keiv" oTk r)popr|v. [I didn't ask, I was so happy] (1. 541)
The father of guilt
The second characteristic of Xuthus' appeal is guilt: 'you will be polluted and a
patricide ifyou kill me' (1. 527) he says, throwing Ion into an anxiety of avoiding a
crime he has not yet committed. As future father blessed with the consent of the god,
Xuthus introduces yet another difficult relationship in which Ion passes from the
hands of one father to another. There is no choice between the consent of the two
fathers. He is only left with a responsibility: to obey their expressed desire. Xuthus'
intervention again strikes the correct note, sending off the resonances of 'you would be
a parricide' to all directions87. The new father puts his finger on the heart of Ion's fear,
the ambivalence toward Apollo. He offers a trick of magic for an answer. When he
proposes 'be my son and you will be everything' he captures Ion's oscillating desire: I
am nothing / I am everything at the point of the unexpressed narcissistic wish to be
the world for another human being. When Xuthus announces 'I am your father' he
offers much more than social status. He teaches Ion how satisfaction works (learn to
be happy), how best to capture it when it comes your way. Nothing and everything are
split, and in the middle- out of nowhere and out of the earth88- springs a flesh and
blood father who already loves beyond belief.
87 The guilt associated with the dead father is associated with aggressive impulses against him; see for
instance Freud [1913, pp. 201-8].
88 Xuthus emerges from the underground oracle of Trophonius - so metaphorically speaking he does
come out of the earth (1. 393).
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The new father challenges Ion's aggression. 'You would be a parricide' summarises the
futility of his anger and his ambivalence and projects them to the future. What would
be the use of killing a man/father, an effigy of Apollo? What difference would it make
apart from confirming Ion as an outcast. What reasons could any one have for killing a
stranger? Deep down Xuthus' plea is quite simple and effective. You cannot hate me,
so love me. You've got nothing against me, so love me. You've got nothing better than
me, so love me.
The relation to Apollo is not resolved. Like the unknown mother it, too, is made to
pass underneath. All questions related to Apollo are wiped out. It does not really
matter whether the god gets rid of a potential embarrassment or an aspiring rival,
whether he cares or not. Xuthus invites Ion to deal with it by cutting off the symbolic
and imaginary links with the oracle and by presenting it as no-choice he really takes
away the image of the world as Ion knows it. Ion gets a glimpse of the fearful reality:
sent away from the oracle, deprived even of the temporary certainty of Delphi, he
loses all reflections of himself in society. At that point, the representation of the
Promised Land in the speech of another father sustains him for the transition. Xuthus
'imaginises' reality, creates the world, for as long as it is necessary for Ion to take it
upon himself and defend it and begin to recognise his form in it. Xuthus knows how
to make himself an indispensable part of the new image.
We may summarise the situation in the following way: half way between Apollo's first
ever expressed desire and the appearance of an earthly father Ion is introduced in the
symbolic and the imaginary. The new father offers him the world in return for his
consent. He fills the puppet-servant with alluring promises of an earthly kingdom and
recognises 'something' which makes 'you' valuable and indispensable. Xuthus has the
advantage of present and future over the imaginary mother and Apollo. He is present
while they are not, sees in Ion what Ion cannot see in himself and promises to satisfy
Ion's desire to know more in due time, in thefuture.
The new father proposes a double repression: of the god and the mother. The mother
is next to impossible to find, absent from the father's representations89. The god is
indifferent and inaccessible. 'Buried together' the mythical parents, Apollo and the
in the previous scene we said that Creusa conveys the symbolic father in her speech. Now in a
symmetrical and opposite way the mother is missing from the father's speech.
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mother, the old family, will merge in a symbolic way as the return to either is now out
of the question. 'I am your father' is predominantly symbolic but under the
idiosyncratic present circumstances it sounds more like 'I am your only link with the
world'. Consequently, 'be my son' means acknowledge my omnipotence, be the mirror
ofmy power, rely on me.
Xuthus' successful appeal depends on two factors that exceed his eloquence and
perhaps his intelligence. He invests the father-son bond with the mirage of a promised
land and the mirage of death, with the echoes of the mother and the father
respectively.
Inventing memory
Memory, thought and the senses co-operate in creating firm realties or firm illusions.
Together Xuthus and Ion embark on proving the naturalness of their bond. Any
rational investigation of their relationship would consider the possibility of an error
but this is the one option they cannot afford. Reason is subjected to necessity. It is
deprived of its dialectic openness and is directed towards finding exactly what it had
set out to find. The permanent characteristic of this peculiar reason is that while it
stays clear of contractions it creates paradoxes that go unnoticed.
The interpretation of the oracle defies conventional reason, not because it involves
belief but because it is like a conclusion that precedes its logical support. To accept
the oracle means to be able to translate it into common sense. Because it is equivocal
it is always correct. To follow either of its meanings implies conforming to the spirit
of the oracle, to proceed with respect, and follow the chosen meaning with
consistency. Xuthus respects the oracle but he also seems to choose a slightly different
way of adapting to its spirit. He makes extensive use of the form of divine duplicity,
replicates it in his speech and resorts to an either/or type of statement when it would
be enough just to admit his ignorance or assert his faith in Apollo.
The following account is a 'quick' presentation of the series of operations involved in
Xuthus' and Ion's attempt to find conclusive evidence of their natural relation. In a
psychoanalytic way the real issue of backtracking one's thought would involve, if it
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were faithful to the principles of logic, re-discovering the origins of discourse. In our
play this would lead Ion and Xuthus back to the first moment of the meeting, in
mutual aporia and reliance on the voice of the god. But in order to 'make sense' the
limitless message must be delimited. Junctions of meaning emerge in the text,
moments of duplicity, aporia and hesitation, points at which meaning 'bifurcates' and
could have regressed to ignorance. But they are under pressure to find something
there. We know that they err, and in due time Ion will learn about their error. But this
is at the far end of the play, a form of reparation for faulty reasoning. Before that,
reason must be followed to a first logical end, the fault must be 'constructed'. Ion's
departure from the oracle must first be accomplished in some sort of alienation, in
losing himself in someone else's reason and vice versa.
The first operation of reason is a tautology. It is a self-referential assurance of
prudence (sophrosyne) which shows what 'to rely on one's own means' involves.
Sophrosyne is not chosen at random. Nor is it only the reply to Ion's 'Are you mad?' It
is aimed at the past, the territory of the folly of youth. 'Sophrosyne' is the trademark of
the older Xuthus who seizes the opportunity to bring the past into present and put
them both right.
The following trajectory is formed: sophrosyne guarantees certainty in general;
certainty in general guarantees certainty in particular cases; if someone is sophron in
general he is sophron in particular cases; a sophron person is not insane, he holds onto
something that is dearest (1. 521) and does not mistrust the god (1. 555). Sophrosyne is
the stepping stone from faith to appropriation, from being given to claiming
something or someone for oneself90.
Within the range of its applications sophrosyne 'migrates' freely from one particular
strand of meaning to another. When the question is raised of whether the king has
understood correctly what he was told, a tautology based on this useful prudence
90 The lines I refer to are: Ion: ydipogev, on 5' eu tppovei ye, kcu 5l)' ovi' 7tpa^opev (1. 517) /1: eu
(ppoveii; pev; p o' egpvev 0eou tic;, to ^eve, P>iApp; Xuth: awtppuvw, xa cpiliaB' ebptov on cpeuysiv
•, r 7 ~ ~ ? (
aqnepai (I. 519-21) / Ion: ou cpiXco (ppevouv apouoouq kcu pegpvoia<; £,evotx; (1. 526) / and later in the
?' I f /-> <— i -> — i
text, Ion: eptppovov p kgitoivov ovia (1. 552) / and in the end, Ion: ico 0ew yow ouk a7uatsiv sikoc;,
"% •*~"v ,v
Xuth: su (ppovciq apa^l. 557)
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emerges at the level of the general argument: Xuthus cannot have misunderstood the
oracle because he is sophron and is sophron because he has not misunderstood the
oracle. Yet the tautology goes unnoticed because its terms are separated by faith and
by allowing the social aspect, the aspect of prospective well-being and happiness, to
determine its strength. We could therefore say that the first step away from the
confusing oracle and into conventional reason involves two shifts: conclusion before
the argument and tautology instead of dialectic. The future is reinforced by the regrets
of the past. The past is put right by the decisive intervention in the future. The
imaginary is being reconstituted for the sake of the desire to put it right by authority
and power. Misrecognitions proliferate.
The next step (lines 528-534) guarantees that the newly derived prospect of happiness
is not swallowed up by doubt. Xuthus and Ion see eye-to-eye. The joint effort to
salvage the meaning of the oracle shows that. One thing that the imaginary cannot
accommodate is sheer persistent stubborn doubt.
When Xuthus claims his son on the basis of having heard the divine oracle, Ion
• • • f'* * \
threatens to throw him into confusion by claiming: sacpaTqq cuviyp' aKOuaaq, [You
r r\ v ) |
heard some riddle and misunderstood it] to which he answers: ouk apf op9 aKouopev*
[Did we not hear correctly] [trans. Owen 1939] or [we heard correctly] [trans.
Vellacott 1954],
They 'find' each other in doubt but doubt is what they must dispel, trying to eliminate
what brings them together, pure chance, and replace it with something different, a
tangible certainty. Even if Xuthus doubts for a second Ion salvages his deteriorating
enthusiasm by a generous act of self-sacrifice, in which, true to the spirit of all first
meetings, he places himself at the gap of knowledge: 'let us try a different approach' (1.
543), he proposes. Thus the uninterrupted pattern of short questions and answers in
which he seemed to participate reluctantly, is at a certain point (1. 530) turning into a
sequence of prompting questions - which becomes obvious later (1. 544). In fact it is
Ion who 'foists' on to Xuthus the idea of having had a child in the past. This perhaps
explains why he is easily convinced by no evidence, in the most amazing way, putting
himself in the place of the missing evidence, and thus taking on the responsibility not
of being convinced but of accepting the image of himself coming back from an
imaginary childhood. The pair of them resort to a trick: they exchange certainties for
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doubts and they exchange certainties between themselves. Ion pledges his only asset,
his presence, and the deal is sealed.
When father and son go over the same message trying to find other tangible evidence
of a natural relationship they perform an amazing 'tour de force'. Language at its best
articulates the aporia of finding nothing concrete there and the desire 'to find
something' against all odds. Thus when Ion wonders: am I yours, what did Apollo
say? Xuthus replies:
Xuth: 7icue? spov 7T£(poK£vai. [Having being mine]
Ion: oov ysyo5iJ', p Scopov allxoq; [Your son by birth, or merely a gift?]
Xuth: Scbpov, ovra cf e^lpov. [A gift, yes, but mine by birth too] (1. 536-7)
This paradoxical statement does not stand out in an environment of normal discourse.
It is part of a paradoxical conversation in which the determination of meaning
resembles the play of repression and the return of the repressed. Xuthus' language
struggles at the edge of a conscious ego-centred certainty but it cannot stay clear of the
ambiguities inherent in the words. Recognition, for example, with its purely legal and
its purely sensory aspects is one of them. Another one is 'pvoiaCco\ a. to seize
property in distraint and hold it till safe, b. to be a robber (Owen, p. 107), the
unfortunate term that Xuthus uses in order to claim that the child belongs to him only.
When followed to their logical extreme such terms lead to the opposite of certainty: if
Xuthus is not a robber then certainly he 'holds' the child for someone else. But Ion is
no one's child. At best then he admits that he is the temporary guardian of this child of
no-one. The whole issue is settled when he appropriates what belongs to no one.
When no such 'subtlety' is available and the duplicity of meaning is all too obvious
language is pushed to the limits. Xuthus' most honest attempt to verbalise the
impossible results in splitting the entangled pephykenai into mine and not mine. By
splitting the rational from the irrational, the explicable from the inexplicable they can
treat each separately, and gradually reject one of them. 'Pephykenai' restates the
problem of meaning in terms of literal and metaphorical 'genesis'. It summarises the
failure of thinking as it copies the ultimate postulate, the infallibility of the oracle.
Mine and not mine, both A and B, is the prototype of ambivalence of thought and
childhood. A first or inconceivable state ofmind, a mode of thinking suitable for gods,
who, irrespective of the outcome, are never proved wrong. But mortals cannot live in
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this no meaning/all meaning limbo- this has been the problem all along, the painful
suspension of social, emotional and other dependencies on the blessing of Apollo. For
mortals a choice ofmeaning is a vital choice91.
Thus both A and B92 necessitates splitting and repression of one of its senses. That's
what they do. And in doing so they obey the spirit of the oracle, which, like the
superego-father orders:" 'You ought to be like this' (like your father).... 'you may not
be like this' (like your father)" [Freud 1923, p. 374] which allows his 'children', both
Ion and Xuthus, to interpret in good faith but not to live like him - in a mythical,
Apollonian, non-contradictory universe. It could be said that sentences like this touch
upon the darkest points of'being', quickly closed off by the infallibility of the god and
the human attitude to it: the only option offered to man is to interpret, not to refuse. If,
therefore, piety is a form of affirmation it is directly related to the generation of
meaning. 'Belief in god, however, the synthesis of knowledge and ignorance, will
always maintain a link with the repressed half of meaning, a minimum touch with the
irrational necessary to undermine and restrain the authority of pure reason.
In the same way ignorance is contextualised and they trick themselves: having
explained ignorance away does not necessarily mean that they have gained knowledge,
especially when ignorance is being renamed 'not being sure'. Again, partial ignorance
is born out of total ignorance, with the addition of precarious reason. This is the
significant though imperceptible change that underlines the explanation of'self-birth':
A story is made up based on a simple operation:
total ignorance—> split ignorance—> insertion of reason—> suppression of
ignorance, a normal breathing pattern, the to andfro of human desire that must accede
to the real world. Flaving already been on such a course- due to their fascination with
each other's presence- a refusal to interpret would be equal to death, to an absolute,
gratuitous, suicidal negation of everything. It would return them to non-meaning, to all
non-meanings encountered during the investigation of reason and to the social non-
We are reminded here of Lacan's description of alienation and the inevitable choice of meaning that
spells out the destiny of the speaking subject. (See fn 28)
92 True to Apollo's 'duplicity' at which the discourse would have stopped if it was their intention to
recognise its origin/beginning and not to exceed it; oracle = knowledge + ignorance.
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being of the childless and the parentless. So they marvel at tyche, the chance that
brought them together (1. 538), and they begin to undo it. Together they break it into
self-explanatory pieces, in which they match the contingent details of a possible past
with the raised expectations of a possible future. Now the Other's desire, Apollo's
voice, is not necessary any more.
"Didyou have some love affair?"
"I was young once, andfoolish" (1. 545) and then:
"Were you ever in Delphi before?
"Yes, I came beforefor the Bacchic mysteries" (1. 552)
"Yes. They were in a state of- religiousfrenzy" (1. 553)
These answers provide the co-ordinates of time and space for Ion to be free-born.
Reason is clouded by drunkenness and Bacchic frenzy (1. 553), completing the
paradoxical equations of the entire speech: then it was folly, now it's reason. To use
reason now for what was foolish then is to make sense out of nonsense.
Is this not executed in a true Delphian spirit? Does this not exactly touch upon the
slight difference/similarity of'what does not make sense' being supernatural or stupid?
Finally reason is celebrated in the same triumphant spirit, for having reached the
foretold end: "Now you see things in their proper light" [trans. Owen 1939] (1. 557) or
according to Vellacott [trans. 1954]: "Nowyou are seeing reason".
Having managed to set the irrational aside Xuthus and Ion now move firmly into the
region of reason and rationalise the latter's birth by having the father visiting Delphi
before Athens, though some doubt remains in the ex-servant's appreciation of good
luck:
"After all, what more could Iwish for - than a father who is descendedfrom Zeus?" (1.
558)
Ion's desire to be the son of Apollo disappears but we know that what is out of sight is
not necessarily out ofmind. At the same time Xuthus may be made to look ridiculous
but his authority will never be openly undermined. In addition to his emotional
involvement he will always be Ion's symbolic father because he is unquestionably the
king and the agent of authority.
We could summarise the situation in the following way. The recognition of the father
and son goes beyond the mutual sanctioning of a symbolic pact. They work together
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on building their relationship on the reawakening of narcissism. To a great extent they
are successful but at the expense of repressing Ion's previous desires, the dream of the
noble mother and the father-god. Xuthus offers and demands total commitment and
total love and leaves no room for doubts. Once a mutual commitment to affirming
their relationship is established, the ways of doing it follow naturally. All it takes is
fixing one's eyes on it and being determined not to give in when ignorance, the lack of
evidence, threatens to bring the negotiation of the deal to a stop. For us, the observers,
their recognition is valid for its socio-legal aspect. The rest may be called untrue, lies,
deceptions, blindness. But is it not the case that any relationship is something more
than meets the eye for the participants themselves? Are they not asked to invest more
than their pure reason? We are offered a good look into an order that would merit the
name 'subjective'. From outside it certainly looks far-fetched and ridiculous. From
inside it is invested with love and devotion.
With a swift move Xuthus severs Ion's link with his past. Alienated in the new order
the desire for Apollo and the mother desire succumbs to reality. From now on, they
form Ion's impossible desire, the Utopian return to the oracle and the impossibility of
finding the woman who bore him, once he is in Athens. The present lesson, however,
is simple. All one has to do is not fix one's eyes on that loss. All one has to do is fix
one's eyes on what one is bound to gain instead.
'Entering the world' is no straightforward business. It involves assuming the other's
desire and introjecting the other's word, a process which, Lacan assures us, does not
happen in one go. Here we encounter the difficulties inherent in the task. What is the
practical value of assuming the other's desire? What are the consequences of accepting
the other's naming 'you will be my son' and duly replying 'and you will be my father'?
When is it appropriate to exclaim: I did not want to do it, I was forced to?
Unfortunately, no concrete advice is given on how to cope with reality! One is
basically blind- or has to play it by ear. Ion, for instance, is supposed to know what it
is like to live from day to day, satisfy other people's desires and be happy for their
happiness. When it comes to his own he finds it very difficult to conform to Xuthus'
desire with the same ease.
An unanswerable question emerges here: "Isn't that what you wanted?" Ion had
wished for a better luck and now he discovers that it goes with a certain price. All the
means developed, all the tricks, all truths and all lies are, for the moment at least, ways
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of bringing one's fading desire into alignment with the chance at hand. All one learns
is that desires are satisfied in the world, via the other who, just like you, has desires
that must be satisfied. At this point Xuthus' intervention is masterfully accurate. By
claiming that Ion is everything he wants he achieves this difficult 'via the other' in a
perfectly narcissistic way. It captures the child's imagination by feeding him with
details matching his ambitions and his lack and by acknowledging him as the equal
part of a self-contented pair. Narcissism satisfied entails a saturated subject-object
relation. In utter stupidity or in utter cleverness Xuthus provides just that by admitting
that his desire is Ion.
Xuthus' Desire
What is Xuthus' desire? We can assemble our answer from his discourse. Is he not the
child who regresses to his past in order to find his object and enclose it in his
contented silence? Is he not the man who regresses into beyond-memory
(drunkenness) to affirm his masculinity and then rediscover this affirmation in others?
Xuthus does not want to be the passive spectator of the times, he wants to be an active
participant. Indications come from everywhere: from the fact that he was a spectator
at the oracle of Trophonius and left empty-handed; from the fact that he can recognise
and loathes the passive position as soon as he abandons it; from the fact that another
man in a symmetrical situation, the servant, will try to escape from his very nature and
will fail. Let us say therefore that Xuthus wants to escape his own nature and that his
nature always returns to him in various metonymic ways.
Xuthus' basic pattern of behaviour is simple. He excludes his passivity and his
ignorance and includes his happiness93. He passes on his ignorance to both Ion and
Creusa and essentially he behaves the same to both.
The rule of investment works here. A withdrawal of libido from Creusa turns her, the
gift of gratitude of yesterday, into the surplus of today. Gratitude is cancelled. The
investment is cancelled. The woman that does not produce a son has no place in the
93 This account is based on Freud's love and hate as modes of response to the external world. Exclude
and include describe a basic mode of behaving along the lines of good/bad.
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father's world. So first Xuthus reduces Creusa to an empty indifferent form, and then
he anticipates (or agrees to) hostility and envy coming from her. Because this is a
game of appearances the other's opinion matters. In his wife's anticipated envy Xuthus
glimpses the reality of his activity and his potency94. It would not be an exaggeration
to say that Xuthus' self-contained (autoerotic) fascination with his son is guarded by
an anal-sadistic hostility towards the external world. Xuthus the eternal child will
remain for ever attached to his little secret and its assurances coming from the internal
bliss and the external envy. Xuthus will never be told the truth but he does not care
either.
Planning to keep Creusa in the dark Xuthus falls victim to his own passion. But there
is no one to see that for the moment apart from the spectator, the one in the very
position he detests. An interesting development occurs in terms of lie, truth,
appearance, not much different in principle from the operation of reason we saw
earlier.
Xuthus's plan of deception is to pretend to be what he really is: childless. His self
deception, then, is to mistake his consciousness/certainty for reality: he pretends not to
be what he is (childless), while he thinks he knows what he really is (father of a child).
Here, only an objective witness or a spectator could really make the equation
secret=ignorance. Only the spectator can detect his lie and by poetic licence Xuthus
will want to eliminate every spectator and every witness of his recognition of the child
and keep it a secret.
Xuthus reconciles appearances by repelling his ignorance and looking no further: He
wants to be a father, he thinks and knows he is a father, he chooses to appear as not-
father. He reconciles his truth, the deepest narcissistic complacent desire, and his
appearance, the display ofauthority and masculinity, with a lie - as the gap can only
be bridged in a make-believe way95. It is the same ignorance he refuses to
acknowledge that he passes on to others, the one he bequeaths to Ion about his mother
94 in other words Creusa's envy is a way of making his 'object' valuable: if she (or any other) envies me
that means 1 have/own something enviable. It does not matter that it is his own speculation that he
projects.
95 At best Xuthus will always be a paradoxical father, the unwilling father he always was, the drunken
father-without-knowing that is now transformed into the not-knowing father.
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or the one he shifts onto Creusa's shoulders about her future status. Ironically, he
behaves to friends and enemies in the same way as he regresses to the folly of his
youth, the metaphorical drunkenness, the euphoria that blurs vision and critical
judgement.
Like the minister in Poe's story Xuthus will be the victim of his own greed. He does
not acknowledge the child's symbolic position, he does not present it to the world. He
keeps it all to himself, unused, passive, in limbo, pretending that nothing has changed.
In a closed, secret world of narcissism Xuthus has expelled the bad gift of ignorance
and lack and in its place he has instituted the good gift of fulfilment and completeness.
This is the ultimate narcissism, the secret order itself and the desire to preserve it. The
ultimate narcissism is the secret knowledge of 'I am not what I seem to be', a difficult
gain worth taking the risk of making oneself ridiculous by attempting to embrace a
stranger.
I said earlier that Xuthus expels ignorance. Like another Apollo he 'disseminates' the
message in the world but he really scatters it, fragments it into pieces so that Ion and
Creusa will have to put them together in order to find out what it means. They both
receive the blindness, speechlessness, immobility and passivity bequeathed by the
father. Xuthus passes the buck of ignorance 'to whom it may concern'.
Ion receives the ignorance about the mother. The privileged position of the heir of
Athens, descendant of Zeus and son of a warrior father does not automatically entail
her presence. Ignorance is now established as the signifier of lack.
Creusa receives another form of ignorance, a double one. Both the indifference and
the silent hatred of the satisfied husband. If desire is first recognised in the other it
might be the case that Creusa recognises her desire for a child in Xuthus arriving there
first. But it is all Xuthus' doing for the moment, Creusa's interpretation and her desire
comes only later. Xuthus' master-stroke is again inspired by his narcissism. He
introduces, or better, circulates not 'a child' but 'a missing child', an unknown 'X', a
pure form to captate any desire. His secrecy, the speechlessness he imposes on Ion
and the chorus, compacts his guilt and gives, to whom it may concern, a fearful ghost-
of-a-child to deal with. The evocative power of the 'missing' human being hits the spot
(or should we say the eye?). The missing child like the moving figure behind the
curtain that is and is not there, a shadow behind a curtain, but most of all the hole, the
absence in the imaginary and the symbolic that only a father can install.
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In the end the king-father is duped. Ignorance returns to him but in a different form.
The son takes his place and 'expels' him from the symbolic circuit of the Athenian
throne. But he is not affected by that because as he is wrapped up in the blindness of
his good luck and no one bothers to 'open his eyes'96.
In this part we discussed the recognition of the father and the son as a case of
imaginary captation. The first man Xuthus sees captivates his eye. The rest is easily
invented. Although the symbolic value of the recognition is never undermined, the
imaginary investment of the bond is very interesting as it depends on a series ofmake-
believe initiatives. Xuthus' desire, is satisfied by turning a blind eye to inconsistencies
and expelling any remaining ignorance. Ion, the object of affection, receives some of
it. Creusa too. This is how self-centred narcissistic satisfaction works - for everyone.
Another Beginning?
Scene Three is a new beginning. It is a revision of a life haunted by death and the
breaking of a silence equivalent to death in the making. One cannot help thinking that
deep down the outbreak of disaster must have a healing effect on Creusa. It is difficult
to think of death and mourning as salvation but who is more dead than she, burdened
with the heavy legacy of the sacrificing father and the women of her line who always
sacrifice their lives?
Scene Three explores a variety of issues. The dialogue parts form a fascinating reply
to Xuthus' projected aggression. Creusa's monologue explores the meaning of death in
a different but equally fascinating way. We will discuss her monologue in a separate
part. For the moment let us say that it falls on deaf ears as the immediate receivers, the
chorus and the old man, are far too preoccupied with their part in the adventure to
listen to what any one else is saying.
The dialogue parts, lines 725-858 and 923-1047, meet Xuthus' plans for the future in
anticipation. Either way, question and answer, situation and counter-situation, are
96 This is actually a Modern Greek expression which, in the spirit of the continuity of language,
describes very accurately what is involved in disillusionment.
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conceived and prepared in an utterly imaginary space. Still, what Creusa's plan lacks
in authority it has in effectiveness. It will be her idea that will bring everything to
light. And still, it will always be the wrong action. Despite the fact that scene three
can be accounted for almost exclusively as a mirror of scene two it appears sharper,
deadlier, sillier and more excessive. Some would even say unjustified. The old servant
is traditionally ridiculous and short-sighted and Creusa is traditionally classed among
the 'bad women'.
We will discuss only certain elements of scene three, those that supplement and
expand on the findings of scene two and account for the effect of excess. My
fascination really lies with the desire of the old servant and the chorus. When all is
said and done their desire is not satisfied. They are left out and they find themselves in
square one. They do not seem to move like the other characters, they do not seem 'to
profit' from the on-going negotiation of meaning. Is this because they are real
mediators? Real ambassadors of the other with no desire of their own? I think not.
Their fascination and their wholehearted involvement leave no doubt that they, too,
have aspirations when the ghost of the 'missing child' passes in front of their eyes. By
chance or divine providence Creusa and Ion will meet their fate. They will not. Their
time never comes. Neither as life nor as death, and they are suspended in waiting for
the next chance to come along, nursing 'unacted desires', having changed places with
Creusa-in-waiting. The chorus and the old man are to Creusa what Xuthus is to Ion,
the receiver of the surplus and blindness and failure.
In the following part I discuss the chorus's function and desire, the servant's function
and desire and the some elements of the pact between Creusa and the servant. This
part is written with 'the other in mind'97. Two structures support scene three. The
interior intersubjective economy of love and solidarity and the response to the
signifiers 'child' and 'father' bequeathed by the previous scene. Creusa and her friends
develop Xuthus' little plot to perfection and to its logical end: death. The previous
situation is symmetrically reversed. They start from the zero point of an imminent
We will not always be referring explicitly to the similarities with the previous scene.
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death. They are the unprivileged and the weak. They have no say and no future, they
do not even have a share in good luck. So they create it98.
The Chorus as Mirror
The first part of the scene, lines 725-858, is a lesson in death and love. It is a beautiful
play of the mirrors. The chorus and the old man, a multitude of faces and voices,
speak in unison, and their agreement on the important issues is as compelling as the
content of their advice. Reading the lines one gets the impression that everything
happens very quickly and Creusa is thrust into a demanding position of public
responsibility just before she has time to think about it. The urgency of the matter sets
the priorities: urgency over thoroughness, quick action over complete thinking. Any
remaining doubts are dealt with by the devastating simplicity of the proposed plan: to
deal death before the other. The definiteness of the solution leaves no room for after¬
thoughts, the hasty anticipation guarantees it, the inspiration from the other confirms it
and the primitiveness of 'expelling' the foreign body endows it with the automatism
of a natural reflex: at the end of the day, what is one supposed to do when one's life is
in danger?
The chorus and the old servant take it upon themselves to declare their allegiance to
their queen, to choke her with love, to alert her to danger and to lead her to a glorious
death. Behind the aspirations of heroism, the concern for Athens and the welfare of
Erectheus' family, the vocabulary of favour and return of favour and eager sacrifice
must always remind us of the darker motives Lacan discerns in the aggressivity of
98 ion's institution in Athens would have meant Creusa's social death. Thus when I am saying that
Creusa's party carries Xuthus' plan to the limit I mean that they translate the social death into actual
death. Along the same lines they imitate Xuthus perfectly. The king is given a shred of truth and he
builds his happiness by himself. He creates. They create accordingly.
However, Creusa is different from everyone else and this must be stressed. In her monologue she
addresses herself'to whom it may concern' and this is something no one else does. We compare scenes
two and three along the lines of silence and secrecy (lathra).
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narcissism and death "even in a relation involving the most Samaritan of aid" [Lacan
1949, p. 6],
The vocabulary of the early lines of scene Three shows that the offer of help, both
from the chorus and the old man, reaches the point of excess. While Creusa is almost
struck dumb by the shocking news and expresses little more than her devastation in
almost inarticulate cries, they manage to figure out both the 'real' story behind the bad
news and 'what is to be done'. And they go about it as if it were their own business.
The chorus offer their endless love and support wrapped up in the threat of death:
"Well, what are we going to do? It means life or death.... shall we tell her? Or say
nothing? What shall we do?...You shall be told, even if I die twice over" (1. 756-760).
As for the news: "My lady, you will never hold children in your arms or put them to
your breast" (1. 761-2) they are supported by the testimony of their own eyes: "I was
there" (1. 781), a fragmented speculative account of the events and, finally, a
declaration of lifelong loyalty: "My dear mistress, I will be loyal too; I am with you in
this, whether for life or death" (1. 857). The chorus identify with Creusa: you die and
we die; or is it we die and you die with us? Either way the question remains: why did
they talk?
If they choose to talk it is because there is no dilemma and no choice. There is only
punishment: if they speak Xuthus will punish them, if they do not speak and Creusa
finds out, she will punish them. Owen comments: "the chorus are reluctant to give
information in view of Xuthus' threat, but they begin at once by going beyond what
they had heard" [trans. Owen 1939, p. 128], Beyond what they have heard is their fear.
Beyond the most altruistic solidarity there is the most primitive life-preserving
egoistic interest. The chorus are safe so long as only one master remains. Any
complication of 'Samaritan' love will only cloud the essential truth of their
involvement.
Let us treat their intervention as befits their peculiar status. In Lacan's universe a
chorus would be the 'polycephalic' subject with whom one identifies, loses sight of
one's defects and glimpses the ego-ideal. Our chorus 'participate' here both with their
structural transparency and with their keen ego-driven interest in Creusa's welfare. In
the first case they are an ideal mirror. In the second they are ordinary human beings
that glimpse virtual realities of satisfaction in the other.
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How can they be such a perfect mirror? Simply because they reflect the same thing
from both sides, death. If the chorus could speak to Xuthus they would give him the
same message they are now giving Creusa. If she were the aggressor they would be on
his side. Let us not forget that despite her present misery Creusa participates in the
world of the masters and certainly seeks her rightful position in it. The chorus lie or
report inaccurately but they reflect- not to say project- what they were threatened with:
death.
They imitate the master. Like him they pass on the message that kills to the next in
line. The style and the inspiration of their intervention comes from the master. They
themselves witness and support their information by their senses. They own up to their
act. They do not disown anymore. They appropriate knowledge, fill in the missing
links with probabilities, appear disinterested. They do this out of sympathy for the
master's house, they even offer to die voluntarily when they are not asked to. They
appear to deny any motive other than devotion: I choose to die if necessary means I
am beyond reward, and this is meant to be recognised as the ultimate proof of
disinterestedness and love. 'We will die if necessary'- but what does one die for? Is
this the 'I would die for you' of the dedicated lover who neurotically expects to hear
the same in reply or is it an act of folly, accepting willingly (suicide) what comes to
humans only as dire necessity?
The intervention of the chorus excludes no possibilities. 'Truth' is glimpsed between
the lines of dramatic necessity and the folly ofwomen, but its effectiveness, as always,
lies with the other. At the junction of scenes two and three the chorus, the mirror of
many faces, bequeaths a message so complicated, impersonal and impossible that it
really re-instates the duplicity of the divine oracle. Creusa, who, following the chorus,
will identify with them, will only be able to make sense of the non-sense (death threat)
by resorting to her personal experience.
What is there for the chorus trapped between two deaths? What sort of satisfaction is
there apart from survival? They cannot hope for any sort of self-determination since
one of the masters will survive anyway. I believe that the 'secret' desire that possibly
seeks satisfaction here is a desire to go beyond the master, outwit him or her and
transgress their word. But this is exactly what gives the perfect opportunity for
identification with Creusa. Let us remember Freud's third mode of identification,
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identification based on a common quality. Creusa and the chorus identify on the basis
of a desire to transgress the law or go behind its back and on the basis of the death
threat.
Behind the perfect solidarity we may glimpse a slightly different reality. The play of
appearances and concealed secrets would support that. Have the chorus played god by
pushing Creusa to the limit? Do they expect to be rewarded for their favour? Or is it
some 'cheap' thrill, that of having their curiosity satisfied, that compels them to break
their silence? A little of everything perhaps. We will never be able to know- we do not
have enough words! But I think that if we put death and favour, the dominant
signifiers of their discourse, together with the fact that there is no disinterested truth or
lie we can get the following reading. By their position the chorus can participate in a
series of narcissistic satisfactions- all of them being satisfactions of the other, the
master to whom they belong. In death, however, a rare possibility emerges, a
satisfaction of playing with the other, the master. All are equal in front of death, the
absolute master. In view of this Creusa owes them as much as they owe her, life. If it
were not for the chorus she would have died. As a true, loyal servant the chorus
expose the cannibalistic paradox" of this loyalty: they envy and love Creusa: if they
kill her she will remain their eternal (as dead) master and since they have also
accepted death they will remain her loyal servants. This is their act of mercy to
Creusa. And as they willingly accept their own death, they may cause Creusa's death
as well. On the other hand, they reduce her to what they are in order to save her and at
last share with her a part of her destiny; but they also reduce her to a mere nobody, a
slave. There are some of the virtual positions we are allowed to assume, all reflected
later in Creusa's own speech, all inspired by the 'play of mirrors', the essence of the
imaginary and the mirage of death behind it.
99 This cannibalism would bring us to the first form of identification for which Freud commends: "it
can turn into an expression of tenderness as easily as into a wish for someone's removal. It behaves like
a derivative of the first, oral phase of organisation of the libido, in which the object that we long for and
prize is assimilated by eating and is in that way annihilated as such. The cannibal, as we know, has
remained at this standpoint..." [Freud 1921, p. 135]. I would suggest therefore that the superficial
identification of lack and death masks an earlier more primitive form of identification.
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The old servant: desire and function
The chorus's self-directed aggression is deflected by the old servant. It is directed
outwards: do not die, kill. Already captivated by the exciting news, he extends his
solidarity in spontaneous plurals: 'we' are being ridiculed, 'we' are being treated
unjustly, 'we' suffer. We? Me, you and the other. Under the urgency of death the
servant becomes the 'mouthpiece' of the house of Erechtheus- and he will pay for that.
For the moment he directs his suspicious aggression towards the new masters (both
Xuthus, who is new because he is xenos, and Ion, the new master). After questioning
the chorus on Creusa's behalf and receiving unsatisfactory answers -their final 'I
cannot tell' (1. 803), he volunteers an explanation of the incredible news, a real
interpretation of the apparent and the obscure, more consistent with the slave's envy
of the master's good fortune rather than with his fondness for Creusa.
The old man's monologue is a masterpiece of speculation, anticipation and projection,
comparable only to Xuthus's self assured manners. The fact that Xuthus is the
inspiration of this speech becomes apparent from the vehemence of his attack against
Xuthus-the-foreigner and the adulterer. Yet he claims: "I am not speaking from any
dislike of your husband, but because I love you better" (1. 812). The old man will
explain how Xuthus became the father of a slave's child, how he arranged the chance
meeting at Delphi, how he planned to 'foist' the illegitimate child on Creusa and how it
would have been a lesser disgrace if its mother had at least been freeborn. He then
adds one of the most remarkable lines of the play, comparable only to the king's "learn
to be happy", he urges Creusa: 6si ae Sr/ yovaixeiov zi Spav [do something fit for a
woman] (1. 843), amplified with a fierce speech100.
With the altruistic speech the slave will set a foot at the threshold of freedom, the first
and last chance of the old man to 'undo' the consequences of the bad name that goes
' 00 Km y0ur husband and his son, before they put an end to you! Either use a sword, or do it indirectly,
or by poison. I mean it, -if you flinch you will lose your own life...I'll help you do it: 1 can slip in where
the boy's preparing the feast and stab him. You've been a good mistress to me, and I owe it to you, if it
costs my life. Yes, it's only the name of slave that carries disgrace with it; in every other point a loyal
slave is as good as a free man " (1. 843-856).
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with slavery. He will stand by Creusa in the preparation of the murder as father and
counsellor and he will be given the family heirloom with the poisonous drop as a
weapon. He will reach Ion's tent where his eagerness will betray him. He will then
renounce his mistress as soon as he is threatened with death. Till the final moment,
when his only chance is wasted, he will enjoy the mirage of that chance to the full.
What does the old servant want? What is his desire? He wants to lose his stick! I think
he expresses it very clearly upon entry on the scene. Creusa supports the fragile old
man and asks him: "Feel the ground with your stick" and he replies: "If I am short¬
sighted, my stick is blind" (1. 744), in other words 'what use is a stick to a blind man?'.
This paradoxical statement summarises his desire, an impossible, unsatisfiable desire.
The old man wants to be young. He wants to reverse or undo time. It is because his
desire is strictly impossible that it is so valuable. It will let him identify with Creusa,
play the father to her, too, envy the good luck of another servant, take part in the
killing and even say at a point towards the end of the scene: "I'll carry out my orders,
I'm not as young as I was; but when work's to be done I'm young enough, I can laugh
at old age..." (1. 1041-1). Indeed it takes a complete fool to get it all wrong as he did,
but it takes an ordinary human being at the threshold of death to try it and be
fascinated with playing freely with all the chances he comes across. The old man has
nothing to lose and in view of that he becomes the best mirror of the master, Xuthus,
who sees his desire satisfied in every possible way101. But he is not only 'a bit similar'
to Xuthus; he resembles Creusa and Ion as well. The slave is another mirror that is left
empty when the image goes.
Deprived of the powers of a master, the slave's desire virtually reveals the
shortcoming of desire in general. It 'feeds on' the other's desire, it follows the same
course, self-deception concealed. The all too obvious impossibility of satisfaction, the
lost cause, make it perfectly clear: any interpretation of desire is personal. Any
interpretation is an appeal to the other's desire and wishes to captivate it, own it,
posses it, and ultimately justify (in the two senses of the word) the desire of the
subject.
'01 The chorus who in reverse mode have everything to lose - a simple reversal keep it all in balance.
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The slave re-introduces the notions of gratitude and favour, the dependence which
Xuthus had managed to disguise under the self-reliance of his own weapons- he owes
his life to no one, the servant owes his life to his master. While Xuthus confronts
ignorance with power the slave enters the 'have all' game wanting power, starting from
the certainty of an absolute disadvantage: I am (born) a slave: un-privileged. He starts
from nothing and seeks the permanence of an identity. So when the servant cries
'favour' or 'favour to the wrong person' (Ion) or when he expresses envy of the fellow
slave he wishes to locate himself not in the world of exchange for which he is poorly
equipped but in the world of favour into which one enters by merit or chance.
The slave is divided between duty and desire: to serve in gratitude for his life as he
acknowledges a debt to Creusa's father, or to take the place of the master, be the
master and be free. There are two ways of becoming a master: representing him and
imitating him. He fails in both.
The servant imitates the limitless power of the master, the power of life and death. He
invests it with the meaning of the current situation and re-sends it to 'whom it may
concern'. So he advises Creusa to kill all her enemies, Apollo included. If that were to
happen, the guarantor of the slave's favour would be the almighty return of his own
good advice and he would have done himself the perfect favour.
The slave's desire backfires: he sends Creusa (the master) to death but then the master
orders him to take her place. So he has to accept the death sentence with eagerness or
once again renounce the chance of freedom. When caught red-handed the servant will
pretend to have been involved in the murder attempt by force. This is the drama of the
slave's desire, to glimpse its satisfaction in a moment and lose it, to expel himself
from the symbolic and resort to what he hates most in order to save himself, the lack
of freedom characteristic of slaves.
Like the master the slave is interested in preserving, manipulating and distorting
appearances and he fails beyond belief. He fails to be the representative of the master
(Creusa). Having the insignia of the master, the heirloom of Erechtheus, is not
enough. To have means to know how (not) to use, to be able to brandish the bracelet
with the twin drops of blood without spending it. The family heirloom is not a
weapon. Its power is only symbolic.
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He fails to be 'himself. The eager slave is a paradox to be detected by another eager
slave, Ion. What Ion sees in the fellow slave is the lack of envy for his good fortune:
"your good maimers do not deceive me", he will say.
The slave wastes his big chance. There is a steady downfall: from wanting to be
Creusa's favourite, father and family and friend, to becoming the 'hand' of justice, to
seeing himself betrayed by his own bad acting. He wants to cause his happiness in a
narcissistic way but he has based that on deception. The reminder of his castrated
nature, the inability to cause in an original way reminds him that the joy he would
derive would not be his but someone else's: the servant's destiny is to make sure that
someone else's happiness/ satisfaction is achieved. In the end he does himself no
favour and he is nobody's favourite.
But this is not what hurts more. The slave-as-coward who takes refuge in his true
nature or in the convenient appearance of cowardice arrives at the bitter end of having
to abandon any aspiration to power. Not only does he accept his failure but he forgoes
any claim to another nature. The slave does not return to another settlement of
appearances as happens with the masters in the end of the play, he returns to square
one, having seen his dream demolished. Now it becomes apparent that desire is
grounded 'beyond' satisfaction102. And if it appeared 'satisfiable' for a moment it was
only because, blind to the essentially aggressive alienating nature of the identification,
he had accepted someone else's desire as his own. On top of that, the worst
punishment comes from one's own likeness or from the reversal of one's intentions or
from both. Let us endow the slave with a few lines in the first person: In the end I
might have done what I wanted to avoid: a favour to the new master. My reversal is
my punishment, the rebound of my missed last chance to be rewarded: instead of
receiving a reward from my future master someone else is rewarded in my place. It is
unfair to reward someone for something he has not done, for being at the right
moment at the right place, but I only wish it was me.
'02 in the sense that it is never grounded onto a logical assessment of what is or is not within one's
limits.
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Crcusa and the servant:
As a child-parent pair Creusa and the old servant carry the game of appearances to
new standards of excellence. They respond to the 'father' and 'child' projected by the
previous scene, they improvise, transgress, anticipate, deceive, rejoice in the future
success of their plan. If they ever commit a crime, if their folly comes out more
prominently than Xuthus', it is because they pull out all the stops of modesty and
moderation, even that last shred that usually urges some kind of precaution- 'what if
we fail?' -and makes people plan their retreat.
The following account considers a number of imaginary regressions103: the old man's
/
obsession with secrecy (doing everything or going XaQpa), the imaginary redefinition
of the past and the 'recovery' of the weapon that will kill Ion from the shadows of
myth.
'Death' sets a high standard. In a way Creusa and the old man are reminiscent of
compulsive gamblers for whom no bet is high enough compared with the thrill of the
game. Does it ever occur to them that they are doing just that? That they are bound to
lose everything even if they win? That the price is too high to pay? But, then again,
isn't that the essence of every neurotic's account, that he or she has always been paying
a disproportionately high price for everything? This accumulated injustice is the best
cause for action. It is what would keep Creusa and the old man and the chorus
together even if they had just met. It is the solidarity of the oppressed. In examining
their excessive ways let us keep our eyes fixed on the reality behind wanting to go
beyond Xuthus and Apollo. Let that be their stake in the symbolic and the reason for
their identification.
The old man excels in his own brand of reasoning. He proceeds from a complete lack
of evidence against Xuthus, to digging up the past, to finding evidence of injustice by
103 The term regression implies backward movement of sexuality - compared to the forward
normalising development. With Creusa refusing sexuality and her and the old man retreating to the
ancestral past in order to find a suitable weapon to kill Ion I think that the term is in its 'natural'
environment. Regression also implies 'going back' in history- also relevant to our case.
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another husband, to punishing the child, to restoring order in the house of Erechtheus
without disturbing the balance ofappearances- the only guarantee of their immunity.
An obsession with doing things in secret (laOpa) emerges. This is the mark of the
other's excellence that both leads him on and makes him the better man:
"a/Aqc yuvauax 7rcu5a<; cicKapTroupcvoc xAOpa 7is(pr|vsv^coc; 76.0pa <?. sycb (ppdaco ...
Aapojv 5g 5oi?/.a AsKxpa vupcpsuaaq AaOpa xov 7iaa5a scpnasv... o S> sv Geoo Sopoicnv
7'a(psxoq, coq 7aGoi, 7iai8ef>Exai.. [...he goes and secretly breeds children with an other
woman... he went behind your back to some slave-woman... for secrecy, the boy is
dedicated to service in the temple] (1. 815-825).
And soon after Creusa's first explanations about her secret: "co Guyaxep, ap> pv xauG11 a
y* paGopriv sycb; ... vooov Kpucpalav rjvud soxsvsq MGpa; ... raT s^CKAcp/ac, raioq
1AnoXkawoq yapouq;" [oh my daughter, then that was what I noticed? ... But how did
you hide what had happened] (1. 944-6), and when asked about who else knows the
C_ V V
truth: "oi)8s ^uvpSsi ooi xiq ekGegw xekvou; / ai ^upcpopal ys lcai xo taxvGavsw povov"
[doesn't anyone know about it? / Only troubles and stealth do] (1. 956-7).
But it is not troubles and stealth that are the real witnesses. An interesting feature
appears at the point of lack of evidence or witnessing. A vestige of an image is
endowed with the truth of a veritable memory. They both had seen and had known and
had kept silent. Neither Creusa nor the old man would let each other down at this
point. The possibility of having shared a secret is upgraded to a certainty. It is a credit
to both. To Creusa for having evaded the inquisitive eye of society, to the servant for
being the sole and silent witness of such a masterful deception.
A new myth replaces the old one. The past is redefined in order to fit the requirements
of the present. A general assault on time, a fragmentation, takes place: backdating
one's certainties, distorting the opponent's place in time, nullifying the good struggle
of virtue and silence, regressing further and further back are what it takes for Creusa
and the old man to legitimise their frustration and their anger. Beneath all lurks the
same motive, the impossibility of desire in whatever disguise.
What does the present require? "xov nproxov''a8ucr|cjavxa d*a7roxivov Gsov" the servant
I
suggests. Creusa retreats from the awesome impossibility of the task: "koU Ticoq xa
Kpsraaco Gvqxoq ona' tmepSpapto;" [Avenge the god who wronged you first / How, I,
mortal triumph over the strong?] (1. 971-2) [trans. Way 1958], Just like Xuthus and
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Ion who are told to leave the oracle together but do not know how and retreat to their
past to find their bearings, the daughter and the father will seek theirs in the very same
space. The slight moderation of their revenge basically preserves the truth of the
oracle, the same one the servant had postulated in the beginning when he had declared
that Apollo was not involved and that it was all Xuthus' fault (1. 825).
Looking back they discover a 'black patch', a stretch of meaningless time they must
account for. Creusa and the old man ought to have seized the opportunity to interpret
it in a symbolic way104. That would have put Creusa's long self-appointed struggle in
perspective. It would have taken into account the responsibility for the house of
Erechtheus and who bears it, it would have dealt with the present trouble and the
husbands in the context of law governed relations, it would have meant that the
present pair would take the Other into account. There the race with Xuthus would
have been won. Unfortunately, only an 'imaginary' extension of the plot allows us to
think what would have happened if Creusa and the old man had not been fascinated by
the secrecy of the other and had shouted 'foul' in the first instance.
They fall victim to the expected and the anticipated reward of their good service and
struggle which they think goes to their rivals instead. What seems to bother Creusa
more than her husband's infidelity is the fact that she does not receive what is due to
her from Apollo- irrespective of the fact that it would also upset the established order.
With the intervention of the slave, the mirror of her fears, Creusa sees nothing in the
place of her noble cause and nothing in the place of her future. She has no past and no
future. She is at the same spot as Ion was in the previous scene just after he learned
that he had to leave the oracle and follow that man into a hostile city. In a similar way
Creusa is left with the form of the agon, the manner and the style of her silence, an
empty form now that its essence had been subtracted. There she is asked to invest it
with new meaning and she will just do that. The presence of the other, the fellow
human being, the benevolent father, is more than enough to guarantee that she will fall
into the same old trap as anyone else in her place.
It is no surprise, then, that Creusa regresses to a less familiar past, an older myth of the
family. And indeed, like Ion, she does that when the other appears to give up:
'04 The similarities with the pair Xuthus-lon are obvious. All four of them prefer to use the moment to
inflate their ego in a narcissistic way rather than admit their ignorance and take it from there.
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Cre: "e7tW|p.ov cfcpovoq, icai xo 8oi)A,ov jkfbsvsq" [No, too open, and-with slaves- too
uncertain];
Serv: "copoi, KaKt^rj cpsps, an vnv |3ouA.sus xi" [If you are afraid, 1 give it up. Think of
something yourself];
Cre: "kcu p.r|v l:yo) ys 5o/aa kcu Spaaxppia" [I have a way - secret and certain] (1. 983-
5).
The weapon that will kill Ion is older than all generations. It is a mythical asset. It
goes back to the separation of good from evil, to the first dyad. Creusa will use it in a
mechanistic way, clearly missing its symbolic significance. It is remarkable how blind
she is to the meaning of the story she herself tells, to the myth that wants good and bad
tied together as she just recites its content in her defence. Yet the twin drops of blood
are nothing but the signifier/symbol of the order of the world and the succession of
kings from the time the monsters were subdued onwards. Under the pressure of the
circumstances the amulet will become a poison and the object of her support, the
slave, will become the instrument of her revenge. The child will have affected its
surroundings in a perfectly narcissistic omnipotent way.
Likewise, the further they retreat from the cause of their aggression, the frustration of
the past, the more the other becomes responsible for their misery. Ion's death is hailed
as salvation and panacea and anticipated with excitement:
"Trpoka^upar youv x"co XP0VU Th9 r|5ovr|g" (1. 1027) says Creusa when everything is
close to falling into place. Everything will be as before, the impostor will be out of the
way, the husband will know nothing - "icai aov /.paeic ttooiv a as G7isi)5sr A,a9sTv" ( 1.
1028) and Creusa will nowhere appear involved in this. The danger, remnant of the
bad object, is expelled and in its place emerges the gratitude of the city to its iiberator,
the ideal-in-the future that seems to support the general mood of debt and
indebtedness.
In their jubilation at the approaching success Creusa and the old servant miss the
simple fact that while their anger is secretly well founded their success will be
exposed to the eyes of the entire world. Indeed their only chance is to fail. The
symmetry of the narcissistic structures guarantees that. "The child who strikes another
says that he has been struck; the child who sees another fall, cries" says Lacan [Lacan
1948, p. 19], So they think they are safe if Creusa who has a motive stays obscure,
away from the scene and the servant, with no apparent motive, executes her command.
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The last impressions are the strongest. The last action determines the issue of all the
previous ones. Creusa and the old servant will appear stupid because of that.
In this part I have discussed the building of the symmetrical narcissistic universe of
the chorus, the servant and Creusa. The chorus proposes a way of dealing with the
trouble that amounts almost to aggression against themselves. The servant redirects it
against the external world. As a tribute to both their desires I have tried to picture the
alienation of an absolutely imaginary identification with the other as the basis of their
mindless and perhaps murderous desire. In the final part, which I also consider as the
introduction to Creusa's monologue, I have tried to follow the ingredients of the
imaginary in a way parallel to the previous scene. Like her husband, Creusa regresses
into her mythical past in order to find support for her claims. Like him, she invests
objects of the external world with love and hatred.
Concluding Remarks
In the beginning of this part I described Scenes Two and Three as arrangements of
mirrors. Apollo's oracle hands down an obscure message, a child. The message passes
from mouth to mouth. The mirage of the child passes in front of the eyes of each
receiver, upsets the order of the world, threatens to spread disaster and chaos.
Everyone loves 'the child' but no one is prepared to take responsibility for it. Its
presence must be concealed. Its fate must be determined in secret (XbOpa) and must
remain a secret, for an indefinite time. A superficial indifference must be maintained.
Appearances must not be disturbed.
In the meantime it, too, works XaQpa. IJnder the unruffled exterior of their childless
sorrow Xuthus and Creusa are preparing the ground for its reception. The child does
not make families, it destroys them. It unearths the prejudice, the secrets, the hatred,
the xenophobia, the mistrust and all the misgivings repressed by the pact of Xuthus'
marriage to Creusa and Athens' gratitude to their saviour. It cancels the past layer by
layer. First, Xuthus' commitment to his wife and vice versa, then Apollo's
involvement, then the authority of the one who orders, witnesses and sanctions the
whole affair - be it Apollo or another father-figure.
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Xuthus does not need to go far in order to sanction the child. He nominates his son
and this should be enough in the symbolic. But when he leaves the position of the
symbolic father and becomes personally involved in it the troubles begin. What
Creusa's side sees in this is primarily the violation of law and order. Thus they start
from the wish to restore it. But they too become personally involved and instead of
restoring law and order they almost end up destroying it completely. Thus the mistrust
of the two sides has its roots in the symbolic where the terms 'husband', 'wife',
'daughter', 'son', 'law' etc. have meaning. Within the same order the threat to their
status and their hopes for re-institution also have meaning. Even when Creusa and her
friends pledge to take the law into their hands and punish the usurper they have to
refer to the law and their position in society.
A silent war begins. It does not matter who started it, it is always the other. Xuthus
and Creusa will never notice their similarity, how much like each other they are and
how little each cares for the other. They do indeed share a lot, but not as symbolic
husband and wife. For as long as the imaginary game lasts, an equilibrium is
maintained- till the moment when one of the parties makes a mistake and exposes
itself to the justified wrath of the other. Neither is better than the other; they are all
equal. This equality is maintained in the face of the 'absolute master', death.
Death is encountered in its imaginary form. Although it is not difficult to trace its
origins in the symbolic fear of castration or symbolic exile from society, it appears
here as an imminent direct attack on the subject's life. It is a very 'rational' fear, since it
is constructed according to the principles of very simple- imaginary- logic: I am
complete, the other envies my completeness, the other envies me and wants my death.
But one can only anticipate what one envies in the others.
Where does it all begin? In our play each scene is a new beginning that always obeys
the universal law of language: in the beginning it was the word ... and it is always the
word of the father. Apollo delivers his word and it reaches down to everyone. By the
same token 'the new beginning' is made necessary by the structure of the play itself.
The child passes from hand to hand and is in a way shared by everyone. It is obscure,
a phallus behind the curtains, 'it', the complement one has or has not, contemplates,
reaches out for and gains or loses. The idea of the new beginnings of the play is
suggested by the play itself. Lacan warns analysts to wait for the completion of
speech, to defer their judgement till the last letter has fallen into place. We are a long
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way from that, but, taking into account the expression of desire, the continuous
reversals of fortune and the high stakes raised in Scene One, we can only say that the
most permanent feature of the desire of the play seeks to cancel all its false starts and
start from the beginning again.
Lacan reminds us that a new beginning is only ever possible in the symbolic. Scenes
Two and Three start off from the symbolic, death and society, travel via the imaginary,
and by the end of the circle, when the time of another new beginning is right and all
passion is spent, the scene is set for the clichi: the first day of the rest of their life.
In this circle, excluding the influence of the future we know as spectators, we prepare
for the future we do not know by relying on the past we want to forget. More than
anything else the most lingering impression from Scenes Two and Three is, for me,
the desire to live mysteriously attracted to the desire of death and a compelling desire
to maintain desire at any cost. Of all the clichis of psychoanalysis none rings truer than
Freud's famous dictum that the subject is quite reluctant to forgo the narcissistic
pleasures of the past. We see it in every moment, dispassionate and non-involved as
we are. Ion states that he would prefer the calmness of the oracular shrine, Creusa
wants to return to the sadness of childlessness rather than accept someone else's child,
and Xuthus and the old man, who seem to have a span ofmemory longer than anyone
else, want to return to the blissful folly of youth. Taken just one step back, it seems
that desire is always narcissistically defined and takes its measure from the previously
occupied position. Carried to extremes, desire is narcissistically defined by the
regression to the furthest of pasts and to the darkest of memories, always tending
towards the blissful ignorance of childhood or Freud's suggestion that the purpose of
life is death, but death reached in the organism's own time105. In our case the
complication would be the foreign body, the ally, the rape, the illegitimate child that
disturb the bliss of the oracular shrine and the peaceful decline of the line of Athenian
kings. This, however, does not seem to be the case. The play of'life' flirts with death
in a different way. It follows the consequences of'entering' meaning via the necessary
repression of non-meaning- and discovering in the other the secret of what has been
denied. Scenes Two and Three are preceded by the disaster in Scene One. They are
'05 |n 'Beyond the pleasure principle' Freud [1920, p. 313] observes that life leads to death by
following its own course.
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shadowed by the ghost of "the child" which as pure signifier can be made to look like
both life and death and like a mirror give body to the moods, the thoughts and the
emotions of the one standing opposite to it. Isn't everyone becoming a child in its
presence? What is this ghost that passes from hand to hand and really 'makes them all
forget their differences', amicably or non-amicably and fall in and out of love with the
other? It is simply a child in which the adult's narcissism is restored and because it can
excite everybody's feelings for its likeness to everybody it is scary as well.
I have maintained throughout this analysis that everybody has an impossible desire. In
Scene One the outcome of the brief'negotiation of meaning' between two strangers is
that they stumbled on the impossibility itself. In that scene Creusa and Ion go through
the same identification of solidarity and are led on by the same lure of the imaginary
narcissism for a brief stretch of time. They fall into the usual traps of the expected and
the familiar image, the other's tears, the noble origin, the namelessness of the child,
the seduction of the half-concealed answers that fire the imagination and allow the
other to see himself implicated in 'your' desire. But the magnitude of their ignorance
and the devastating directness of their demand is such as to make any progress
impossible. Who would fall for 'just die for me' coming from a stranger or 'forget your
desire, do as I say' coming from a slave? So, upon breaking up their short-lived
solidarity in Scene One, they return to the safety of the previous position, the
assumption of strangeness and protective silence, their little narcissistic reserve that
conceals the 'trauma' of the unexpected news.
The new beginning is another ' trauma', a mixed blessing even for the fortunate. Ion
puts it nicely: 'Where did this new avpcpopa (hap) come from?' he wonders. The new
meaning supersedes the old one. A new order is placed on top of the unresolved
previous one. Scenes Two and Three evoke Scene One, differ from it, and in the end
arrive at the same point. Certainly go beyond Scene One in their span-of-time, but
they reach the same unsettled questions of life and death when they come full circle,
when Creusa and Ion meet again at point zero. The failure of all participants to reach
the beginnings of discourse, their aporia, is the kind of progress we are talking about.
Two ways of seeing are now established. According to the first, wherever you look
you see nothing, the emptiness of the missing child, the suspension of your desire, the
total aporia and nothingness you are coextensive with. According to the second, you
are someone, and if you are lucky you are everything. You know more than you
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thought and there is someone else to help you and complement your knowledge and
your life, and, most importantly, to see in you what you cannot see in yourself. Neither
of the two orders is ever destroyed.
I would call Scenes Two and Three 'an apprenticeship in the imaginary' or an
'apprenticeship in appearances'. The least one learns - if there is anything to learn - is
that the apparent Tightness of one's cause does not guarantee the Tightness of one's
position, does not justify one's means and at the end of the day, one has to resort to the
same 'sordid' little deceptions as the other who is certainly worse than oneself. But this
lesson in humanity or in the scarincss of meeting one's double comes only later. The
ground is being laid for it. For the moment, however, this is not obvious. The
Imaginary scares away the ghosts of nothingness by offering a trick and illusion, the
lure of completeness and unity in the form of the other. The gift of love offered so
amply and so generously at the right moment- such a good timing should make it
suspect- is accepted with gratitude. 'You are nothing' is reversed into 'you are
everything to me' and to 'I abandon myself to you' or 'I would die for you', which
answers the need of the previous time. Coming from the shock of death Creusa and
Ion are easily hooked.
For the first time the presence of the other 'lends its clothes' to the 'naked' desire of the
un-loved child. The offer of paternity is an offer of unconditional love, which answers
the eternal demand for love with the display of infinite affection 'I care for you, I
would die for you, I would do anything for you'. But love is to be returned, not to be
just recognised like desire106.
With the offer of love the world splits into two symmetrical parts: us and them, the
narcissistic symmetry of the imaginary world. We have seen how it works and how it
perpetuates its forms in the other and via the other by projecting its shortcomings and
ejecting its own goodness. By developing hate as the opposite of love.
With the offer of love the world of concrete things is born, the order of the obvious
and the transparent in which the senses acquire their certainty, thought thrives, and, in
general, body and mind work in harmony to restore not just a previous condition but
the blissful mindless happiness of another time. The would-be child is shown what is
'06 Desire is recognised [Lacan:MilIer 1975] means it is expressed and mediated in/by language, in the
Symbolic. It does not means 'it is satisfied'. Satisfaction mainly falls within the Imaginary.
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in store for him/her in the glory of Athens, without being warned of the possibility of
failure.
With the offer of love the order of appearances and deception is born. The implication
of the symmetries that govern everything from the reversal of fortune of Scene One to
planning the elimination of the other the general imput of the apprenticeship is that
everything has another side. But to the characters, who are in-side, this is no easy
thing to see. It is, however, manifested in its basic form, when one pretends not to be
what one thinks one is. I would therefore say that under the caring gaze of the fellow
human being a first glimpse into being and representing is achieved in which the
subject begins to play with forms and desire(s) without destroying them completely.
Even under the absolute stress of 'death' that dictates unholy alliances this is, in my
opinion, the first effect of humanisation of desire- where previously there was only the
suspension and the speechlessness of total aporia.
I have constructed the interplay of desires in Scenes Two and Three with the
following two basic principles in mind. First, that desire is essentially unsatisfiable
and second, that satisfaction is never complete and total, it is never an elimination of
desire. This fact is the simple support of the success of appearances, of the reliance on
the other, of the reawakening of narcissism and of being able to see oneself in the
future where one saw nothing before.
I have also tried to show that despite the solidarity of common causes cemented on the
need for some satisfaction (imaginary) and some recognition (symbolic) the opposite
is also grounded here, the basic aggression that threatens to destroy the edifice of good
will and comradeship from inside, from the side from which trouble is not expected. If
Xuthus and Ion and Creusa and her friends can get prepared for the enemy attack and
duplicate the other's movements in a carbon-copy fashion they miss the obvious in a
big way. They miss the obvious return of the repressed, their own aggression at the
point where a friend kindly orders: abandon your (previous) desire, bear my desire, do
as I say supplemented with because I know what is best for you.
In the multi-layered combination of mirrors the truth of the matter is that each and
every one is on his own. Eternal gratitude is due to the other, the fellow human being
for supplying the vital images for the subject and for supporting the ego when it was
almost breaking up, for allaying the fear of death or the fear of castration by
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(re)presenting a powerful but relatively manageable father; but gratitude stops
precisely there. The father on my side still remains the object of ambivalence and
gives rise to mixed feelings. Enchanted by playing the father, Xuthus and old man
unwittingly replicate ways too familiar to Ion and Creusa. Their crashing indifference
for the mother or for the effects of their acts are reminiscent of the indifference of
another father. Xuthus' uncontrollable sexuality and youthful folly will never stop
echoing the indifference of another father. The old man's blind eyes will not stop
echoing another father's blindness or deafness to paternal feeling. Under love and care
lies the suspicion of another unfortunate woman who, though she might have entered
into the Bacchic mysteries in full consciousness, took leave of her senses.
The crashing indifference of the ignorant fathers goes against the grain of Ion and
Creusa's desire- and more importantly against the grain of their neurotic desire which
for the moment takes the form of the missing mother and the (dead) child and
ultimately, of not been able to satisfy their curiosity and their knowledge in a
definitive way- by making Apollo speak.
Xuthus and the old man inadvertently order 'Be a man'/ 'Be a woman' and throw into
turmoil their innocent 'children' who have repressed any knowledge of sexuality. Still,
there is always a certain degree of fascination in the father who is ready to give his life
for/to his child. Creusa and Ion have refused to die for each other in the previous
scene but when they see such a spontaneous display of endless love, of love to the
death they are bound to be moved by the mark of excellence represented even by such
mindless devotion. There. I believe, the offer of death from the other hits the most
sensitive area of impotence in the neurotic desire of the future mother and the son who
could never match such excellence. This inimitable trend in the other, paired with
conflicting advice and verbal demands, will promote the response that will finally




If Scenes Two and Three are full of passion and potential, Creusa and Ion's second
meeting is an explosion of meaning. It starts an avalanche of changes, a series of
intense short episodes which succeed one another with dramatic rapidity. Suspense,
agony, drama is the effect of that rapidity.
These episodes are full of meaning on their own but when they are considered
together, like a string of letters forming a word, they spell a more profound message.
With the second meeting and the collapse of communication between Creusa and Ion
a problem is created: how to survive, how not to die. When death is 'postponed' by the
Pythia the problem begins to take its final form: how to live- meaningfully.
The chapter is entitled "Ion's desire". It is written with Ion's essential aporias in mind
and it ends with the discussion of the meaning of Athena's intervention. The basic
argument concerning Athena's intervention is that she answers a very precise demand
and it is only by doing that, that she creates the circumstances necessary for life to
take a normal course. Creusa's desire and the discussion concerning the happiness of
the mother-son pair are completed in the next chapter.
The present chapter does not require a theoretical part as the previous two did, and we
must assume our entire knowledge of the Imaginary and the Symbolic at this point.
The approach, however, to the here and now of the scenes has been influenced by the
final stages of analysis as discussed by Lacan in the Seminar on Freud's technique. I
must therefore introduce the relevant notions very briefly. Another reference to theory
(towards the end of the chapter), to the function of procreation and the notion of 'being
a father' in the economy of desire, is based on earlier discussions of the Oedipus
complex and mainly expand on familiar notions.
Analysis relies on the notion of intersubjectivity. "Everything begins with the
possibility of naming, which is both destructive of the thing and allows the passage of
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the thing onto the symbolic plane, thanks to which the truly human register comes into
its own. It is from that point on that, in a more and more complicated manner, the
embodiment of the symbolic within the imaginary experience takes place. The
symbolic will shape those inflections which, in the life of the adult, the imaginary
commitment, the original captation, can take on" [LacamMiller 1975, p. 219].
Intersubjectivity summarises the essential requirements for human relations. By
'destructive of the thing' Lacan means the breaking of the imaginary duality (between
the ego and its object) by the introduction of the symbolic mediation of language. The
characteristic example of the 'destruction of the thing' and the representation of both
the sacrifice and the law that causes it is the famous 'Fort/da' case107. Intersubjectivity
also implies recognition [LacamMiller 1975, p. 216], another key notion in
psychoanalysis: referring to desire, recognition means acknowledgement of desire, of
having a desire, rather than satisfaction of it.
107Freud [1920, pp. 284-6] observes his grandson playing-acting the departure of his mother by
throwing away and retrieving a cotton ball attached to a string. At the same time he pronounces two
distinct sounds o/a (which later Freud deciphers: fort/ da: here/there). Freud assumes that the child was
reproducing the painful experience of separation and by doing so he was mastering it. Lacan lays
emphasis on the introduction of language at that very point, on the verbal representation of the
experience. The linguistic representation causes/is the death ofthe thing.
The following quotation-comment from Lacan [LacamMiller 1975, p. 174] summarises the essentials
of access to language: "it is in fact already in his solitude that the desire of the little man has become
the desire of the other, of an alter ego, who dominates him and whose object of desire is henceforth his
own affliction ... but don't forget that, when he says Fort, it is because the object is here, and when he
says Da the object is absent- and since his call has the effect of making him slip away, he will search in
a banishing affirmation ... the provocation of the return which brings his object back to this desire. So
you see here that- already before the introduction of the no, of the refusal of the other, when the subject
learns to constitute ... the negativation of the simple call, the appearance of a simple pair of symbols
when confronted with the contrasted phenomenon of presence and absence, that is to say the
introduction of the symbol, reverses the positions. Absence is evoked in presence, and presence in
absence ... it is in so far as the symbol allows this inversion, that is to say cancels the existing thing,
that it opens up the world of negativity, which constitutes both the discourse of the human subject and
the reality of his world in so far as it is human. Primal masochism should be located around this initial
negativation, around this original murder of the thing".
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Coming to analysis, the subject commits himself to the discovery of a truth, to be
looked for initially in his symptoms. He also commits himself to a symbolic relation
and to an ignorance as to the meaning of his symptoms and to a gradual 'unearthing'
of knowledge concerning them. The success of analysis depends on the acceptance of
intermediate findings/truths and finally on the full symbolic integration of what has
been found. Thus the analysand revises his personal history in order to elucidate its
'grey areas'. The term history is important. It does concern fact but mostly it concerns
interpretation. History starts from the past but continues into the future. Analysis aims
at clarifying the particular meaning of the subject's discourse as a historical discourse
unfolding in the present: "the subject's centre of gravity is this present synthesis of the
past which we call history" Lacan says [Lacan:Miller 1975, p. 36], meaning that it is
because the subject has a future and because this future must be meaningful that he
seeks to unravel the entangled threads of the past in the present time of analysis.
Lacan reminds us that the repressed and meaningless part of the subject's history is
"covered by a blank or falsehood", it is, in other words, misrecognised and
misinterpreted by the subject itself. Recognising its significance, reorganising and
interpreting its meaning, accepting it in one's own history- with the clarity of a
historical fact perhaps- is what matters most. Analysis proceeds first by dealing with
the ego's identifications, peeling off its layers: "Once the number of cycles necessary
for the subject's objects to appear have been accomplished...all is not, for all that,
brought to term. What was initially there, in O, then here, in O'. then again in O, has to
be referred to the completed system of symbols. The very outcome of analysis
requires it" [Lacan:Miller 1975, p. 199]. At the point when all objects have been dealt
with and all mirages have been set aside, the subject must take the next step: "Every
analyst, in fact, is a witness to the fact that no resolution of an analysis is possible,
whatever the diversity, the iridescence of the archaic events that it brings into play, if
it does not end by knotting itself around this legal, legalising co-ordinate, which is
called the Oedipus complex" [Lacan:Miller 1975, p. 198]. It is one of Lacan's most
stable positions that symbolic integration must pass via (a representation of) the
Oedipus complex. This is because the Oedipus complex is one of the most dominant
expressions of the subject's relation to the law in Western societies. At the end of
analysis, the complex represents the general cultural referent to which the value and
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effectiveness of the analytic experience will ' return'. The final reference to the
symbolic myth represents a form of acknowledgement of the 'success' of analysis as a
whole. Indeed Lacan uses the term 'myth' and refers to 'mythologies' as anchors or
'patterns' of behaviour in the past of humanity [LacamMiller 1981, p. 200].
The interest in the Oedipus complex at the final stages of analysis is also closely
related to the direction of the inquiries towards 'the absurdity of the super-ego'. Law
and super-ego are tied together: "The super-ego is an imperative., it is consonant with
the register and the idea of the law, that is to say with the totality of the system of
language, in so far as it defines the situation ofman as such, that is to saying so far as
he is not just a biological individual". The problems, then, dealt with in analysis,
converge on its "senseless, blind character, of pure imperativeness and simple
tyranny" is so far as "the super-ego has a relation to the law, and it is at the same time
a senseless law, going so far as to become a failure to recognise [meconnaissance] the
law. That is always the way we see the super-ego in the neurotic... [it] is at once the
law and its destruction. As such it is speech itself, the commandment of the law, in so
far as nothing more than its root remains. The law is entirely reduced to something,
which cannot even be expressed, like the You must, which is speech deprived of all its
meaning. It is in this sense that the super-ego ends up by being identified with only
what is most devastating, most fascinating, in the primitive experiences of the subject.
It ends up being identified with what I call the ferociousfigure, with the figures which
we can link to primitive traumas the child has suffered, whatever they are"
[LacamMiller 1975, p. 102, emphasis added].
What gives access to the truth of the subject, to the misunderstanding of the past and
the entanglement of the absurd super-ego? "Truth emerges from the mistake" Lacan
says. He explains: "Error shows itself to be such whenever, at a given moment, it ends
in a contradiction. If I started by saying that roses are plants which generally live
under water, and if it seems from what follows that for the whole day I remained in
the same place as the roses, since it is also quite clear that I cannot remain for a day
under water, a contradiction appears in my discourse, demonstrating my error. In other
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words, in discourse, it is contradiction which sorts truth from error"108 [Lacan:Miller
1975, p. 264], And because the error is not only the slip of the tongue or the 'witz'
(joke), analysis proceeds by creating the circumstances under which the error, the
contradiction, will appear, "..we make strenuous efforts, when things aren't going
well, to exact some words from him [subject] which will tie him down. Lord knows
how adult's dialectic skids! The point is to link the subject to his contradictions, to
make him sign what he says, and to pledge his speech in a dialectic" Lacan says
[Lacan:Miller 1975, p. 230],
For the end of psychoanalysis, for the 'exit' from it, Lacan refers to nothing else but
the subject's relation to language. At the end of the second Seminar [LacamMiller
1978, p. 286] language is defined by its historical continuity and to a certain extent by
an abstract purity, while the subject's participation in it is defined by meaning, what
introduces him in the temporal succession and, at the end of the day, his own private
and particular 'meaningful' interpretations of 'the language' (ibid). The experience of
psychoanalysis, as transitional experience, is to be found in this wider perspective:
"Each subject" notes Lacan "doesn't simply have to take cognisance of the world, as if
108 por tiie relation of truth to error Lacan asks: Where does truth emerge? "In life, you can see truth
catch error from behind" says Lacan [LacamMiller 1975, p. 264], "In analysis, truth emerges in the
most clear-cut representative of the mistake- the slip, the action which one, improperly, calls manque
[missed, failed, abortive]". More specifically "Within what we call free associations, dream images,
symptoms, a word bearing the truth is revealed" (ibid). In dreams the significance of the word in
revealed not in a single meaning but in a network of meanings. In analysis these dimensions are
reopened: "[the subject] tells us this speech not only verbally, but through all his other means of
expression. Even through his body, the subject emits a speech, which is, as such, speech of truth, a
signifying speech which he does not even know he emits. It is because he always says more than he
means to, always more that he thinks he says" (p. 266).
We should also remember, at this point, the ignorance of the subject in analysis and the appeal to the
analysts or whoever he looks up to to offer him the key to his desire. Psychoanalysis seeks that key in
the unconscious. There appears a significant analytic principle: "What Freud means when he talks
about the suspension of the principle of non-contradiction in the unconscious is that the genuine speech
that we are supposed to uncover, in the dream, in the slip, in the Witz, obeys laws other than those of
discourse, which is subject to the condition of having to move within error up to the moment when it
encounters contradiction. Authentic speech has other modes, other means, than everyday speech" (p.
267).
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it all happened on the level of noetics, he has to find his way about in it. If
psychoanalysis means anything, it is that he is already engaged in something which
has a relation with language without being identical to it, and that he has to find his
way about in it- the universal discourse" [Lacan:Miller 1978, p. 283], One of the most
quoted phrases of psychoanalysis defines the relation of the subject to discourse: "he
[the subject] is the chorus line of this discourse, he himself is, if you prefer, a
message. A message has been written on his head, and he is entirely located in the
succession ofmessages. Each of his choices is a speech" (ibid).
A word on the role of the analyst must be added here. The analyst does not give ready
made answers and does not interfere except when the analysand 'is almost there', when
he is about to reach and recognise the meaning in what he has been saying. Any other
intervention by the analyst will be received either as an encouragement of certain
imaginary attachments or a reprimand from the super-ego. Ideally, the analyst, whom
Lacan expects to be pass master in the function of speech and alert to its nuances, will
stir the subject towards the multiple meanings of his speech that arise in the difference
between veut-dire and vouloir-dire (what he wants to and would like to say).
[Lacan:Miller 1975, p. 242].
I would like to close this short theoretical note with two quotations from the Seminar
on Freud. The first one concerns the poetry of language and applies, I believe, to all
language and to all uses. It concerns the creative function of the (linguistic) symbol:
"Were I to address another being, whether created or not, in calling him sun ofmy
heart, it would be an error to believe... that it is a question of a comparison, between
what you are in my heart and what the sun is...Simply from my having formulated this
relation, it is me, my avowal, my invocation, which enters the domain of the symbol.
Implied in this formula is the fact that the sun heats me up, the fact that it allows me to
live, and also that it is the centre of my gravitation... that it also blinds me, lending
false clarity and the deceptive glitter to everything" [Lacan:Miller 1975, p. 238].
The second quotation concern the 'responsibility' of the subject, of the speaking
human being. This, too, goes beyond psychoanalysis. It is supported by the difference
of the Imaginary and the Symbolic in its fullest sense, by what differentiates the
Symbolic as such from a formidably organised Imaginary that looks like it: "That is
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what we have to explore in a rigorous fashion if we want to make any progress at all
in thinking about what we are doing. Of course, we don't have to do so. I will even
admit that the majority of human beings quite universally excuse themselves from so
doing, and accomplish what they have to in no less satisfactory fashion. I would go
even further - one can push discourse, and even dialectic, extremely far, while
avoiding thought entirely. Nonetheless, every step forward in the symbolic world
capable of constituting a revelation implies, at least a brief moment, an effort of
thought. Now, an analysis is nothing other than an entire series of revelations
particular to each subject. So it is probable that his activity requires the alert as to the
meaning of what he is doing, and that, from time to time, he devote a moment of
thought" [Lacan:Miller 1975, p. 267],
In our play we have no analysts and no analysands. But we have two interventions
'from above' in Creusa and Ion's quarrel. We have truths and revelations and the poetic
play of language at its best. We also have two subjects who would like to live happily
beyond the confines of the shrine. We also have paternal figures of some considerable
strictness and a proneness to death. We will be looking for meaning and
meaningfulness in their discourse.
In this chapter we focus on a number of turning points: a) Creusa and Ion's second
meeting; b) Pythia's intervention; c) Ion's hesitation about opening the box; d) the
recognition of mother and son; e) the unveiling of the secret of paternity and Athena's
last intervention. The reading relies on the effect of the succession of these moments
as much as on the impact of each one on its own.
The final part of the play contains some fascinating moments which both attract our
attention and tend to 'monopolise' an interpretation if considered in isolation. For
instance, here is the happy ending. I am not the first to point out its 'soap opera' effect.
I am not the first to be left with mixed feelings in the end. There is the fascinating
second encounter between Creusa and Ion ridden with stillness; there is the Pythia's
intervention which at first appears absolutely arbitrary and 'divine'. Emphasising any
of these terms disproportionately to the others creates different readings. Attributing
equal significance to all allows meaning to emerge from all.
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With the second meeting the divine powers become more prominent. A subjection of
'the mortals' to higher powers appears to alternate with mortals' strong desire to upset
or even destroy the order of the world. The reintroduction of Apollo's message
through the Pythia, amounts to a new beginning which reverses the course of the play
and makes the second half look like a mirror image of the first109. We will try to show
that mortals' desires rather than divine providence direct the progress of the play.
More reasons for reinforcing the 'human' point of view: emotion reaches its peak in a
confrontational threat, not a tragic death, and so never loses its reversibility, and from
then on it is being redirected to happier causes like a malleable mass of unspecified
feeling ready to take any shape. There also appears to be a gratuitous extension-to-the-
limits of some formalisms, reversals and recognitions and copying of positions which
reminds us of the eternal play of mirrors, the endless mirrorings we learned to
recognise as essentially, narcissistically, catastrophic. The same mechanisms that
create disaster now seem to allow happiness to materialise, together with the doubt
that subverts it: how is one supposed to believe one's eyes, one's senses, one's mind,
and above all the other, when all that is said and done is swept away as 'error'. There
comes a god that cuts short the perpetuation of doubt, distributes valedictions together
with some clues about how to discern between 'always' and 'forever'- but what makes
this intervention meaningful? Or is it not meaningful? Or are mortals just
impressionable?
In the following reading I try to represent the passage from a hopeless situation to a
hopeful one. I try to represent 'the air' of consent and good faith. I am guided by the
happy ending to the extent that it is the last lasting impression, but I merge it with the
spirit of the play and the requirements of psychoanalysis that claim 'success' by means
of a successful re-integration into society. It is not the happy ending as such that
matters but the achievement of an affirmation, a general accession to the symbolic
through the necessary sacrifices.
'09 in the 'first part' we had Hermes' opening, then the father's recognition and the mother's hatred. In
the 'second', we have hatred, recognition and Athena's closing. This symmetry is bound to catch our
attention and affect our interpretation, but there comes the 'moral lesson' of the danger of fascinations
right from the previous part.
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We will focus on Ion's desire because he is the child that keeps the family together. I
consider the course of the play from the second meeting of Creusa and Ion onwards as
a complete version of the oedipal drama that ends with the assumption of a (paternal)
signifier by Ion. I believe that 'the second part' of the play clearly shows the difference
between a symbolic arrangement and any other solution. It illustrates the flow of
signification, the value of an encounter with the absurdity of the superego, the fact
that meaning is never exactly where one thinks it is. Ultimately, I am guided by the
poetry of language, the laws ofmetonymy and metaphor that must necessarily appear
and be made to work. In our case it takes two well-timed interventions before Ion can
make the first steps 'out in the world'.
The Altar Scene : Specular Duality
Death spills over from the previous scenes at the second encounter between Ion and
Creusa and updates the unresolved issues of the first meeting. Saturated with love,
scared to death. Ion and Creusa will take it upon themselves, as in the first time round,
to defend the indefensible order of the other's desire, while yet unable to see how it
relates to theirs. Mirror positions are maintained, a perfect balance of words and
appearances, a deadly symmetry finely illustrated by their exchange of positions110.
The following account consists of three parts. First, a demonstration of how the
exchange of words deteriorates into a dead end of silence, second, an examination of
the consequences of the clash on the past relations (paternal, friends, and what they
represent), third, an evaluation of the clash in relation to the immediate future of the
play.
The limits of the verbal duel are set with reference to the Law, which is hastily
invoked by both of them: one has the right to defend one's rightful position. Take it
' '0 The exchange of positions reverberates with possible meanings. Is it a chance event? It is possible.
Do they owe their salvation to an accident (of haste) then? To resort to the altar as suppliant implies
being able and eager to use the symbolic option that is available. Structural necessity makes this
entrapment at the altar the only possible way forward.
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any further and things stop being self-explanatory. Beyond the appropriation of 'the
right to protect' and the simplistic projection of 'the wrong' onto the rival, the
simultaneous reference by both Ion and Creusa to the very same ideals only throws
them into deeper confusion. Both look up to an order they think exclusive to
themselves until the real dimension of the problem emerges in language. Having
exchanged places, the two rivals rehearse all the available arguments of self
righteousness. They are specular images, man/ woman, master/ servant, now/ then,
doubles of the same paternity, the same descent and the same despair, the same
corporeal inviolability protected by the law of the oracle and the city. All arguments
are thrown in and all are counterbalanced. The verbal duel deteriorates into an
inevitable silence when they reach the point of absolute likeness (similarity to each
other).
There are arguments of belonging and time: "I here dedicate my body to him" (1.
1285) "You belong to your father" (1. 1287), "you were Apollo's but ceased to belong
to him" (1. 1289).
Arguments of guilt and enmity. "You are guilty, I was innocent /1 guilty? You are an
enemy ofmy house" (1. 1290-1).
Arguments of literal and metaphorical meaning: "I never took arms against Athens /
you were setting Erechtheus' palace on fire" (1. 1292-3).
Arguments ofpaternal heritage and authority, "my father has a right to give me what
he won / what right had the son of Aeolus in Athens?" (1. 1296-7) or "surely I had
some right there as a son / Your right there is - his sword ... no more" (1. 1304-5).
Arguments offuture misfortune, hasty anticipation and fear and envy, "why kill me
for fear of my hopes? / to save my own life I had to strike first / because you are
childless you grudge me to my father/you envied me / Because I am childless must
you snatch my home from me?" (1. 1300-3).
Lines of linguistic skill and sneering reproach: "he saved Athens; and by arms, not
arguments", "...does that make him a citizen?" (1. 1298-9).
We can imagine this fatal exchange going on for ever - or as long as they can rely on
the rights they are defending and on keeping still, frozen, where they are. Thus they
are bound to mirror positions, to the same consequences of the same acts and to the
same father. Nothing differentiates them, as they lose the exclusive right of an appeal
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to Apollo, the guarantor of the Tightness of their cause. Ion and Creusa have managed
to reach the dead end of narcissism. Everything starts from here.
As the variety of father-inspired arguments begins to lose its meaning by repetition,
Ion and Creusa begin to rely on their physical presence more and more. They are
inter-locked into a (living) representation of death which paradoxically preserves the
body and makes it the strongest argument. The symbolic meaning of the stillness and
of putting one's body on the line to save what one stands for, makes a difficult point. It
obscures one similarity and brings forth another. It obscures the (re)semblance of their
aggression but exposes the devastating truth of the issue at hand: you might have to
lose your life in order to defend your rights. You might need to die for your ideals, or
at any rate, you might gain them only by losing everything else1 H.
The order of the world, however, will not be disturbed by Ion or Creusa's death. It
seems to leave them out and consider them dead anyway. It is only to them, to their
narcissism, that death and annihilation matters.
In the middle of that inconceivable stalemate a narcissistic 'solution'- do for me what I
cannot do for myself- is proposed by Ion. It is a verbal demand, which literally
squeezes the last drops of speech out of the situation. It is so naive and so honest and
so true that it does not really matter whether it is spoken in anger or in frustration, as a
plea or as a threat:
"skA-suis Pcopov kcu GeriAaxonq sdpag" [get up, leave the holy altar] (1. 1307)
But the request is not satisfied. Instead it is answered by the apparent aimless
masochistic 'turning upon oneself with which Creusa refuses it and demolishes the
distance between gods and mortals:
'11 The subject is confronted by a menacing loss: your ideals or your life; usually, one 'gains' one's
ideals by dying- which is no good for living and for having resorted to the altar in order to live. The
radical 'way out' would have been a withdrawal from the scene, a complete 'giving up' of action. 1 am
drawing attention to these 'hypothetical' options in order to stress the fact that such dilemmas confront
one with one's ideals more than with a rival.
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"tic; pSovq oot Oeou Gavsiv sv ax^ppaai; / X,u7triao(xsv xiVj tov AsA.u7xriij.eg01 wco" [Why
do you choose to die (what pleasure is there) on an altar?/ At least I will hurt someone
who has hurt me] (1. 1310-11).
In order to put this gratuitous mess into perspective, we can define the present part of
the scene as the protracted 'da' of a loose fort/da game112. The entanglement of the
imaginary and the symbolic, the moment before their splitting is a self-reflexive
passive vengeance of one's own death in the making- both vengeance in the making
and death in the making- separated from each other and from the subject by a
moment's breadth. The stillness of life- still life is a contradiction in terms- is the zero
point of the oscillation between life and death, the fraction, the interval, the nothing,
that is only to be symbolised by two terms, before and after113.
At the same time, the masochism of taking death upon oneself indicated by Creusa,
illustrates another aspect of meaning. It brings up the real 'beyond' of the pleasure
principle, the pleasure of death, that transcends and connotes paternal desire and
everything that is going to lose its meaning in the next moment. But even at that point
it speaks only one truth: desire is bound to the Other. Even when the subject
contemplates, causes or luxuriates in the feeling of its annihilation, it only does so in
the thought of the Other who will feel the loss and suffer- perhaps. Creusa could not
have said it better as her gift to Apollo is cunningly human: I want to make someone
sorry might just mean 'I want to imprint a lasting memory of loss upon someone and -
with a little luck- make him suffer for ever.
Having arrived at Apollo's altar, Ion and Creusa may not have lost their lives but they
have jeopardised something more valuable, the imaginary mother and son that have
' The 'da' stands for the loss of the object and its passage to language. The whole game is usually
classed as a moment of masochism. Remember also that in a similar environment, analysis demands
the dissolution of all the imaginary supports of the ego, i.e., of all the objects. This is what I mean by
'jeopardising' the objects in the reading of the altar scene.
'' ^ In the fort/da game the vowels a/o represent the devastating experience of the loss of the mother.
Metaphorically speaking, in our case we could say that the two times, 'before the experience' and 'after
the experience' represent the devastating experience of coming near death: they are two related and
distinct experiences, almost as symmetrical, distinct and related as the vowels o and a.
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been supporting them all along. Saying I am doing it for my mother/ my child is not
enough. If Creusa and Ion die, their beloved will never be reinstated in their rightful
places. If one of them kills the other, their beloved will have to suffer the
consequences of the punishment (exile, exclusion from the city). That they never
thought of that drawback allows us to say, in a metaphorical way, that Ion and Creusa
cause the death of their beloved 'unwittingly'. For us, however, this only updates an
earlier knowledge concerning the imaginary and fantasmatic nature of the narcissistic
'beloved' objects: they never were really alive! Ion had already disposed of his
imaginary mother the moment he consented to follow Xuthus. Creusa had already
killed her child when she exposed it. Now they only 'turn against their own' for a
second time. Indeed 'mother' and 'son' have been convenient supports up to the
present. They have been kept 'alive' for as long as they could serve as external
purposes and inspiration for daring plans, for as long as they could conceal the
individual narcissism behind the pretext of altruism.
Ousted from the symbolic order and having destroyed the imaginary alter ego, Ion and
Creusa stare at each other as if at the smashed mirror of their own refection. Though
they cannot see that the other's misery is their own, the 'last nail' on the other's coffin
comes from one's own loss of narcissism: "admonish your mother" sneers Creusa
from the precarious security of the altar.
We have made an incision into the text. We have stopped its flow at the moment
before death and examined the correlation of forces. We have located the
confrontation in the general context of the masochistic fort/da game, considering it as
the protracted 'da', which destroys the Imaginary and gives birth to the Symbolic. A
similar crucial moment appears in the course of analysis, when the subject, having
exhausted all his pretexts and having removed all the reflection of love-objects,
encounters an absurdity that requires interpretation. Lacan reminds us that when the
analysand has reached that point it is one of the few occasions when they analyst can
intervene in a productive and helpful way. Let us examine our scene in which the
Pythia will intervene from this perspective.
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Have all love-objects been spent in our case? We just saw that nothing, fantasmatic or
imaginary, can support Ion or Creusa at the present moment. An end has been reached
from that point of view.
How about the absurdity? I believe that absurdity is represented by the arrangement of
the scene itself. Creusa is clinging to the altar and Ion is standing one step from it, his
hands tied by the laws of the holy place. The moment at which they are finally
deprived of past, present and- perhaps- future, coincides with the exhaustion of all
possible permutations of meaning, pacts, solidarities and grand plans. The end of
permutations culminates in a visual representation of the last and most absurd of them
all: having switched places. Ion and Creusa have done the unthinkable, they have
exchanged fathers/protectors: now Apollo is Creusa's 'father' and rapist, and Ion is the
'son' of the ferocious Erechtheus and the polluter of the shrine.
But is it a fruitful moment? Is it a moment worth "the analyst's" intervention? We
have no analyst, of course, but we have something better, the Pythia. We will return to
her role in a while. The moment is fruitful because it 'voices' two very significant
features: the problem, the absurdity of the super-ego, and the subject's position
towards it. Ion articulates both:
"Ha! The laws gods make for men, -what strange error, what folly! Criminals should
not take refuge at an altar, they should be driven away...sanctuary should be for the
innocent when they are wronged. As it is, good and bad come with the same claim,
and the gods give them both the same privilege" (1. 1312-19, emphasis added).
Ion does not understand, he does not understand what is going on. He expresses his
confusion, and with it the core of the problem, which concerns the god's laws (the
father's laws). As we remember, he had expressed similar aporias in the opening
scene. This confirms that we are talking about the same, persistent, consistent
problem. The short apprenticeship in the imaginary blunted the issue for a while but
did not resolve it- despite Xuthus' honest efforts to brush it aside. Now it returns and it
clearly shows what it involves: the god, this woman who refuses to fall on the sword,
the law that allows one to punish one's enemies and another law that prohibits one
from doing so. Ion the child is about to become a murderer without even having a
clear idea ofwhy and for whom.
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We could say that at their second meeting Ion and Creusa are standing at positions
identical to their first meeting. There are the same aporias, the same exorbitant
demands (do as I say), the same regression to silence. But they have travelled the
Imaginary of love and affection and they have resurrected and disposed their
affections and finally they have reached the opposite point from where they started.
They have come full circle. At that moment, a declaration of ignorance, or, in Creusa's
case, an acknowledgement of the importance of the Other's desire, amounts to
articulating and giving expression to the deepest cause for anxiety, unhappiness and
fear. It is a moment of truth. A moment of death.
The Pythia's Intervention
The Pythia's intervention is timely. We consider it symbolic, not imaginary, because
she does not offer love or knowledge. Instead she re-introduces ignorance by her
remarkable inability to account for her own actions and the remarkable efficiency with
which she both excludes herself from the 'vicious circle'114of love and hatred and
delivers the gift of someone else's desire. Hers is the first of two interventions, and
settles the issue of death. The second one, that of Athena, will settle some aspects of
sexuality.
In the following analysis we first examine the content of the Pythia's speech and the
concrete effects of her word and her gift (the box) upon Ion's desire. The second
discussion is an account of the general effect of her word also meant as a reply to
some issues raised by the death scene. The Pythia is responsible for the reintroduction
of the laws of signification along with ignorance. She encourages the poetry of
language that encompasses the death experience without dwelling on death itself and
opens up the prospect of a better future understanding by removing the danger and
anxiety of the present situation.
' Like the detective in Poe's story, like the analyst who gets paid, she too excludes herself from the
circle of exchanges and loves by making her affection unavailable.
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Pythia enters with an order: 'stop it my son', "s7UG%sc;, co 7tou" (1. 1320) and with a
single word dispels the fascination of death. The re-introduction of language, of
mediation, breaks the specular identity and the deadly silence. It also represents the
prohibition necessary to restore it in its rightful place. She delivers a sequence ofmild
specific commands: "cm 5* ropoq ©v apapxavsrq... |xq xauxa' A.surcov tspa kcu ax£ 17.01v
7iaxpav ... icaOapoq'AOpvac"ckd1 vrf cncovcbv Kakmv ... pp cm ys" 7tap' pprov ctckap' ouc
IsX® Xoyovq..." (1. 1327-35).
She casts doubt on Ion's black and white universe but without exactly saying so much.
This is her masterful intervention which we consider sufficient to restart the
negotiation of meaning. The Pythia reintroduces the word just as it was beginning to
wane. Then comes the box, which symbolises115 her discourse, then comes everything
else. In the beginning it is her speech loaded with the prohibitory significance of
"8Jtio%sq" and the effect of the vague reprimands and negatives.
By 'symbolises' I mean represents by using objects, examples. 1 use the term as it is used by Lacan
who comments on one of Melanie Klein's cases [LacamMiller 1975, pp. 84-6], It involves the visual
representation and symbolisation of the Oedipus complex by the analyst. It is, I think, a very eloquent
example of what we could call 'symbolic gesture' (the emphasis on gesture). Klein's little patient 'does
not speak': "There is a subject here who quite literally does not reply. Speech has not come to him.
Language didn't stick to his imaginary system...His faculties, not of communication, but of expression,
are limited..." Having no verbal resources to advance analysis Klein takes advantage of the toy-trains in
the playroom: "She starts off, she says, from ideas she already has, which are well known, as to what
happens at this stage. I won't beat about the bush, I just tell him- Dick little train, big train daddy-train.
Thereupon, the child starts to play with his little train, and he says the word station. Crucial moment,
when the sticking of language to the subject's imaginary begins to sketch itself. Melanie Klein plays it
back to him- The station is mummy. Dick is going into mummy. From this point, everything starts
firing. She'll only feed him these kind of lines, and no other. And very quickly the child makes
progress. That's a fact". Lacan commends: "you can discriminate between what is a function of the ego
and pertains to the order of the dual relation, and what is a function of the super-ego". Klein did just
that. She 'grafted' the symbolisation of the Oedipus complex upon the child's 'ego-related inertia': "[she
did nothing other but] bring in verbalisation. She symbolised an effective relationship, that of one
named being with another. She plastered on the symbolisation of the Oedipal myth, to give it its real
name" (p. 85, emphasis added).
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The Pythia recasts the past, the present and the future in terms of a wealth of
possibilities. She presents the (notions of the) father and the mother in symbolic light.
From now on they will be irrevocably lost but retrievable.
The god sets you free and does not needyour services any more (1. 1342-3)
Ion is released from servitude, having paidfor his debt of life with his (servant) life.
Apollo's decision to send him away is the symbolic 'payment' for services rendered
and not some sort of obscure favour. Thus, Apollo retreats: he had only been the
temporary guardian of someone else's child, explains the Pythia.
Ion's desire to find his mother is symbolically recognised116: "xpv xeKonoav 8K7rov8i"
the Pythia says, and with these very words she re-channels Ion's energy to more
fruitful tasks than serving the temple117. With the same words, the Pythia eternalises
the maternal desire by grafting it onto Ion's assets, the child's purity and
industriousness, the narcissistic remnants of the dedication to Apollo:
"Search ... All over Asia and Europe / You must decide where..." (1. 1356-7) she says,
gently creating an endless, vast-like-the-world maternal desire, slowly shifting it onto
the shoulders of the ex-servant who used to despair of his ignorance. Metaphorically
speaking, to bear the burden and the vastness of the world means to look eager to
embark on the most mythical of all mythical quests, to re-discover one's own image in
the world, having, every time, to start from the beginning.
By way of explanation the Pythia does not say much. She supports her word with her
own good example. She bears the other's desire willingly and thus asks for her desire
to be borne likewise. Hers is a desire of the father and not for the father.
By bringing together the two fathers (Apollo and Xuthus), the mother, her own desire,
and Creusa, the Pythia ties all the knots of the past with the present and the future, the
right time in which everything will find its real purpose, value and meaning: one day
everything will have made sense. This will have been the future anterior118 of Ion's
116 por tpe meaning 0f symbolic recognition; see introductory note of this chapter and Lacan's "The
Object Relation and the Intersubjective Relation" [Lacan:Miller 1975, pp. 208-19],
1 17 Ekkovco, echoing Ion's own language of toil and labour in his monody.
118 See Weber [1991, p. 14],
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actions, the very inspiration and desire that have their origin in the past and in the
present day.
Her word, however, could have been just another command were it not for the context
of the previous death. The matter is simple; you take it or leave it: not the enticing
offer of a throne of Athens or a substantial reward of loyalty but the time of the
signifier that takes its time to fall in place, exactly where it should be. This is the
secret, let us say, the deep structure, in which in a very poetic way the 'procreation' of
meaning acquires its first (foremost) meaning. The Pythia restores the sparkle of
desire in the promise of seeing oneself in someone else's eyes and her general lesson is
simple: you are neither dead nor immortal, you are alive, human, that is, subject to the
signifier (as maternal and paternal desire) and by giving Ion the box she subjects him
to the most essential aspect of the mediated relation: symbolic recognition by the
other. Thus death is averted as the old demand of bearing the other's desire willingly is
invested with the prospect of the subject bearing the mark of its unknown future and
the poetic openness of the signifier. Between the stillness of death and the fearful life
she inserts an extra time, the one excluded by the negotiation of meaning polarised
between the previous two. Thus she provides Ion with the only personal past he can
identify with in good time, his own attributes and the mysterious contents of his box.
She fixes him with a signifier 'tattooed on his head' (see introductory note in this
chapter), addressed not 'to whom it may concern' but to the one that is/will be really
concerned. This signifier is both light and heavy but not deadly.
Because her answers are selective, they represent/embody the sliding of the signifier
that does not answer the question exactly but crosses over to one beyond, leaves a lot
to be desired and evokes the desirable without exposing, killing or choking it with
over-interpretation. The Pythia orders Ion to translate the experiences of the day into
the poetry of a lifetime. She interprets, she does not explain.
It is impossible to account for the wealth of Pythia's intervention, while the course of
the play confirms its value. Let us not forget that her word is only part of an organised
discourse, the meaning of which emerges in the end. We can appreciate her
intervention for its value in terms of what it says and how. If we consider her
intervention as another turning point, another moment with some significance, we can
say that the Pythia 'educates' Ion and Creusa in symbolic terms. Both the content and
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the effect of her speech are marked by the symbolic- though they certainly exploit the
other side of her appeal, the imaginary maternal love.
As I said before, the Pythia's intervention is timely. Like the analyst who intervenes
only when the analysand is about to recognise and verbalise the meaning of what he
says, she, too, enters the scene when it matters most. Thus her intervention is not just
another interruption of discourse. It is a meaningful intervention and does not fall on
deaf ears. It provides the third alternative between still life and untimely death. This
alternative is the function of the signifier as such 'that encompasses several meanings'
[Lacan:Miller 1975, p. 242] a proposition I understand in relation to what we know
that follows, a search for identity starting from zero, having been branded by death,
passing via routes that were till then considered unacceptable, for instance, willingly
accepting the other's desire.
I said earlier that Pythia says nothing, explains nothing and introduces nothing new
apart from a meaningless box full of clothes. There is nothing concrete in her
intervention and yet it is the only suitable one. In saying that, I am guided by Lacan's
comment on the change of the analytic situation once its similarity to the analysand's
past has been redefined. The following quotation captures the spirit of the timely
intervention: "why does a complete transformation of the analytic situation ensue as
soon as the relation between the situations has been revealed to the subject? Why do
the same words then become effective, and constitute genuine development in the
subject's existence?...Speech as such is instituted within the structure of the semantic
world which is that of language. Speech never has one single meaning, nor the word
one single use..." [LacamMiller, p. 242].
The Pythia does not dwell on death, she proceeds with the discourse answering the
'wrong' question, another question, the metonymic remnant of Creusa and Ion's
confrontation. If the issue raised by the altar scene could be articulated as 'what am I
at the hour of death?' the Pythia re-orientates the interest to 'who will I be beyond this
death?' Death is ignored, right and wrong is ignored and the justification of their
causes as well. The Pythia transcends the core of death, the nothing they just
encountered by re-locating them in the network of intersecting desires, theirs that
comes from the certainty of a personal future, hers that evokes the maternal wish, the
God's that evokes the king's that evokes the city's that evokes theirs, that evokes the
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other's....The Pythia does not refuse them the pleasures of death so long as she 'saves'
them from its fascinations. If Creusa and Ion have lost their narcissistic attachments
and the mirage of the world with them, her intervention reads: 'you may evoke your
loss but you may not cause if. The Pythia turns despair into poetry and fuses the
significant experience of death with the symbolic existence: you are nothing as you
are defined by the nothing of death, but you may also discover you are lots of other
things...you are nothing and you are everything as you were in the beginning- in Scene
One and, later, in Scene Two. It is upon you to discover who you are but you must
discover it nevertheless. It is your duty and your desire to obey my desire. The
Pythia's gift to Ion is the return of his own gift/signifier, the infinite ignorance he
could not cope with, the one he now welcomes, the metaphoric alternative to the
instruments of death, to the double-edged sword and the twin drops of blood. The
Pythia bestows ignorance and desire: to live and know who you are, to follow that
eternally, to the end of the world.
Now Ion is ignorant and "gifted" (neologism for 'having received a gift'), none the
wiser, 'rescued' by a mother different from the one he had set out to rescue in the first
scene, richer through experience, a token of affection and the strict order not to mis¬
use it. The Pythia givers no answers but advances an interpretation: 'do not kill' and
then 'search', making 'her son' the living bearer of her own pythic word and the
duplicity of Apollo, who speaks with her tongue, and her own desire, which speaks of
another.
The Pythia imposes an internalisation of all the rules Ion has been playing with so far.
She distances the threat of death, renders it harmless, makes it look like the first move
in a child's game of representation of death, a clumsy representation of the equivalent
mental phenomenon that demands the dissolution of narcissistic first loves, brushes
past death and redelivers the 'mature' child and its mother 'to the entire world'.
What to do with One's Desire
Ion is given the world, the boundaries of the city and the vastness of the continents.
Before happiness, before the return of the imaginary narcissistic recognition, there
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appears a moment of reflection, a moment of loss and calmness akin to death. All
pretensions have been abandoned. Excluding the dramatic necessity that requires him
to show his contents of the box to Creusa, Ion will for the moment debate within
himself what to do with the insignia of his identity. There emerges a moment of
honesty and profoundness that loses its tragic grandeur only because it is phrased as a
cliche. It appears to be a moment of free will, as much as a renunciation of it. We can
place it in context: it bridges the prohibition of the desire of the father and the return
of the doubt and suspense that have dogged Ion up to the day. It threatens to block the
new beginning:
"Apollo was kind. Fate was cruel. All these years when I should have lived happy in
the comfort of her arms, I was denied the sweetness of the mother's care. She, too, lost
all the joy of motherhood, and suffered the same bitter loneliness. -There may be
things I would not want to discover: I will dedicate this cradle to Apollo, and know
nothing [oiaco 0eco dv'a0qp', 'iv1 supoo jipbsv rov on [3ou/.opai]. If my mother was a
slave it would be better to leave her unfound. -Apollo, I dedicate to you this...What
am I doing? Apollo kept these tokens for me, and I am opposing his purpose! I must
open it and take the risk favoucrsov tad1 sort icai xofpr|xsov]. Nothing that I do can
stop the course of Fate - What secret have you for me under these holy knots? You
have treasured here the love I owe - to whom" [rot yap TisTipcopev1 ov% wrspPalqv nox1
'av.'fl ax/:ppa0' tspa, xi 7roxs poi K£Ksu0axs, xai <xuv5s0^oiai xap' s(ppoupr|0r| cpila;] (1.
1380-90).
It is a moment of decisions119, that recasts knowledge and the desire to know. Ion has
just internalised the Pythia's representation of the paternal word. It is a valuable line of
rare insight. Try striking it out and the whole play loses its edge.
No one rushes to action any more and, given the circumstances, Ion seems to realise
the full significance of what he embarks upon, the vastness of his future search. To
'will' is to oscillate; to doubt, not to want to see your desire fulfilled, to want to keep it
suspended and intact, to hope forever rather than be disappointed, and then to sacrifice
that will, to succumb to the power of more pressing desires, like the desire to be
' in the psychoanalytic sense a moment-of-conclusion.
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'someone', to be part of the (symbolic) world, someone's son, someone's father, king
and so on.
By a happy coincidence the description of the box fits with the definition of the
subject as a locus or a knot120 addressed to the other(s), here, to the one who can untie
it. Let us say that Ion grasps what in psychoanalytic language would be the relentless
flow of the signifier and the fact that one is born into an organised system that, strictly
speaking, can do without him. Destiny appears again, in the familiar but now revised
form of a choice that has already been decided, in favour of the symbolic sacrifice of
the ghosts of the past: in order to go ahead you need to leave things behind.
What to do with one's desire? The question can be meaningfully answered only when
it is placed/ asked in the context of the mother(s) and the father(s) together.
Ion has been asking the same question from the beginning of his ordeal and at the
present moment he finds himself unable to sustain it or dedicate it to Apollo, the old
formidable father/love-object. He is a little like Xuthus who has to pass his desire on,
and a little like Creusa who must return hers to its Sender. Undeclared secrets fester
and rot away, fulfilment cannot survive narcissistic silence. Ion cannot keep the secret
of the mother to himself12'. So he buries122 the fantasmatic mother of his dreams, the
noble Athenian and his high hopes, in order to re-claim the mother of reality, the
person he will try to find.
Giving Ion the luxury of choice, despite the certainty of his obedience, makes us
think that the words of the Pythia, Apollo and later Athena all draw their prestige from
the present moment. Shifting the emphasis from divine imperatives to human consent
The idea is borrowed from Sibony [1977, p. 89]. He discusses the writing-effect in Hamlet. In the
following quotation he echoes the nothing of death and separation, the not of the verbal negation and
the knot that is the subject: "Is a writing-effect the knolhing that arises between irreducible utterances,
when knot and thing meet in nothingness, the thing exploded in language and the knot separated from
its pure phallic dimension?".
'2' If he had decided to keep it to himself his desire would have had no better fate than Xuthus' or the
minister's in Poe's story.
1 -- 1 am saying 'buries' and not 'kills' because the killing of the fantasmatic mother has already taken
place.
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makes us realise that it is perhaps in combinations like this that the superiority of the
divine 'will' is transcended and ultimately subjected to the same laws: gods and
mortals define each other in a continuous negotiation of consent and desire, form and
desire, giving in and taking back.
'What to do with one's desire' when it appears unsatisfiable and vast seconds before it
recaptures the approaching familiar image? The answer is 'nothing', inspired by the
recent experience of death. What it says there is everything, for anyone to see, and for
Ion himselfwho holds the secret of identity in his own hands, his own solitary double
(the box) that unites him with an even older past and naturally makes him the
'meantime' of his own present.
It is important for Ion the child to perceive itself as a 'knot', the meeting point of
other's (sexual) desire that makes him the product rather than the recipient of that
sexuality. Apollo wants nothing from him other than his obedience. As for the access
to the mother, it becomes obvious that it passes via the father's word. It is not the first
time that this happens. When Ion met Xuthus and consented to be his son it also
became obvious that he would have to look for his mother from inside Athens, from a
position within the organised society. From the psychoanalytic point of view this
requirement (twice over) shows the Oedipus complex at work. That the road to the
mother passes via the father only means that she cannot be sought after in the
immediate (non-mediated) way of the primary narcissism. To lose the mother and to
rediscover her demolishes narcissism and reconstitutes it after the prohibition has
taken effect. Lacan reminds us that no big change occurs in a single stroke but here,
third time around, we have a 'miracle'. No sooner has Ion renounced the imaginary
mother than she appears, flesh and blood, before him123.
Recognition
'23 From the imaginary to the symbolic mother: that means, from the breast, of the narcissistic image
with which one identifies to the whole person, the individual 'mother'.
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Despite its ample symbolic significance the recognition scene is made painfully
similar to the previous imaginary recognitions. What distinguishes the real scene from
the imitations it inspires? The clothes and the box? If the play has taught its wise
audience and its heroes anything at all is to be suspicious of their own senses. Creusa
can be the mother and the boy can be her son for symbolic reasons and that would
have been enough. The claim of natural bonds should by now raise suspicions.
Do mothers ever lie? Do they know everything? Even the Pythia cannot account for
all the facts. Behind the jubilation of the imaginary encounter there should return the
doubt that accompanies 'good luck'. Indeed this doubt emerges but slightly delayed,
later, and a bit out of context. It creates the circumstances for Athena's intervention, so
we will defer its discussion.
Before that, we will give the recognition scene some attention. We wonder what
would happen if Ion could see that the first woman he meets is her mother. What
would happen if they could see themselves with the devastating detachment of the first
scene. Creusa leaves the altar and, like Xuthus, puts her life in the hands of her future
son. Ion prompts her with questions just after having dispersed his disbelief in her
descriptive powers and together they look for and find the proofs of their common
origin. They find them exactly where they were supposed to be, intact and preserved
in time, like the olive branch in the box124.
Owing to the independent corroboration of it, present recognition is the 'real' one and
retrospectively determines all the previous ones. This is how, in a way, an event in the
future has been determining the past. This is the moment they have been longing for
and they are sure about it as soon as it happens125. The form of the mother and the
form of the son captivate each other's desire. It is immediately invested with love.
Who cares about past mistakes?126
The splendour of the contents of the box salvage the prestige of the recognition. The
presence of the symbols, the snakes, the olive branch, the insignia of Erechtheus, can
124 From a rational point of view the ever-green olive branch is highly uncanny.
125 'Truth' here is recognised as soon as it is given to be seen: the box is given to be seen and Creusa
and Ion's desire rushes forth to meet its complement, the other, fascinated by the form itself. This is a
'suspicious' recognition, in psychoanalytic terms an imaginary one.
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be translated into many other symbols, condensed signifiers that tell a story of their
own, and in our case retell their story of the paternal signifiers in which the mother's
action is entirely submerged. The symbols maintain, even at the hour of recognition,
some contact with the Symbolic.
Their song of praise to Apollo and to good fortune is full of the words 'tyche' (chance)
and r|Sovr| (excessive joy), the very word Creusa had used to anticipate the gratuitous
satisfaction that was to be derived from the boy's murder. The embrace of the mother
and the son echoes other embraces but now it seals their consent, the unconditional
investment of the world with love and the unconditional satisfaction of the demand for
love which saturates the two and just represses the abortive attempt of the previous
recognitions which had only ended in bitterness and doubt: 'well, isn't that what you
wanted?'
Surely the play teaches us that an object of love is to be found where it was least
expected, and here it is so present, so fulfilling and so precisely tailored to the needs
of the subjects that it causes any loss disappear. Each one's devotion is
unconditionally pledged to other's. They bear each other's desire. They have
everything. They are captured by a ghost similar to 'falling in love' (VerliebthkeitI27).
On top of that, further inquiries into the issue of paternity seem to satisfy Ion's wildest
dreams: the phantasy of Apollo the father becomes reality, a reality beyond Ion's
imagination.
Doubt, and Silence or why Apollo Must not Speak
And then this happens:
"Mother, to have found you is a dear happiness; and to be Apollo's son is beyond all
my hopes; but there is something I want to say to you alone. Come; this is a private
matter between us two- anything you tell me shall be as secret as the grave. Are you
certain that you did not- as many a girl does- they cannot help it- become infatuated
'-6 I mean both the 'wrong' recognitions and the exposure of the child and the near-murder.
'27 See Theory, Chapter Two.
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and yielded to a secret love, and then lay responsibility on the god, and to avoid
bringing disgrace on me, say Apollo was myfather when he was not?" (1. 1518-27)
And to Creusa's very reasonable explanations based on the familiar ambivalent
7ie(poKevcu once introduced by Xuthus:
"Are Apollo's oracles truth or lies? This troubles me, Mother, as well it may" (1. 1537-
8) and to Creusa's last attempt to make him both see reason and defend the truth of her
testimony:
"That is mere trifling. I am looking for a better answer. I will go into the temple and
askApollo himselfwhose son I am" (1. 1546-8).
The final part of the drama starts with ion's doubt128: this is too good to be true. It is
the natural 'ending' of a circle, the outermost limit of all categories, knowledge,
ignorance, happiness, which finally endows with meaning the search for identity.
When all is said and done, when happiness is made tangible, the desire to know the
truth takes its bearings neither from ignorance nor from knowledge but from doubt129.
It emerges as an unsatisfiable appetite that seems to be looking for its complement
once more beyond what meets the eye.
This doubt is not new. It appeared in the first scene where Ion doubted Creusa's
truthfulness. It appeared in the second scene when Ion doubted Xuthus' sanity. It
appeared earlier in the scene, when Ion declared his ignorance about the function of
the Law. But now he has everything. The doubt appears so misplaced and so unfitting,
so out of context in the scene of general happiness, that it seems ominous. Had it been
there from the beginning nothing would have happened- and perhaps everything
would have taken the uneventful course predicted by Hermes130. Now it threatens to
turn everything into nothing by casting doubt on the foundations of Ion's own
dedication to Apollo. Owen [1939, p. 177] comments: "Ion's views have changed
since 369ff., when he had said that no one would interrogate the god about matters
■ 28 Wolf [1965, p. 188] recognises the function of the culmination of doubt at the particular point.
Interesting and not-very-biased presentation of Ion's character (though the main conclusion emphasises
the mythical component behind the plot).
'-9 This is the adaptation of the Lacanian 'Truth emerges from error'.
13® In the structural presentation of the plot we said something similar, that in scenes two and three
knowledge never doubts itself.
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where questioning would be unwelcome. It is difficult to see what he can gain from
his question, which, according to 1537, is whether the god speaks the truth or not. The
question 'Are you telling the truth?' will be satisfactorily answered by the greatest liar.
V[erall] thinks that Ion's questions would have meant that the truth must come out
with disastrous consequences, but if the oracle were so entirely the fraud that he
supposes, it would have been quite capable of giving a fraudulent explanation".
Indeed whether the god tells the truth or not is hardly the issue. What is Ion trying to
do,then?
Is he trying to embarrass Apollo? Such arrogance could be inspired by the present
love and fulfilment. Is Ion turning a blind eye to old troubles and displaying his new
strength to his most formidable ex-love-object? Certainly mother and son are on top
of the world, or- much more aptly- at the centre of the world, Apollo had been the
object of ambivalence, and is, perhaps, now being fought with his own weapons. His
silence, which used to drive Ion to despair, is now rendered suspicious and is,
metaphorically, returned to him131.
The twin issue of that doubting of Apollo's truth is the sexuality of the mother. From
the beginning of the story Ion-the-servant was eager to identify with the suffering and
wronged mother. Now he is turning against her with malice. Creusa's 'truth' is as much
at stake as the god's. Ion is turning against his own kind sadistically, and, without
realising it, against himself. The worthy son of his mother, grandchild of Erechtheus,
neurotic non-believer, is about to betray his happiness, to abandon and refuse the
future and cut short the prospect of happiness recently founded on mutual trust and
reliance132.
In terms of the structuralist analysis in Chapter Two this would have been Ion's passing the buck to
Apollo, the completion of the last of all moves.
'J- It is possible that Ion's behaviour reflects the deep division of the Greek society described by
Slater [1968 and 1974]. According to Slater the division into oikos (household) and public space and
the subjection of women to the hardships of marriage resulted in the following pattern of ambivalence:
in her little son, a woman sees both her protector and the representative of 'the men' that have been
responsible for her hardships. If we adapt this claim to our play, perhaps we can suggest that Ion, who
is now beginning to enter the adult male world, is turning against Creusa.
185
An ambivalence characteristic of neurotic desire unfolds here. A simple law governs
the oscillation of the child between the mother and the father: one of them is right and
the other is wrong. It is impossible for both to be right at the same time.
And if we extend this speculation to Creusa's present defence of Apollo we could
perhaps say that Ion the child sees itself excluded from the parental pair- that leaves
him out of their sexuality, like a useless complication of a secret affair that makes
him, by definition, the shameful product of lust. So, the more Creusa defends Apollo,
the more Ion doubts his honesty. Perhaps Ion feels he is losing the mother to the
splendid father with whom he cannot compete and consequently turns against him. Or,
again, the pure Ion refuses to take his place in the family of deceptions. Any of these
reasons or a combination of these reasons would be enough to explain quite well the
last return of doubt.
The vacillation is cut short by the arrival of Athena. But as we know already, the last
time a representative of Apollo appeared (the Pythia) something quite serious was
happening. This time, the representative of Apollo is even more impressive, his sister
Athena, and the occasion is no less serious. Athena's intervention is different from the
Pythia's in the sense that she explains and reveals the future with clarity and throws
ample light on her brother's behaviour. Her intervention serves a variety of purposes
(to be discussed shortly) but I believe that its deepest effect meets a particular desire
in both in Ion and Creusa.
We will discuss Ion's case here: When all the questions are answered, this last one, the
most unanswerable and, therefore, the most irrelevant, must be referring to something
beyond the meaning of the individual words. Ion is trying to say something for which
the word 'truth' and the excess of the demand for truth itself are the best available
vehicles. In order to find what it is, we follow the movement of his thought as he
returns, after describing a full circle, to the issues raised in the first scene. What we
notice is that Ion's aporia about Apollo's desire has not changed at all. 'Does he tell
the truth' is, first of all a statement of ignorance and because it appears out of context
at the end of the play, it points to the other moment with no context in the first scene,
to the moment when Creusa divulged the secret of the rape. We had said then that she
had created a rift between Ion and Apollo, and most importantly, that she threatened
Ion's world by placing 'a child and its mother' beyond the mercy or, indeed, the
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capacity of Apollo. This mercilessness and carelessness- of which Creusa accused the
god- went together with an uncontrollable sexuality, a jouissance (analytic term), that
appeared to transgress, or, better, to be unapprehensible by any law. In the last scene,
at the end of the adventure, Ion finds himself to be the son not of the brilliant Apollo
of his morning song, but of Apollo the uncaring and the lawless. The other father,
Xuthus, reinforces the idea that sexuality is lawlessness. The classical oedipal problem
of identifications emerges: on what terms can Ion seek an identification with the
father, or, how can he live with the knowledge that the Other, the only Other of his
life and death and sexuality neither speaks nor cares about the world, the law, the
order?
In order to appreciate Athena's involvement we must return to the relation of the
Symbolic and the Imaginary as a relation between narcissistic identification and the
paternal metaphor. In the seminar on 'The Psychoses' Lacan [LacamMiller 1981, pp.
161-205 in particular] explains the function of the signifier in relation to issues raised
by the question 'What am I?' and the Oedipus complex. We shall try to explain what it
is in Ion's constitution that necessitates and creates the specific requirements for
Athena's intervention, as another timely intervention parallel and complementary to
the Pythia's, and not as a hasty conclusion to the plot of recognition. We will be
reading the particular situation alongside key points in the section 'On the signifier
and the signified'133.
As we know, Lacan considers the subject's relation to the Other to be at the heart of
both the problem and the answer: "I spoke to you of the Other of speech as being
where the subject recognises himself and gets himself recognised" he says. "This, and
not the disturbance of some oral, anal, or even genital relation, is the determinant
factor in a neurosis" [LacamMiller 1981, p. 168], Sexuality and its normalisation,
The section mainly examines the properties of the signifier and the Oedipus complex and not
'psychoses'. 1 must also say that I do not consider Ion (or any of the character) psychotic.
The signifier involved in the discussion is defined as a not meaningful word and is understood as
"initially distinct from meaning. It is characterised by not in itself possessing a literal meaning"
[Lacan:Miller 1981, p. 199], In other words, it is a symptom or a best possible expression for
'something' that does not work properly. As we know, psychoanalysis looks for that 'something' in the
subject's relation to the Other that is constituted in terms of signifiers.
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being a man or a woman, concerns the Other "in so far as integration into sexuality is
tied to symbolic recognition" (p. 170). Being placed in a performed symbolic system
that institutes the law in sexuality is, according to Lacan, what the Oedipus complex is
about. When the particular oedipal identification has not taken place or is problematic
"Everything that is said, expressed, gestured, manifested, assumes its sense only as a
function of a response that has to be formulated concerning this fundamental
symbolic relation" (p. 171, emphasis added).
Ion has not yet entered the Symbolic, properly speaking. He is at the threshold of the
organised society and at the threshold of being recognised by name and relations. Let
us constitute the portrait of Ion as the meeting place of other's discourses134 at the
moment he raises his voice to verbalise his discomfort.
Ion inherits two maternal interventions.
The first one is by the Pythia. It puts Ion in touch with his signifier of loss, the purity.
She orders him to go to Athens katharosn5 (pure, clean). Purity comes from a time
previous to all peripeteia and all knowledge and in Ion's history it is both an old 'myth'
and an old symptom. It comes from a time before Ion decided to inform Apollo about
Creusa's blasphemies. Now, by re-positioning him in his past, the Pythia confronts Ion
with his own old limits and his own old aspirations. To be katharos, in Ion's terms, is
to return to the purity of before-the-misunderstanding. But what does it mean?
Creusa, the second mother, delivers a different message. Her own change of mood
invites Ion to forget and not ask any further question and follow her to Athens and be
the successor of Erechtheus136. The two demands have something in common. They
'34 Lacan would remind us at this point that 'the unconscious is the discourse of the Other', in our case
of the god whose voice Ion is trying to discern in every discourse.
'35 The predominant meaning of katharos in the Pythia's sentence is, clean from blood, un-polluted.
But it is not enough. Katharos has been 'Ion's word' from the very beginning, and it is from him and for
him that the term has a particular meaning. We are trying to trace it by going back to the first other to
whom he ever addressed this word, to Apollo.
'36 Creusa on the altar castrates Ion in two ways. The image of her clinging to the altar might be
considered as an image of sexuality (copulation) which the child watches petrified (see "The Wolf
Man", in Lacan's account [Lacan:Miller 1975, pp. 58-9] for the devastating effect of the coitus-scene
upon the child). From the symmetry of the two characters in the altar 'me in the place of the other' and
its sexual overtones can be easily inferred.
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bear witness to Apollo's wisdom and better judgement, which in both cases guarantees
the optimal result. But the optimal result is hardly the point. The issue here is that by
different routes both the Pythia and Creusa confront Ion with Apollo, one by
reminding him of his purity, the other by inviting him to forget it along with
everything else. In both mothers' discourses Ion's own truth appears, once again,
alienated in the Father.
In order to appreciate this alienation we must place it in a context wider than the day's
events. We must place it in a context that would 'make sense' of having just lived
through an experience of individual death narrowly avoided, of having been
introduced to the sexuality of the father (as physical copulation with a woman) and of
having been assigned- for future use- with a signifier, 'pure', that, as yet, has meaning
only in the past. What does it mean, for Ion, to be 'katharos' (pure)? What does it
mean to go to Athens? What does it mean both to be katharos and to go to Athens?137
In 'The Pyschoses' Lacan [Lacan:Miller 1981, p. 170] discusses the issue of sexuality
under a similar wide perspective, that is, in relation to procreation. 'What am I?', the
classical question of desire, is recast as 'Am I or am I not someone who is capable to
procreate', a question that defines masculine and feminine attitude rather than
biological sex138 in relation to two special features: creation and individual death.
Looking at the transition from the Imaginary to the Symbolic in these terms allows
Lacan to say: "It is in so far as the function of man and woman is symbolised, it is in
so far as it is literally uprooted from the domain of the imaginary and situated in the
domain of the symbolic, that any normal, completed sexual position is realised"
In a second way, Creusa castrates Ion by her very defiance. She clings to the altar and she sneers at
him, certain, almost, that he will not use his weapons (On the effect of mother's aggressivity and the
castrating effect on her son, see Lacan [1948, p. 10]).
137 Kadapoq for Walsh [1978, p. 305] primarily has the meaning of "unalloyed with foreign or base
blood".
'38 Lacan discusses the sexuality of men and women in relation to the signifier in the chapters 'The
Hysteric's Question (I and II)' [Lacan:Miller 1981, in particular pp. 161-182]. The main point is: the
Oedipus complex is essential for both sexes and so is the phallus qua symbol. The sexes are related to
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[Lacan:Miller 1981, pp. 177-8], The important characteristic in the case of death and
creation is that these two terms "are not situated purely and simply at the level of
experience" (ibid). This is how Lacan explains his position: "The symbolic provides a
form into which the subject is inserted at the level of his being. It's on the basis of the
signifier that the subject recognises himself as being this or that. The chain of
signifiers has a fundamental explanatory value, and the notion of causality is nothing
else. There is nevertheless one thing that evades the symbolic tapestry, it's procreation
in its essential root- that one being is born from another. In the symbolic order
procreation is covered by the order instituted by this succession between beings. But
nothing in the symbolic explains the fact of their individuation, the fact that beings
come from beings. The entire symbolism declares that creatures don't engender
creatures, that a creature is unthinkable without a fundamental creation. In the
symbolic nothing explains creation" (ibid).
Anxieties and worries about death and the purpose of life, repeated inquires about
them rather than 'getting on with living' are then to be considered as indications of
some form of mis-adjustment in the Symbolic in general and in relation to the Name
of the Father in particular: "The question of what links two beings in the appearance
of life only arises for a subject when he or she is in the symbolic, realised as a man or
a woman, but so long as an accident has prevented him or her from acceding to it.
This may just as easily occur to anyone by virtue of his or her biographical accidents"
(ibid). This mis-structure endows the questions of life and purpose with a neurotic
quality, especially when death enters the picture. Man's relation to the signifier leaves
out "something radically unassimilable to the signifier. It's quite simply the subject's
singular existence. Why is he here? Where has he come from? What is he doing here?
Why is he going to disappear? The signifier is incapable of providing him with the
answer, for the good reason that it places him beyond death. The signifier already
considers him dead, by nature it immortalises him" [LacamMiller 1981, p. 180],
Lacan is, of course, referring to Freud's position that biological death does not interest
psychoanalysis and to the fact that it is by a death, loss of the immediacy of the
the phallus in a dissymetrical way, and that is the source of the problem. The woman has to take the
image of the other sex (masculine/phallus) as basis for identification (p. 176).
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primordial mother and castration, that access to life/symbolic is effected139. When the
question of life and death is posed by the subject it is, then, an imaginary question.
Ion at the threshold of the Symbolic is not neurotic. But it is in order that he should
not be, that the questions of sexuality and his place in society must be addressed
before he leaves Delphi. The question 'What am I?', then, naturally links his
knowledge of sexuality and his own sexuality to the father's. This question is now
posed with regard to the future. Ion is standing at the threshold of a new future for
which he is ill-equipped. The day's events have been exhausted and in their place
'What will I be beyond the altar?' still remains unanswered. In place of a convincing
answer Ion is offered the position of heir to Erechtheus. If sexuality is Apollo's issue
par excellence, death emerges in relation to 'grandfather'. How is Ion supposed to take
his place in a line marked by violent deaths and disappearances? How is he supposed
to 'revive' it?
At the threshold ofmaturity, death and sexuality lose their shame of the mother touch
and specifically 'return' to Apollo. The rite-of-passage to manhood and the city cannot
be accomplished without an identification with the (signifier of the) Father. In other
words, if Ion is to leave Delphi, he must detach himself from Apollo- the fact that the
god simply sends him away is not enough. If he is to enter Athens as an Athenian-to-
be and not as the son of an epactos (foreigner), he must receive a purpose, a measure
of uniqueness and a sense of stability from no one else than the Father. Thus, at the
beginning of the new life, Ion must separate the imaginary Apollo of his pre-
adolescent years from the symbolic Apollo of his manhood, the super-ego and the
purpose-in-life. Ion returns to the temple precisely because this last re-structuring has
not taken place.
Isn't Xuthus an adequate symbolic father? In the previous chapter we concluded that
no matter how deceptive the imaginary was, the symbolic relation of the father and
son constituted in Scene Two was valid. Xuthus is adequate in so far as he installs Ion
in a symbolic position and thus creates the conditions for the questions and the doubts
to arise. Fie is inadequate in so far as he is a foreigner in Athens and cannot provide
'39 A reminder (from 'The ego and the Id' [Freud 1923]) Death for the ego is the fear of relinquishing
all cathexes; the fear of death is derived from the fear of castration (p. 400).
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Ion with a solid position. And, more importantly, he is inadequate so long as he
brushes the issues of sexuality aside, exclaims 'learn to be happy' or, perhaps, 'learn to
be a man', but he does not say how. In fact, it is in Ion's reply to Xuthus that we
discover the signs of anxiety concerning purpose, social position and sexuality- even
before the full development of the day's events.
In the absence of a proper paternal identification, says Lacan, the subject "will have to
bear the weight of this real, primitive dispossession of the signifier and adopt
compensation for it, at length, over the course of his life, through a series of purely
conformist identifications with characters who will give him the feeling for what one
has to do to be a man" [Lacan:Miller 1981, p. 205]. If we recall Ion's identifications,
as he presents them in his reply to Xuthus, we will notice that they have all been
cursory and inadequate. Ion claims to have found happiness in the visitors' happiness:
"Whether at prayers, or in conversation, the people I help are happy, not miserable. I
welcome new guests, and enjoy their company, as they do mine, because it is always
fresh; then I say good-bye to then as friends" (1. 639-41). He expresses his fears about
his reception in the political life in Athens, he expects to be hated and isolated and
avoided by the good and the wise (1. 595- 600). As for the identification with Xuthus,
this is the very relationship that inspires the anxiety and is indirectly criticised in all of
his arguments.
If Ion ever used the word 'useful' (oocpsAipov) for the name of Apollo, he may now
wonder what the father 'bequeaths' him. Unable to accede to the Symbolic, Ion
regresses to the imaginary past in order to find his bearings. His way is certainly
aggressive. But as we know aggressiveness, as a mode of behaviour to others, derives
from aggressivity, which is, first and foremost, a relation to oneself. In analysis
aggressiveness appears at a crucial moment when the subject approaches his truth140.
Ion states his intention to confront Apollo with his knowledge and a crucial but
meaningless question such as 'are you telling the truth' because it is really his own
truth and not Apollo's and his own role and not his father's that he is interested in.
'40 See, Theory Chapter Two and also Wilden [1968, p. 12]
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Meaningless though this gesture is, it is full of significance. Because he is in need of a
paternal identification Ion will turn to/against Apollo and will question his
truthfulness, the standard of excellence and the mark of his divinity, his omniscience
and his omnipotence from the point of view of the mortal that has lived through an
adventure of appearances and deceptions. In bringing Apollo down in terms of
standards, Ion is not attempting to denigrate the brilliant god but to humanise him, to
make him a suitable father to identify with. If Apollo remains a god and a
transgressor, Ion has nothing else to identify with but his divinity and his
uncontrollable sexuality141. Both are impossible. It is in so far as Ion is eager to leave
Delphi and enter a human community that he demands, here and now, the mark of
origin-ality from his father. It is in so far as he wants the day's adventure to make
sense and have meaning that he must tie it to Apollo, who has more or less inspired it
from the break of dawn.
Lacan observes: "in order for there to be reality, adequate access to reality, in order for
the sense of reality to be a reliable guide, in order for reality not to be what it is in
psychosis, the Oedipus complex has to have been lived through" [Lacan:Miller 1981,
p. 198, emphasis added]. I believe that Ion reaches the point at which an identification
is necessary and a direction. With the outburst of aggressiveness he signifies both the
arrival at the crucial point and the return of ambivalence to Apollo that must be
resolved. In other words, Ion lives the Oedipus complex and, therefore, Athena's
intervention is a structural necessity.
Athena intervenes at the right moment. It is the second successful intervention and,
like the Pythia's, destroys a specular relation but she also goes beyond that. She
speaks, she clarifies and she fixes Ion's eyes upon a glorious future. Athena re-aligns
'4' Lacan [Lacan:Miller 1981, p. 204] comments on the influence of'exceptional fathers': "We are
familiar with cases of these delinquent or psychotic sons who proliferate in the shadow of a paternal
personality of exceptional character, one of the social monsters referred to as venerable. They are often
characters strongly marked by a style of radiance and success, but in a unilateral manner, in the register
of unbridled ambition or authoritarianism, sometimes of talent, of genius. They don't necessarily have
to be genius, have merit or be mediocre or nasty, it's sufficient that this be unilateral and monstrous".
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the Father and the Law, an issue opened up in the very first encounter with Creusa.
She assigns Ion a mandate and affirms his castration.
Lacan explains the meaning of the mandate and the meaning of castration with
reference to procreation. He resorts to the relation of the signifier and the signified142
as it is used in psychoanalysis, and the difference between it and the relation defined
by Saussure. Saussure claimed that the amorphous mass of the signifier and the
amorphous mass of meanings and interests run parallel [Lacan:Miller 1981, p.
294].143 Lacan claimed that the two orders intersect, defined their intersection as the
locus of the Other, the quilting point, the "treasure of the signifier". In general terms,
Lacan describes the varying degrees of normality, neurosis and psychosis with
reference to the quilting point. The mandate explores the potential and the function of
this locus of the Other as the source of the energy and the dynamics of the signifier as
a whole. What the subject says, in analysis in particular, proceeds from that locus, and
the meaning of the subject's words is clarified in relation to it. When the subject is
spoken to, the message is received, again, with reference to that locus. Thus, the
employment of the signifier or its successful manipulation by the analyst or the
interlocutor, depends on making the signifiers reverberate, 'resonate otherwise', as
Lacan says (p. 323).
Procreation and the meaning of 'being a father' is discussed in relation to the (whole
of the) signifier and the signified. Lacan chooses the particular example for its socio-
cultural prominence and starts by distinguishing the sexual act that makes one a father
from the symbolic significance of procreation, descent of generations and structural
order. He links 'being a father' to the mandate delivered in the form "Thou art the one
who wilt follow me" [Lacan:Miller 1981, p. 297], and he uses the particular phrase in
order to highlight how the 'thou', 'the one' and the 'wilt' work together in harmony
precisely because they depend on each other and on the Other144.
'42 The relation of the signifier and the signifier in Saussure and Lacan: see Chapter One.
'43 'Amorphous' does not refer to internal organisation; as we know "the Signifier" is the perfectly
organised system; with this word Saussure refers to the lack of any fixed relation between particular
signifiers and signifying intentions.
'44 We have discussed these relations in chapter One. For the meaning of the "thou art..." Lacan relies
on the properties of signification: meaning emerges when the last term of the sentence has been put in
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The thou, says Lacan, has no literal meaning. 'You', in linguistic jargon is a shifter, a
signifier without fixed referent and no inflection. What interests us here, is not the
properties of the you as shifter but how it passes onto the level of the signified in the
particular sentence, how, in other words, one is to understand 'you' as having him and
no one else as referent: "Attributing autonomy to the you as signified isn't without
difficulties" (ibid). Lacan observes. The 'you' as first element in a sentence-being-
formulated hooks the other to meaning, prepares the ground for the statement that
follows and goes beyond the simple call for attention ('it's you I am talking to'): "Let's
say that in general it has the value of an introduction, of a protasis as we say, that
which is placed before. This is the most general way of designating what precedes the
statement \enonce\ of what it is that gives the sentence its importance" (ibid). As we
know the '1/ you' (and the other terms) are meaningful at the level of the ego, since
they always refer to the separation of the I from the you in perceiving oneself as
distinct from the other. But concerning the raising of the signifier 'you' to a signified
'you', or in Lacan's terms, to subjectivity, always echoes the oedipal adventure in
which both the ego and the superego (Other) appear. This ego-Other relation is
reflected in the following statement: "what is required to elevate this you to
subjectivity so that, in its form as signifier, present in discourse, it becomes the
supposed support of something that is comparable to our ego and yet isn't our ego,
that is to say, the myth of the other?...We simply say that this you presupposes an
other who, in short, is beyond him. How does this come about? Our next step should
be situated around an analysis of the verb to be" [Lacan:Miller 1981, p. 300],
To be contributes to the sentence both "the copulatory function pure and simple" and
the "ostensive function" (p. 301). Lacan explains: "Which element is it that, elevating
the you, makes it go beyond its indeterminate function of boredom and begins to turn
it, if not into subjectivity, then at least into something that constitutes a first step
towards Thou are the one who wilt follow mel It is the It is thou who will follow me.
This is ostension, which in fact implies the presence of an assembly of all those who,
whether or not united into a community, are supposed to form its body, to be the
its place. With this he emphasises the syntax, the order of the sentence. At the same time, with
reference to the retroactive effect of signification, "meaning" is to be understood with reference to the
Other.
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support of the discourse in which ostension is inscribed" (ibid). By visualising -
almost- an assembly in front of which the subject is singled out and receives the
mandate Lacan connotes the social aspect of the Other as well as the paternal one145.
The subject's reply will define him or her with reference to the Other and every other.
The proper answer- in fact the only answer- is Ifollow yon: "unless he complies there
is at this level no other response open to the subject than to maintain the message in
the very state in which it was sent to him, at the very most modifying the person, than
to inscribe it as an element of his discourse, which whether he likes it or not is what
he has to reply in order not to follow it" (ibid).
What does it really means to accept the mandate/message? Lacan situates the
difference between the imaginary and the symbolic identification at the heart of the
answer. The recognition of the Other as Other and the end of the aggressive dual
relationship defines the successful assumption of the mandate. Lacan chooses
ignorance to represent the difference between the imaginary and the symbolic
identification: it is one's ignorance that one pledges in the symbolic identification: "If
you examine this closely, if Thou art the one who wilt follow me is a delegation,
indeed a consecration, then it's in so far as the response isn't a play on words but an /
follow you, I am, I am what thou hast just said. There is a usage of the third person
that is absolutely essential to discourse in that it designates what its very subject
matter is, that is, what has been said. Je le suis, ce que tu viens de dire, I am it, what
thou hast just said, which as it happens means exactly -1 am very precisely what I am
ignorant of, since what thou hast said is absolutely indeterminate, I don't know where
thou wilt lead me. The full response to the Thou art the one who wiltfollow me is I am
it" [Lacan:Miller 1981, p. 304],
Athena delivers a message and a mandate. Ion will be the father of four nations. It is
someone else's message, Apollo's, and is obeyed eagerly by Ion. In the prospect of
being a father, Ion glimpses, perhaps, his own image coming from the future but the
implied narcissism is second in importance compared with the internalisation of the
role of the father. What does it mean, for Ion, to be a father? He hardly knows what a
'45 See definitions of Other in chapter One.
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father is at present- an indifferent god or a drunken nobleman? - and of course he does
not know what he himself will be in the symbolic position of the father. Why is he
persuaded then? Is it simply because he is addressed in public, before civic assembly
as witness? Is it vanity? Or is it sufficient to assume that his ignorance and the
authority of the goddess combine to work miracles?
I believe that Ion's mandate makes sense and is accepted within the general context of
the child's purity and the account of the father's sexuality. The mandate goes together
with the final stage of the Oedipus complex, its acceptance being the corollary and the
outcome of that adventure. Athena calls Ion to harmonise with the signifiers of
paternity but that would have been impossible had she not known how to employ
certain signifiers and how not to employ others146. Indeed, Athena speaks of harmony
rather than dissonance, when she stresses Apollo's providence and plays down his
recklessness. She elevates him to the function of the father, the man-of-the-family.
For Lacan the Father is the ring that holds a triangle together, not the traditional
father-mother-child triangle but one in which he appears as the 'owner' of the phallus.
The new triangle, (father)-phallus-mother-child, allows Lacan to say: "The notion of
the father can only be supposed as provided with an entire series of signifying
connotations which give it existence and consistency" [LacamMiller 1981, p. 320].
It would be wrong to assume that Athena restores Apollo to purity. It would be wrong
to say that Ion would have expected to find a pure, un-sexual Apollo. But if the god
must satisfy his desires and get away with it, he must at least make some provision for
Ion but in Ion's terms. He must show some interest and care for those that depend on
him. Care and provision for one's own were, from the beginning, the issues involved
in Ion's and Creusa's argument about Apollo's sexuality, the accusation being,
alternatively, of rape and negligence.
Athena addresses Ion's confusion. She assures him that Apollo arranged it in such a
way that Creusa's pregnancy went unnoticed and later sent Hermes to bring the baby
to Delphi. She thus bridges the gap between the father and the Law. Although Apollo
will never be held accountable for 'the crime' he is at least shown to be caring and
'46 The expressions 'to harmonise with the signifiers' and 'to employ/not to employ some of them' are
taken from Lacan [LacamMiller 1981, PP- 322-3].
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provident. His jouissance- a fact- does not change but is moderated by his humane
interest. The harmony of the world is restored when the Imaginary Apollo and the
Symbolic Apollo take their proper place in relation to Ion's desire.
This is encouraged by Creusa, who seems more than eager to forgive and forget. For
the child Ion, the loss of the mother, who by this consent and her volatility makes the
accusations of the rape all the more suspect, is compensated by the invitation to be
first in the line of procreation. Athena does not emphasise the line of Erechtheus but
the line of Ion. Ion glimpses the signified father in the prospect of being looked up to
as the father, the patriarch by the four sons and the four races. Ion will be
disseminating meaning like Apollo and his words and will be procreating not like the
birds (7rai5oupyco is the verb he had used) of his mourning song who hardly know the
purpose of it, but for creating a new line, and receiving the mark of origin-ality from it
in the future and from Apollo in the present. Being pure, Ion will be able to discern
between lust and purpose, will avoid illegitimate sons like himself and will have
subjected Apollo's sexuality to the regulation of the Law.
We will leave the last effect of Athena's speech that concerns Apollo for after we have
examined Creusa's desire. This chapter 'continues' in the next one. I would like to end
it with a suggestion about Apollo's silence. In Lacan [1959, p. 219] we read the
following remark about the Name-of-the Father: "Further still, the father's relation to
the law must be considered in itself, for one will find in it the reason for the paradox,
by which the ravaging effects of the paternal figure are to be observed with particular
frequency in cases where the father really has the function of a legislator or, at least
has the upper hand, whether in fact he is one of those fathers who make the laws or
whether he poses as the pillar of faith, as a paragon of integrity and devotion, as
virtuous or a virtuoso, by serving a work of salvation, of whether object or lack of
object, of nation or of birth, of safeguard or salubrity, of legacy or legality, of the
pure, the impure or the empire, all ideals that provide him with all too many
opportunities of being in a posture of undeserving, inadequacy, even of fraud, and, in
short, of excluding the Name-of-the-Father from its position in the signifier". I would
simply add that because everyone must live happily ever after Apollo must be silenced
198




CREUSA'S DESIRE: REPRESENTING FEAR
Creusa's Monologue
Undeniably, Creusa's monologue (1. 859-922) is a powerful piece of poetry147. It is
lyrical, profound and, though completely wrong in relation to the truth foretold,
honest and moving.
147 There seems to be little doubt about Creusa's constitution. [Ferguson 1969, p. 115] considers her
impressionable and superstitious. Rosivach [1977, p. 291] thinks her point of view is narrow and naive
and that she unconsciously places her actions in the broader frame of the earthborn's rebellion against
the gods. He does not explain how this 'unconsciously' works, however.
An interesting view is put forth by Wassermann [1940, pp. 588-90]: Creusa's ordeal must be
appreciated according to the data of a time when women were little more that property. According to
the author, Apollo's choice of Creusa as the mother of his son is wise and seeing only the violent aspect
in him is unfair. It goes without saying that from a modern perspective the article is rather biased in
favour of the male-Apollo. The reason 1 mention it, however, is that at a certain point, Wassermann,
too, refers to "the unconscious ambiguities of Creusa's very words" which reveal an ambivalence
towards Apollo. This is enough for the author to infer the god's innocence.
Sinos [1982, p. 130] draws attention to the fact that by the time of her monody Creusa has nothing to
loose. He claims that Creusa had been seduced rather than raped and she "fumes at the personal affront
of having been abandoned by her lover" (p. 131). He also suggests that her husband and Ion are hated
due to transference of the feeling for Apollo, and that basically she is a gentle woman trying to come to
terms with the god (p. 132).
Grube [1941, p. 270] considers Creusa's monologue to be the emotional climax of the play and draws
attention to the fact that the main accusation, Apollo's indifference for the child is undeserved.
Burnett [1962] believes that "Creusa herself kindled her doubt into a flaming grievance; from her
inability to trust Apollo she created a conviction that their son was dead" (p. 90). Further on, "Her
passionate devotion to error is the cause of her war with the god, and by means of falsehood she
spreads the violence of her own nature to those about her" (p. 98).
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From a psychoanalytic point of view it is an excellent example of the truth of the
subject. Creusa forgoes her silence and gives a spectacular account of the silent years.
Thinking that she is near the end of her life, she gives an account of her personal
history148. A single idea underpins the entire monologue, fear. Much later, at the end
of the adventure, Creusa will name it as well (1. 1497).
The second event with which Creusa designates her fear is her withdrawal from the
scene before the attempt on Ion's life. She plans the murder, she provides the weapons
and in the end sends her slave in her place. We will discuss her withdrawal from the
scene with reference to the monologue and the figure of Erechtheus.
The theoretical background for the reading of the monologue is the Imaginary, the
idea of aggression in particular, and the Symbolic, in which, for the duration of the
monologue, Creusa has no place. We will be referring to psychoanalytic notions we
have introduced in previous chapters. "Creusa's desire" is the continuation of "Ion's
desire" and much of the vocabulary involved in that discussion is used here. For
instance, we use the idea that the father is 'the ring' that holds together 'the mother' and
'the child' in the phallic triangle. We refer to the ego's relation with the super-ego and
we use the 'quilting point', Creusa's fear, in reverse order: instead of arriving at it we
pre-pose it as a guide for our understanding.
For Creusa's withdrawal from the scene we will refer to a special case of the mandate,
the question 'Che vuoi?' (What do you want?) which, in Lacan's terminology,
represents the difficulty of accessing/assuming the signifier of the Other.
148 At the end of the second Seminar [Lacan:Miller 1978, p. 286] language is defined by its historical
continuity and to a certain extent by an abstract purity, while the subject's participation in it is defined
by meaning, what introduces him in the temporal succession and, at the end of the day, his own private
and particular 'meaningful' interpretations of 'the language' (ibid). "Each subject" notes Lacan "doesn't
simply have to take cognisance of the world, as if it all happened on the level of noetics, he has to find
his way about in it. If psychoanalysis means anything, it is that he is already engaged in something
which has a relation with language without being identical to it, and that he has to find his way about in
it- the universal discourse" (p. 283). For Lacan the subject is totally and absolutely, even in his actions,
the subject of speech: "he [the subject] is the chorus line of this discourse, he himself is, if you prefer, a
message. A message has been written on his head, and he is entirely located in the succession of
messages. Each of his choices is a speech" (ibid).
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The monologue149 represents the moment at which Creusa is called to assume her loss,
the loss of the child and her own future, and to account for them in language. She says
more than she articulates and in that, we discover the real meaning of her speech150.
Creusa's words go beyond facts, they offer an interpretation of her experience as well.
Inspired by the demonstration of love and altruistic excellence by her friends, Creusa
will tell her story in front of the paternal figure, her servant. This is important because
'the Father' is at the heart of her troubles and the servant, benevolent father though he
is, creates more.
Creusa starts with a concrete intention. She will declare (audaaco) her troubles to the
entire world in order to prove her husbands (both Apollo and Xuthus) A.sKxpcov
Jtpodoxon; &xaPioxouq [thankless traitors to her bed] (1. 880).
The monologue is a synthesis of topics, all representing Creusa's confusion151. We
will discuss the following points: the value of the monologue as a cry for help, the
'49 Creusa begins her monologue with the shedding of shame and the announcement of the intention
to reveal a secret (1. 859-880): Though it is difficult for someone to strip off shame Creusa will have to
do it because there is no reason to keep silent any more. She has no children, no home and no hope.
She will 'ease the load' and she will prove her husbands traitors.
She turns to Apollo (1. 881-906) whose lyre inspires immortal songs. She will denounce him. Apollo
approached her, radiant and gleaming, dragged her to a cave despite her cries and raped her. Creusa
bore a son. She exposed him in the same place as she was raped. She reproaches Apollo by asking
about the child's whereabouts and by pointing out the god's indifference.
In the last part of the monologue (1. 907-922) she denounces Apollo once again, shouting at the top of
her voice for the whole world to know. Apollo is a traitor because while she kept quiet all these years
Apollo rewarded her by doing a favour to her husband instead of her. Her child is dead- torn to pieces
by vultures. Apollo is hated by his own sacred tree, the laurel, his birthplace, Delos, and his own
mother, Leto.
'50 Ion follows the same course to a great extent. We can consider Creusa's soliloquy as equal to his
own great monologue at the end of scene two- to which he receives the stern reply: 'learn to be happy'.
As far as the immediate context of the monologue, the fact that it is addressed to the chorus and the old
servant we can assume that it satisfies their enormous curiosity and rewards their loyalty. Creusa
performs a striptease of her soul in front of an inappropriate audience.
'5' In the discussion of Creusa's monody, LaRue [1963, p. 127] draws attention to the creation of a
paradoxical effect by the adaptation of the traditional hymnal style to the expression of accusations by
Creusa. Part of the effect is alo acheived by the delay of the disclosure of the name of Apollo (p. 131).
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representation of the mother-child relationship, and Creusa's relation to the father:
both the father of her child and her own father.
Her speech is a cry of agony and the words for crying out are everywhere in her
speech: raoq aiyaaco/... anSdaco/ co paxsp p3 auScoaa/ orpoi pot/ corf, xov Aaxouc auSco/
al)8av kapu^oAIoc) kcxko<; sbvaxcop (11. 859, 886, 893, 903, 906-7, 911, 912)152
A cry is a sign. It is inarticulate speech with various meanings, a sign located at the
beginning of language or where language subsides and emotion spills over.
Considering the cries, we can say that Creusa has reached the limits of meaningful
language and, at certain points, loses language altogether. The signs of utter distress
convey what articulate speech cannot, the fear of the imminent disaster.
The cries are also related to the inefficiency of her resistance to Apollo. From a
psychoanalytic point of view we could say that they now perform the protective
function they did not manage to perform at that time. In view of a new 'violation'
Creusa shouts out 'foul play' well in advance. She anticipates an attack similar to the
old one and she raises her voice to deflect it.
Thus, we could say that her cries perform two functions. On the one hand they convey
the fear of the imminent death, on the other, they constitute an appeal to the whole
world, to pay attention and witness the injustice. In that way, Creusa commits herself
to the protection of the public assembly.
The monologue is dominated by the tension between unacceptable sexual desires and
the organised ego, images of fragmentation, disintegration, the return of chaos and the
end of unity153. We say that Creusa's monologue explores the Imaginary with our
certainty of knowing what will happen next.
'52 dvSaaco and Kapbgco, to say/voice and to declare openly are mixed with exclamations. Articulate
and inarticulate speech together create a powerful effect of spontaneity.
'53 See Lacan's "On aggressivity" [1948, pp. 8-29] for an account of images of fragmentation in
dream and in painting. They all represent the ego's fear of castration.
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One of the most difficult relations represented in the song is the mother-child relation.
Creusa's representation of the exposure of her child154 is a vivid account of her secret,
but the word 'child' concerns her as much as her son. We begin from the end. The
cliche of hatred at the end of the monody, 'your mother hates you', addressed to
Apollo, 'summarises' a problem between all mothers and all children. Creusa's mother
and herself, Leto and her son, herself and her son: there are three 'generations' of
women that, according to Creusa, hate or should hate their offspring. The mother-
child relationship consistently reproduces hatred, not love. Creusa participates in the
order of both the children and mothers. There is herself, Apollo, and her child as
children of hating mothers. There is herself, her mother and Leto as hating mothers.
This hatred is punishment. The worst punishment for a child is the loss of the love of
the mother. Creusa receives and returns hatred as mother and child respectively, and
with that she signifies two intentions. First, the desire to protect herself by deflecting
the hatred of the mother- exposing the child and pretending that nothing happened;
second, by exposing Apollo to what she thinks is the worst punishment she thinks that
makes them even.
In her account of the rape Creusa places her mother before and after the event:
"Atukoic f.pipuc Kap7iounv / %stpcov sic avxpou koikxc / Kpauyav' L> paxsp
al)8a>aav..." [...as I was crying 'oh mother'...] (1. 891-93) and "xucxca 8' a Suaxavo'q ooi
N
' \
Koupov,/ xov cppiKa paxpoq..." [I bore you a son, in dread ofmy mother's eye] (1. 897-
8).
The mother appears and disappears at the end of childhood. The transition to
adulthood is represented by her loss155. Suddenly 'the girl' is transposed into the
meaningless world of men.156
Images of horror and fragmentation emerge: the child she exposed does not just die
but perishes 'snatched' by the birds (sppei 7txavofc; ap7iaa0£ig...) (1. 903). The choice of
the particular image is amazing, oscillating between the anticipated dismemberment of
154 For the exposure of infants, see Patterson [1985, pp. 115-6]. Creusa's case is classed under
exposure of the "illegitimate child" although the article considers mainly historical data.
'55 Actually it is represented by the shame of going to her with sexual knowledge.
1 The plural refers to both Apollo and Xuthus.
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a helpless creature and the underlying assumption of wholeness as he vanished 'into
the thin air' -leaving behind no trace of dismemberment. Again, Creusa, designates her
fear by projecting onto another human being and deflecting from herself the absolute
loss of unity that dominates her speech.
So, regarding the mother-child relationship as representative of Creusa's fear, we can
say that with a mixture of cruelty and maternal compassion Creusa 'wrecks' the
famous mother-child symbol of unity and re-assembles it from an entirely new
perspective: it represents not the union of the pair but their dis-union. Both parts
implicate Creusa, who oscillates indeterminately between the two, marking the
transition with the signifier of hatred imposed/ forced by another scene, by the rape
and the fear of the father. The vulnerable mother-child relation is attacked and as such
represents its own misery: it is branded by and evokes the hatred of the father, the
vulnerability of the weak, the trauma, the absurdity of the entire world.
This loss is one part of a series of losses: of life, virginity, home, country and family.
Creusa's experiences and the ineffectiveness of her solutions suggest that this is a
sequence of related events. We discern a pattern, one which becomes obvious if
pieces of several 'times' are put together. If the fear of life represents a loss or a lack at
every turning point of life, we begin to understand that Creusa always locates herself
at the waning side of her fate. Constantly under attack, she must conceal the
knowledge of being under attack, dissimulate it and repress it. Everything happens in
silence, outside language. From the disappearance of the family (her sisters), to the
cries of the rape, to the present, the disturbing events are 'repressed' without leaving a
trace and then return and reinforce her compulsion always to react in the same way. It
is not Creusa's word that we believe, it is the consistency of her representations.
Concerning the rape, Creusa' s self-presentation fluctuates between a self-reproach
and an excuse: I was not able to do anything but look, I was subjected to an
unpleasurable experience for which I was totally unprepared. Rectification comes
after the fact: the result of the rape, the child, is removed from sight. The causes for
anxiety, however, remain, and, as Freud says for the repressed instincts (see chapter
one), they proliferate in the dark. Creusa is entangled in unfinished intersecting stories
of death and by placing herself at the end of all these lines she ends up at exactly the
same place that Ion had located her at the end of their first meeting: before no-future.
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In Creusa's speech the child who refuses to consent to the loss of the mother meets the
adolescent girl who enters genital maturity in a traumatic way. She refuses both, and
in returning to the bliss of a before-sexuality-simulated-innocence she suspends her
castration. Out of sight, out of mind. The child is nowhere to be seen and Creusa has
taken his place in the line of Erechtheus. At present, which is another big turning
point in her life157, Creusa will react to the news by planning to re-play the familiar
story one more time. Indicating ego-under-attack, the outbreak of aggression and the
renewal of the renunciation of genital sexuality (regression) allow us to say that
Creusa seeks to establish herself in an impossible position: the position of the phallus.
Creusa cannot locate herself in the present and the past, in the role of the mother or in
the role of the child, thus remaining outside both, in silence and in hiding, always
anticipating the hostile future, and always planning to return to the eternal hiding
which is better compared to death. Creusa lives XaOpa (in secrecy) at the level of
existence.
Creusa's verbal representation of her relation to Apollo and of Apollo's influence in
her life rewards close analysis. No doubt the hatred is genuine but between the lines
we can scan a return and a plea to Apollo158. Raped or seduced, forced or deceived,
Creusa feels wronged and, invariably, demands at least compensation for having kept
silent about Apollo's indiscretion. In this we are looking for the meaning of her
speech.
In the second part of the song (1. 881-906) Creusa comes closest to describing the
rape.
'^ In Lacan we read [1948, p. 25]: "This conception [an account of the ego] allows us to understand
the aggressivity involved in the effects of all regression... especially on the plane of sexual realisation,
and more specifically with each of the great phases that the libidinal transformations determine in
human life...weaning, the Oedipal stage, puberty, maturity, or motherhood, even the climacteric".
'58 To return or appeal to Apollo does not necessarily indicate that Creusa indirectly admits she was
not raped. Rape victims usually hold themselves responsible or accuse themselves for what happened,
for being there. And though it seems that in the description of Apollo approaching her Creusa presents
herself as deceived by his look, the demand that we are going to discuss is in both cases (rape or
seduction) the same.
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The passage from innocence to experience, the shattering of childhood's narcissism, is
underlined by the birth of a shameful secret, a son and the knowledge of sexuality:
"You gripped my bloodless wrists ... and you had your will- for the honour of
Aphrodite!" (11. 893, 896)
The spectacular arrival describes Apollo's deceit as one of form and appearance.
Creusa does not feel threatened by the glittering light of Apollo, by the mirroring of
herself and the narcissistic replication of her own colours (of the colours of her dress
and the flowers she collects): "You came to me, with the gleam ofgold in your hair /
As I was picking an armful of yellow flowers / Whose petals, pinned on my dress,
mirrored the same golden gleam" (1. 887-890).
She emphases the appearance and disappearance of form. The deception-of-the-eye is
the brand ofApollo, the 'trademark' of the divine father.
We cannot fail to notice that in the second part of the monologue Creusa differentiates
sharply between the seen and the unseen, describes her acts and inserts herself in a
line of appearances and disappearances (of Apollo, of herself in the cave, of her child)
almost compulsively: she disappears a child and re-appears a woman, beauty is an
appearance and conceals ugliness, a child appears as a result of her ordeal and
disappears soon afterwards. Apollo and his son, too, are two opposites in terms of
appearances and disappearances. All passages to the unknown, to the new and the
unexpected are marked by the same opposition: appearance / disappearance, loss and
return, darkness (of the cave) and light (of the sun), silence and speech, hiding oneself
and coming out, contemplating or planning one's disappearance and return, passive
and active.
We recognise the symmetrical, eye-catching properties of the imaginary in her
speech.159 Creusa's life unfolds along invariable lines. Destiny unfolds along
invariable lines. We are going to say, however, that this consistent imaginary
summary is already a sign of progress. It is what Lacan calls an imaginary integration
of the subject's history. A genuine interpretation and a fresh access to the Symbolic
may follow.
'^ Based on the theory of Chapter Two.
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Let us re-examine Creusa's relation to Apollo. She accuses Apollo of indifference,
refusal to own up and amend his mistake, lack of loyalty and ingratitude and she does
that by addressing the issue of life and sexuality:
co xac S7ixa(p0oyyou pek7icov Ki0apaq evo7iav, ax* aypaij/.oiq kspacnv sv a\|/uxoiq axsT
^ e n \
pooaav opvooq soaxnxoix;... [Listen, Apollo, you who can wake to song the seven
strings of your lifeless lyre, till they chant immortal music to lonely shepherds] (1.
881-4).
The song of the lyre is an expression of harmony and bliss and immortality. The
'awakening' power of Apollo is ultimately life-giving. His sexuality, the reference to
which follows in the text, comes very close to this life-giving.
Acknowledging his life-giving powers and challenging him to answer her accusations
Creusa places Apollo within an imaginary exchange of questions and replies.
Omnipotence and immortality are envied. Seen in the other, alienated in the other, the
gifts that would have given Creusa a full life now cause her aggression. Apollo is
called to reciprocate. In Lacan we find similar claims by analysands in the discussion
of aggressivity: "take it upon yourself...the evil that weighs me down; but if you
remain smug, self-satisfied, unruffled as you are now, you won't be worthy of bearing
it' [Lacan 1948, p. 13]. In our case, Creusa's call for help is addressed to the god and if
he fails to respond, to the entire world to listen.
Her behaviour is therefore remarkably ambivalent. Paradoxically, Creusa seems to
identify with Apollo. Surely the master of appearances is a source of inspiration for
the woman that has spent her life dissimulating her losses. 'The god' as image of
completeness is enviable. The god as representative of absolute power, transgressive
sexuality, and gratuitous satisfaction of any desire is indeed an attractive 'prototype' to
identify with in silence. On the other hand, Apollo holds the key to her innocence,
being the only witness of it. From that perspective, he must be made to speak, or, even
better, to return the favour he had once received: Creusa's decent silence.
My last point about Apollo concerns this contradiction. From what position does
Creusa speak when she demands a reply from Apollo? Her song is not a supplication.
She does not humbly ask for help. On the contrary, she demands that Apollo should
account for the child, in other words, declare voluntarily, that his transgressive desire
has finally been made subject to the law. In that sense, Apollo is addressed neither
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from the position of the child nor from that of the mother but from that of the father
(representative of the law) whose figure dominates the song by fear and inspiration.
This is Creusa's most problematical identification, full of super-ego harshness and
indifference. The ideal of heroism, the defence of the house of Erechtheus that will
soon follow, is inspired by the super-egoic father and allows her to project her own
ego-ideal outside of herself. Seen from this point of view, the paternal ideal, Creusa's
growing strength as her song unravels, now emerges in the place of the weakened ego,
turns against the ego with the ferocity of an enemy and almost demands Creusa's
death. The figure of the father completes the sketch of Creusa's dependent relations
and enters the picture as the only possible strong reply to the aggressive sexuality of
the husband.
In her personal history the identification with the father is shown in Creusa's
inexplicable attraction to the family destiny: like the father, she has sacrificed her
child. In the name of his house she will risk her life and her inheritance. Unable as yet
to handle 'the Law' in its many poetic and metaphorical implications, Creusa will
follow a sterile imitation of the ways of Erechtheus. She will borrow the form of the
father's desire, his ferocity and what she thinks the law is, and will inflict death upon
her enemies without noticing that she is turning the very same weapon against herself.
If 'Who are you?' is an easy question to answer, 'What are you?'160 must be the most
difficult one. If Ion must find his way in life, Creusa must make sense of her entire
life. In the monologue she answers the 'What are you?' in three negatives: not-mother,
not-child, not-father. Instead, she moves freely from position to position, assumes
characteristics of each one of them, only to abandon them in the next line,
she participates in two families: the first consisting of herself, her mother and her
father (Erechtheus) and the second one of herself, her son and Apollo. The similarities
of the larger than life father/husband and the disruption of the normal progeny by the
death of children before their parents make the two families very much alike. In fact,
in Creusa's discourse we have observed examples of the two families merging on
160 'what am I?' concerns desire, the subject's place in the imaginary (narcissism, love) guided by the
symbolic (ego-ideal) placement (see [Lacan:Miller 1975, p. 414])
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common points. This lack of distinction, brought about by the refusal of genital
sexuality, the refusal of castration and lack of proper symbolisation of rape and death,
allow us to treat the two families as one. The 'secrecy' concerning the family ofApollo
and the fear concerning Erechtheus compel Creusa to 'play' with the figures of the
mother, the child and the father with the ease of the child who constitutes the world in
simple imaginary oppositions:161 lacking symbolic representation, the 'marriage' to
Apollo and the offspring acquire almost imaginary status (in the common sense of the
word). The speculations about the child and the demands made of Apollo reflect this
lack of symbolic representation in their excess and their extravagance: not anchored
on concrete rule, the family drifts in any direction and may be interpreted in any way.
In direct proportion to the inefficiency of the symbolic relations in which she
participates, Creusa voices her demand for wholeness, a regression into a state of
purity and phallic omnipotence, by a variety of contradictions. She may have killed
but she did that only to protect her wholeness (life). She may denounce to her rapist
but he is the only one she looks up to. She may be inspired by Erechtheus but she is
also afraid of him. We notice, therefore, that Creusa drifts from identification to
identification without being able to relate herself to anyone; and so long as she moves,
so long as she is not trapped in this or that position, she maintains the position of the
phallus in the two triangles. We are speaking of the imaginary phallus, of course,
which Lacan describes as a 'wanderer', always being elsewhere, always elusive: trying
to be the elusive phallus, involves an eternal game of never being it. Speaking of the
mother-child relationship and the prolongation of the imaginary dependence of the
one on the other, Lacan notes that inspite of the bliss the dual relation is thought to
entail, it only results in conflict: "Now, the couple finds itself on the contrary in a
situation of conflict, even of respective internal alienation. Why? Because the phallus
is, as it were, a wanderer. It is elsewhere. Everyone knows where analytic theory
places it- it's the father who is supposed to be its vehicle" [LacamMiller 1981, p. 319],
Refusing to recognise (in the symbolic sense) stability in any of the positions of the
triangle, Creusa signifies her uniqueness with demands of omnipotence inspired by
A characteristic example is given by Lacan [LacamMiller 1975, pp. 91-106], the case of Robert, in
which the child begins to constitute his subjectivity and his relation to the world by simple oppositions:
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Apollo, cursory identifications with her father, fascinations of solidarity with the
slaves and heroic plans to save her city. Being no one in particular, Creusa can see
herself reflected in everyone and, consequently, can see a threat in everyone.
The same essential un-locatability underlines Creusa's mourning of the child she
herself had exposed. In "Mourning and Melancholia"162 Freud [1917] suggests that an
identification usually takes place between the ego and the lost object (in our case the
child). At the end of her own life Creusa will mourn the ineffective sacrifice163 and
will basically see herself in the position of the child that had once taken her place in
the succession of disappearances in the family of Erechtheus. Creusa is the paradox-
child that mourns for its own death.
Looking From Afar
We can reconstruct Creusa's second representation of fear and the desire for
wholeness by examining the significance of her withdrawal from the scene before the
attempt on Ion's life. Dramatic necessity requires her to be alive and non-involved.
We can make the most of it, of the clever arrangement that separates responsibility
from action, planning from execution, masterminding from being the instrument.
in/out. container/contained etc.
162 Mourning is a complex expression of death and identification with a dead object [Freud 1917, p.
251-69] with all the characteristics of lack in the external world and returning on memories [LP, p.
485], missing something in the object rather than the object [Freud 1917, p. 254] and in normal cases
gradually realising the necessity to give it up as narcissistic interests recapture the ego that was taken
over by death.
In LP we read: "The concept of the work of mourning should be seen in its kinship with the more
general one of the psychical working out, understood as a necessity for the psychical apparatus to bind
traumatic expressions... The existence of a work of mourning is borne out, according to Freud, by the
lack of interest in the outside world which sets in with the loss of the object: all the subject's energy
seems to be monopolised by his pain and his memories until at last 'the ego' confronted as it were with
the question whether it shall share [the] fate [of the object], is persuaded by the sum of the narcissistic
satisfactions it derives from being alive to sever its attachment to the object..." (p. 486).
163 por jpg pact tpat tpe eXp0Sure 0f the child did not fend off the threat of death for ever.
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Creusa's withdrawal from the scene reverberates with connotations of deception of the
eye and passive witnessing. It is consistent with Creusa's behaviour so far -she has
lived all her life in secrecy (lathra). It is also consistent with the imitations of familiar
features: Apollo's deceptive powers, the servant's advice to lie low and proceed by
stealth and the return of shame and silence after the outburst of self-exposure. We, the
disinterested onlookers, know that Creusa's actions are rash and unjustified. We may
even condemn them, but we cannot say the same about her fears. Unjustified or not,
fears simply 'are', exist and manifest their existence in rash and incongruous actions
like these. Aware of the semantic proximity of seeing and knowing in Ancient Greek,
we can say that Crcusa withdraws from the scene in order to see from a safe distance
what she could not access completely with her intelligence: the meaning of the day's
and the life's events. Creusa-seeing-from-afar implies- in the poetic way that blurs the
difference between literal and metaphorical meaning- both that she acquires a vantage
point-of-view, a 'pan-optic' point-of-view, and that she is watching a spectacle in the
sense that the little girl in 'A child is being beaten' [Freud 1919] watches her father
punishing another child.
We reconstitute the meaning of the withdrawal from the scene because we want to
understand what it is that makes sense for Creusa in Athena's intervention. As in Ion's
case, we claim that Athena's intervention satisfies a particular desire of the subject
and it is only by satisfying this desire that the goddess' intervention is able to prepare
the ground for a future less absurd than the past and the present. Again a mandate is
involved: 'thou shall be... a woman? a mother?'- I use the question-mark to stress the
near-impossibility of accepting it. It is first articulated by the servant: 'do something
fit for a woman', referring to killing Ion, and then repeated by Athena: "...you and
Xuthus, too, shall have sons..." (1. 1589).
We situate our discussion between the first and the second form of the mandate. It
concerns Creusa's aporia, her ignorance of what it is that she has to do, her fear of the
consequences and, above all, the ignorance about the desire of the mother and the
father, her parents, whose eyes she avoids in shame. Together with her predictions for
the future Athena says: "KaAxoq O^Atio/Acov ttovt1 cirpacc/ Tipcoxa psv avoaov Xoy/vsi
d v - 1cf come pt) yvcovai cpdovg" [So Apollo has done all things well; first he gave you a
healthy labour- so your family did not know] (1. 1595-6, emphasis added).
212
We are lookingfor the support of Creusa's desire in the deception of the eyes.
The central figure to Creusa's desire in the present time is the servant. He is the one
who praises the worthy daughter of Erechtheus and the one who, like a real father,
imposes upon her the responsibility to protect the family name. He claims he had
suspected Creusa's past troubles. He is the blind old man who sees clearly through
Xuthus' trick, and the mature adult who misses the apparent fact that in Ion's tent
(where the attempt on his life will take place) he will be standing out- a stranger
among friends. We could say that only a blind man could not really see that he is
walking to his death.
For Creusa, this eager, protective, caring, altruistic father is the opposite of Erechtheus
but no less scary than the latter. The old servant puts Creusa in charge of the house of
Erechtheus, in a position usually reserved for men and at the same time asks her to
prove herself a woman. With these two contradictory demands the slave delivers a
mandate that cannot be received by Creusa. It cannot be received without her
accepting the ever-increasing possibility of her own death. How does a man defend
his house or his city? By sacrifices and death. How does a woman defend his country?
With her willing sacrifice, by accepting death.
What the old servant cannot grasp is that by representing the caring father, who,
nevertheless, demands a sacrifice, he 'awakens' Creusa's ambivalence towards
Erechtheus. He cannot appreciate the fact that Creusa has lived all her life avoiding
the eye or the attention of the father, despite the fact that she has only spoken of her
reluctance to meet her mother's eyes. Creusa has spent her whole life in substitutions
and refusals. When she was a baby she was not sacrificed with her sisters because she
was too young to give her consent. Other children took her place. Later, when she was
raped, she refused to expose herself to the wrath of her parents, she refused to consent
to having being raped. Another child took her place and received the punishment
meant for her. In these metonymic substitutions we notice that remaining a child is
essential for remaining alive. Undertaking responsibility means punishment. On the
same analogy the imaginary pairs: Creusa-sisters and Creusa-son indicate that a
continuous shift within the family positions is also vital. The child Creusa, neither
man nor woman, does not refuse sexuality as pleasure but as a sign of transition to a
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state other than childhood. In resisting maturity she resists responsibility and death,
and in resisting death, as we know from a psychoanalytic point of view, she resists
castration.
It is not difficult, then, to imagine why Creusa will send her servant in her place. Not
only is he the substitute fit for the circumstances but, also, the effigy of the father,
Erechtheus, to whom her ambivalence, love and aggression together, is addressed.
Moreover, the voice of anxiety that brings back ghosts from the past, deaths and
narrow escapes, will be silenced. Consistent with the tradition of the play and Creusa's
own conception of punishment, the innocent, in this case the one who unwittingly
becomes involved, will suffer most164. The present adventure is a singular opportunity
for Creusa to deal with all her fears at a stroke.
Let us now return to the meaning of Creusa's withdrawal from the scene in relation to
the paternal identification that in psychoanalytic terms underlies the acceptance of the
mandate. It will not be an exaggeration to say that the key element in our
understanding of her situation is the servant's blindness.
Discussing Ion's desire we arrived at the conclusion that Ion can identify with Apollo
on the basis of the promise of the future paternity and can defer his ignorance of what
he-as-father will be in view of being the first in a new line of descendants. In Creusa's
case no identification with Erechtheus can take place. Like Apollo, he is larger than
life. Lie springs from the earth and returns to the earth. He knows everything or can
see through everything- otherwise Creusa would not be afraid of him. It is this idea,
the all-knowingfather (echoed in Apollo's omniscience), that we shall now discuss.
The father knows everything but what does it mean? Is this omniscience a sign of
inhumanity- no human being knows everything- or is it exactly the opposite, the
reason why Creusa is spared and still alive? And if she is spared, is it a token of
'64 Consistent with the play: in Scene One Ion has said: the god will punish the mediator... the servant
is someone else's representative, a mediator; isn't the messenger sometimes punished for bringing bad
news? Creusa, on the other hand, has maintained her innocence and her non involvement in the rape:
but she feels punished all the same and so is her son; and so will be her servant.
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preference and a sign of love? Is Erechtheus the seductive father165 of the little girl's
emerging sexuality? Does he encourage the little girl's preference for him as a love
object and the rivalry with the mother? Or does he have a special purpose for keeping
her alive, another sacrifice in the future perhaps? Creusa does not know166.
Creusa has not so far confronted Apollo or her father, has not exposed the guilty one,
has not spoken the truth about the rape. Covered with silence, early and later
experiences of death and sexuality intertwine. Neither having attained proper
symbolisation they exist in a limbo of deferred action,167 producing phantasies
(discussed shortly) of never arriving at the other who knows, never addressing to him
the questions that need to be answered and always settling them in some other way.
This is the point I wish to emphasise in relation to Creusa's desire: lying in waiting,
living in eternal suspension, waiting for the other to volunteer his grace or his
information, is the expression of the impossibility of living, not a solution but a least
painful arrangement, even when it implies living in pain. In the discussion of the
165 in lp (p. 404) the scene of seduction, real or imagined was one of the first of Freud's attempts to
explain early sexuality. It was later abandoned. We use it as a support/expression of another part of the
theory, ambivalence.
'66 After the rape by Apollo similar issues arise: the mother is avoided- a sign of rivalry perhaps. The
god must have a purpose and a reward for Creusa and another one for her son as well. He is the one
responsible for sexuality, for the rape or the seduction, not her. She does know why this happened and
she refuses to know as well. We could say therefore that interesting permutations relate the two pieces
of the past, Creusa's two families as we said before, and transform the issues of sexuality and purpose
of living into eternally deferred questions.
'67 in the same entry we read about the scope of the term: "the first thing the introduction of the
notion does is to rule out the summary interpretation which reduces the psychoanalytic view of the
subject's history to a linear determinism envisaging nothing but the action of the past upon the
present..." the notion of deferred action guaranteed the effect of meaning both ways. Further on, LP (p.
112) define 'deferred action' by its characteristics: "It is not lived experience in general that undergoes
a deferred revision but, specifically, whatever it has been impossible in the first instance to incorporate
fully into a meaningful context. The traumatic event is the epitome of such unassimilated experience.
b. deferred revision is occasioned by events and situations, or by an organic maturation, which allows
the subject to gain access to a new level ofmeaning and to rework his earlier experiences.
c. Human sexuality, with the peculiar unevenness of its temporal development, provides an eminently
suitable field for the phenomenon of deferred action".
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monologue we had said that Creusa refuses to locate herself in any stable position and,
instead, maintains the position of a wanderer-phallus. We will now turn to theory to
see how the subject that lacks the essential paternal direction/identification 'fares' in
life and desire according to psychoanalysis.
In the "Subversion of the subject and the dialectic of desire" Lacan approaches the
issue of the suspended desire "according to the structure of the phantasy" [Lacan
1960, p. 312], A phantasy168 is an arrangement of conscious and unconscious elements
employed by the subject in an attempt to articulate or stage his desire together with
the defences against it. We say 'to stage' and not 'to satisfy' or 'to get recognised',
terms usually associated with 'desire', in order to stress the different character of the
phantasy.
According to LP, a phantasy is a mise-en-scene of desire in which what is prohibited
(I'interdit) is present in the formation of the wish. Discussing the relation of the
phantasy to desire, LP point out that they have a common origin in an (early)
experience of satisfaction [LP, p. 318], They summarise the important features of the
phantasy and its relationship to desire in the following way:
"a. Even where they can be summed up in a single sentence, phantasies are still scripts
(scenarios) of organised scenes which are capable of dramatisation- usually in visual
form.
b. The subject is invariably present in these scenes; even in the case of the 'primal
scene', from which it might appear that he was excluded, he does in fact have a part to
play not only as an observer but also as a participant, when he interrupt the parents'
coitus.
'68 The present version of the phantasy is rather 'streamlined'. For instance, I make no explicit
reference to the object a of the drive. Any introduction/presentation of the phantasy starts of course
with Freud's [1919] "A child is being beaten" and necessarily includes Green's "The logic of Lacan's
object a and Freudian theory" (in the indispensable Smith and Kerrigan [1983]). The most
comprehensive discussion of the phantasy (history and development) is Rappaport's [1994] Part One:
Appearances of the Fantasm in "Between the sign and the gaze".
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c. It is not an object that the subject imagines and aims at, so to speak, but rather a
sequence in which the subject has his own part to play and in which permutations of
roles and attributions are possible...
d. In so far as desire is articulated in this way through phantasy, phantasy is also the
locus of defensive operations: it facilitates the most primitive of defence process, such
as turning round upon the subject's own self, reversal into the opposite, negation and
projection" (ibid).
In Lacan desire and prohibition and phantasy are incorporated in the dialectic of
castration and jouissance. We are familiar with the notion of castration. We have
discussed it in relation to the phallus, the symbol/representative of the adventure of
sexuality, of the transition from the pregenital to the genital stage. The phallus stands
for a series of losses, the loss of wholeness through separation from the mother, the
prohibition of wanting to be the phallus-of-the-mother and the subject's acceptance of
the Law of the father that bars the return to the mother and establishes access to the
Symbolic. Jouissance [usually translated as 'bliss'] is the term used to designate all
that is lost and all that must be sacrificed in order to accede to the Symbolic and the
Law represented by the father. Both the successful and the unsuccessful completion of
the transition are encapsulated in Lacan's "Man's desire is the desir de V Autre" [Lacan
1960, p. 312], for which he explains that this 'de' implies both that man desires as
(qua) Other and that man addresses the question of the Other's desire (ibid). We know
that desiring as Other is the product of the oedipal adventure that starts with
imaginary alienation and ends, hopefully, with the internalisation of the father's
desire/signifier. The second case, the one that interests us here, implies a dwelling on
the question of the Other's desire, and suggests the stagnation of the predicted
development we are talking about. Instead of accepting the loss of jouissance and the
mark of castration, the subject questions the meaning and the purpose of the loss and
at the same time assumes that the Other, the father who prohibits jouissance, has
access to it. The fact that the subject "imagines that the Other demands his castration"
[Lacan 1960, p. 323] indicates an essential misunderstanding of the father's relation to
the Law. Lacan notes: "What the neurotic does not want, and what he strenuously
refuses to do... is to sacrifice his castration to the jouissance of the Other by allowing
it to serve that jouissance" (ibid). In other words, the subject believes that it is the
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father and not the Law (access to language, organisation, Symbolic) that demands this
appalling sacrifice. Thus he refuses to comply. An eternal question arises instead
(metaphorically speaking): 'Che vuoi?' ('What do you want?'). Emanating from the
Other, the question confronts the subject with an aporia that belongs to him but
reaches him as the aporia of the Other: What does the Other want? What does he want
from me? in other words, why does he demand my castration and the sacrifice of my
jouissance?
The way out of this misconception is only one: the subject must understand that it is
not the father as real person that demands castration and renunciation of jouissance
but the father as representative of the Law. The subject must understand that the father
as person, too, is castrated as much as he is, subject to the same Law and not above or
beyond it. In Lacan's words: "Castration means that jouissance must be refused, so
that it can be reached on the inverted ladder... of the Law of desire" [Lacan 1960, p.
324],
The Law of desire opens the way to 'normal' sexuality with all the consequences
'normality' entails. It opens the way to the regular interplay of form and desire (see
Chapter Two), it disperses the meaninglessness and the absurdity of the super-ego
characteristic of the problematic relation, it restores the 'normal' function of the
phallus as symbol of having accepted castration (having or not having it) rather than
trying to regain it (be the phallus). The phallus, explains Lacan, participates as
negativity: " the erectile organ comes to symbolise jouissance, not in itself, or even in
the form of an image, but as a part lacking in the desired image.. [Lacan 1960, pp.
319-20],
How does the subject 'survive' in view of his misconception of the role of the Other or
the lack of the essential paternal identification? What does the subject reply to the
impossible-to-answer question What do you want? he himself poses?
The phantasy is the subject's own answer to the unanswerable question. It is a scenario
in place of the missing signifier of the Other's desire. Rapaport [1994, pp. 64-5]
illustrates the point with a vivid example, Lacan's commentary on one of Ella Sharpe's
cases. It concerns "the symptom of a patient's intermittent coughing" which Sharpe
relates to a series of sexual fantasies. Coughing when entering the analyst's room, the
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patient explains and elaborates in the following way": 'It [the coughing] has, however,
reminded me of a fantasy I had of being in a room where I ought not to be, and
thinking someone might think I was there, and then finding me there I would bark like
a dog. That would disguise my presence. The 'someone' would then say, 'Oh, it's only
a dog in there'. Sharpe queried: 'A dog?' And the patient continued, 'That reminds me
of a dog rubbing himself against my leg... I am ashamed to tell you because I did not
stop him. I let him go on and someone might have come in' Sharpe adds 'The patient
that coughed'". Sharpe relates the coughing to the desire to interrupt the sexuality of
the father. Lacan would probably highlight the fact that the dog is (the signifier of) the
Other whose signifier (barking) has been adopted and then transformed into a cough.
The dog is the locus of sexual pleasure to which the subject wants to accede. Rapaport
observes that the enigmatic dog forces the analysand to ask the question, 'What do you
want from me? The symptom (coughing) raises the question as signifier of the Other
since the dog is not the Other but something that signifies in its place. Although the
fantasy itself is totally inefficient (at the end of the day 'it's only a dog') the important
point is that "the subject does not ask what the signifier ofthe Other is in relation to it.
For this reason a fantasme is necessary so that an Other is produced, but for the sake
ofwhat? a signifierprecisely" (ibid, emphasis added).
We notice, therefore, that the phantasy is both the support of one's desire and the
'screen' of the Other's inaccessible desire. Following Lacan, Zizek [1989, p. 322]
comments: "the usual definition of fantasy ('an imagined scenario representing the
realisation of desire') is therefore somewhat misleading, or at least ambiguous: in the
fantasy-scene the desire is not fulfilled, 'satisfied', but constituted (given its objects,
and so on)- through fantasy, we learn 'how to desire'. In this intermediate position lies
the paradox of fantasy: it is the frame co-ordinating our desire, but at the same time a
defence against 'Che vuoi?', a screen concealing the gap, the abyss of the desire of the
Other. Sharpening the paradox to its utmost- to tautology- we could say that desire
itself is a defence against desire: the desire structured through fantasy is a defence
against the desire of the Other, against this 'pure' trans-phantasmatic desire (i.e. the
'death drive' in its pure form)" [Zizek 1989, p. 118].
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Relating it to a more socialised and less theoretical aspect of the mandate, Zizek
explains what is involved in the 'Che vuoi?' question by referring first of all to the
difference between the imaginary and the symbolic identification (identification with
the ideal-ego and the ego-ideal respectively): " imaginary identification is
identification in which we appear likeable to ourselves, with the image representing
'what we would like to be', and symbolic identification, identification with the very
place from where we are being observed, from where we look at ourselves so that we
appear to ourselves likeable, worthy of love" [Zizek 1989, p. 105], Identification, he
explains, is not a simple imitation of images. It is more subtle, it relies on features and
traits that are usually hidden, rather than on a whole image. He also observes that the
imaginary identification is an identification "on behalfofa certain gaze in the Other"
(ibid). The most extreme examples of this characteristic are to be found in hysteria
and obsession in which the subject behaves as if s/he was constantly under the
observation of the Other and is experiencing himself as "somebody who is enacting a
role for the other"169 (ibid.). This shows that no matter how malfunctioning or
'69 The entire quotation is very interesting: "This gap [between appearing likeable to oneself and the
other] is brought to its extreme with the obsessional neurotic: on the 'constituted', imaginary,
phenomenal level, he is of course caught in the masochistic logic of his compulsive acts, he is
humiliating himself, preventing his success, organising his failure, and so on; but the crucial question is
again how to locate the vicious superego gaze for which he is humiliating himself, for which this
obsessional organising of failure procures pleasure. This gap can best be articulated with the help of the
Hegelian couple 'for-the-other'/'for-itself: the hysterical neurotic is experiencing himself as somebody
who is enacting a role for the other, his imaginary identification is his 'being-for-the-other', the crucial
break that psychoanalysis must accomplish is to induce him to realise how he is himself this other for
whom he is enacting a role- how his being-for-the-other is his being-for-himself, because he is himself
already symbolically identified with the gaze for which he is playing his role" (p. 106).
A non-clinical example for the difference between the imaginary and the symbolic identification (given
by Zizek) is the Charlie Chaplin's attitude to children in some of his films: "children are not treated
with the usual sweetness: they are teased, mocked, laughed at for their failures, food is scattered for
them as if they were chickens, and so on. The question to ask here, however, is from which point of
view must we look at children so that they appear to us as objects of teasing and mocking, not gentle
creatures needing protection? The answer, of course, is the gaze of the children themselves- only
children themselves treat their fellows this way; sadistic distance towards children thus implies the
symbolic identification with the gaze of the children themselves" (p. 107).
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problematic, the symbolic identification always determines the situation and always
affect the imaginary one [Zizek 1989, p. 108],
In the 'Che vuoi?' question the imaginary and the symbolic identifications are haunted
by the subject's inability to assume the identification necessary for the 'execution' of
the mandate. Again, the response developed, is very much similar to acting out and
symptoms of 'under the gaze of the Other' type, but this time the emphasis is on the
resistance to the Other rather the subjection to it: "the Other is addressing the subject
as if he himself possesses the answer to the question of why he has this mandate, but
this question is, of course, unanswerable. The subject does not know why he is
occupying this place in the symbolic network. His own answer to this 'Che vuoi?' of
the Other can only be the hysterical question 'Why am I what I am supposed to be,
why have I this mandate?... Briefly, 'Why am I what you [the big Other] are saying
that I am?" [Zizek 189, p. 113), which is an expression of the subject's incapacity to
assume the symbolic identification that will allow him to fulfil his mandate and the
phantasy an attempt to fill the gap of the question with an answer.
An example Zizek quotes is discussed by Lacan in "The ethics of psychoanalysis". It
concerns the figure of Antigone as a representation of an impossible identification.
Zizek observes: "In Sophocles' Antigone, the figure with which we can identify is her
sister Ismene - kind, considerate, sensitive, prepared to give way and compromise,
pathetic, 'human', in contrast to Antigone, who goes to the limit, who 'doesn't give
way on her desire' (Lacan) and becomes, in this persistence in the 'death drive', in the
being-towards-death, frighteningly ruthless, exempted from the circle of everyday
feelings and considerations, passions and fears. In other words, it is Antigone herself
who necessarily evokes in us, pathetic everyday compassionate creatures, the question
'What does she really want?', the question which precludes any identification with
her" [Zizek 1989, p. 117].
Creusa's attempt to respond to the impossible mandate or to what it really is that the
father wants from her, is an one line scenario: she withdraws from the scene and
instead of being under the gaze of the father she becomes a gaze herself. Instead of
addressing the question 'what does he really want from me?' Creusa assumes that the
father wants her disappearance and she simulates that immediately. Unable to address
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the question she has always postponed, Creusa reinforces her impression that
Erechtheus wants to punish her the moment his representative, the servant, begins to
speak about punishment and death. Consistent with being dis-placed or mis-placed
and at the margins of society (being a childless woman and more recently a step¬
mother), she fails to see what good a sacrifice would be to her, or, how it would not
facilitate her enemies' plans. In retreating from the scene Creusa is also consistent
with another characteristic we identified in her monologue, the refusal to be trapped in
any single position, woman, man or child, becoming instead the elusive complement,
the phallus, of all three. The day's events give her an excellent opportunity to regress
to another interpretation of the eternally deferred mandate: to be the living phallus of
someone else some other day. With her withdrawal, combined with the murderous
plot, Creusa refuses to be the daughter of her father and the bride of Apollo, so long as
they both turn away from or against their own people with crushing indifference. But
at the same time, as we said at the beginning, she does not demand answers. She
simply postpones her question for ever, reacting to that literal and metaphorical
'turning away' (ignoring/ looking elsewhere) by making herself unavailable to be seen,
disappearing, and directing their eyes elsewhere. In that way, she makes herself
unavailable to the uncontrollable appetites of the father and the husband. She makes
herself unavailable to serving a jouissance associated with cruelty and indifference
and the expression of which is a transgression of the limits of violence.
It is the special relation between violence and purpose, violence for a purpose or with
no purpose, that allows us to get as close as possible to what constitutes Creusa's
inability to consent to any form of mandate coming from the Other and associated
with being a mother or a father. If the phantasy is a question and not an answer, then
Creusa is trying to pose the question of the purpose of violence and with it the
question of punishment as subjection to the law and with that the question of the un¬
punishability of the one who makes or regulates the law. We notice that her questions
are similar to Ion's, and we may also remember that in their first meeting it was she
who first introduced the schism between the father and the law.
The phantasmatic game of seeing and being seen, of eluding the gaze of the other and
even directing it to forms that deceive the eye by their likeness to the elusive original,
is underpinned by a question with symbolic significance: to what law is the one who
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regulates my existence (father, husband or even mother) subject? Unable to provide
the answer to that question, Creusa stages the protest-reply by exceeding her
ignorance. She exceeds it by eliminating it (the resemblance to Xuthus is obvious),
and by merging a misunderstood jouissance with the violence she is trying to deflect:
seeing from afar, Creusa anticipates the hedone (rj§ovr|) of watching the murder of the
impostor. She exposes her misunderstanding of the relation between violence (death),
law and sexuality by countless failed approximations of the important question.
Having no measure other than the gaze she must evade, Creusa swings from
exaggeration to exaggeration, from Apollo's immortality, to his overpowering
sexuality, to Ion's death, to statements that betray an immense ignorance of their very
content:
"Kneel there, and they dare not touch you" says the chorus, advising Creusa to seeks
protection at Apollo's altar. "But the law condemns me to death" replies Creusa (1.
1256) without explaining what she means by this 'but'.
Due to some questions concerning the relation of law, death and sexuality, Creusa
becomes a very special phallus. Usually attributed to the child's desire to be the
phallus the mother, the imaginary, regressive expression of the refusal of castration
acquires its significance in relation to the desire of the mother. The mother wants the
child-phallus but the father separates them to the dismay of both. This is the typical
pre-oedipal scenario. But in Creusa's case the mother is avoided, her gaze is avoided
as much as the father's. The mother is swallowed up by the immense question.
Looking from a safe distance, Creusa is the phallus of no one but herself, thus
designating her completeness and the refusal of sacrifice (be it of life or castration)
with a total eclipse in order to return again. In the metaphor(s) of desire Apollo-the-
sun, whose immortality is related to the regular appearance and disappearance, is the
only appropriate, impossible model for her desire.
Neurotic desire demands what it cannot offer, death or fear or any other mark of
excellence to which it cannot subscribe. It refuses to subscribe to the Other's
jouissance and in reality stages this refusal by elevating the 'elements of the scene' into
unparalleled virtue measured against which the subject finds himself lacking, lesser,
inadequate, worse off, condemned on the one hand to dissimulating his failure.
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desiring, on the other, the subjection of the father to the same faults. Ion and Creusa
love the excellence of Apollo and Erechtheus and at the same time hate it for it leaves
them out. But if the father does not bat an eyelid at the misery he causes will he not be
moved by being told that someone knows more-than-him or more-than-he-would-like
him to know? The demand and the abhorrence of knowledge starts from here; it is
applicable knowledge, dangerous knowledge and potentially deadly knowledge, of the
same rank as the poison and the sword.
The imaginary, the world of symmetries and polarities, does not have room for two of
the same kind and in the same way does not allow second chance a second time. In the
imaginary there is always only one fool, usurper, rival and it's always the other. And
this happens because the subject has always to be ahead, anticipating and expecting,
never-to-be-surprised itself.
I would say that the subject is in competition with itself, dedicated (its desire being
dedicated) to never reaching its completion for fear of being exhausted there. At the
end of day, desire is weakness, desire is lack and 'I' do not lack anything.
We could say that Ion and Creusa could be classed as neurotic for they desire to be
removed or to remove the gaze of the father as much as preserving it in order to defeat
it. Are we describing a desire that can have it either way? As much as we are
describing a desire that could have it neither way! Travelling the distance from
interpersonal relations to the reassembled phantasy, we can see the entire vocabulary
of the play subjected to a very simple principle, the change into the opposite which
appears to be ungoverned and ungovernable. At the heart of the phantasy and at the
surface of human relations what 'hurts more' is the dream-like fluidity of the world.
An obsession with appearances emerges. At the heart of the phantasy we find only a
rhythm170. It is elusive, it is metaptosis going on for ever, an eternal repetition of the
same old story, surprise and anticipation, recognition and non-recognition, knowledge
and ignorance changing into one another without an apparent and fixed law.
To Ion and Creusa who have known 'alterity' and who have been made to become man
and woman too late too soon it should not be very difficult to recognise that this desire
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will always remain elusive and essentially catastrophic. If you see from where the
other sees you may also turn against yourself with his indifference. There the desire to
remain obscure and live, time-honoured and familiar, clashes with the desire to see
from the place of the Other, as Other, with the Other- even one's own death. If the
mark of excellence is death then witnessing one's own death from a distance (a desire
we can logically infer from the structure of the phantasy and from the successive
identifications) refers us to an inexplicable paradoxical and condensed expression
which always loses a part of its meaning once it is opened up and subjected to
interpretation. It might mean all or nothing, to outwit the father, die after him as is
natural, not by him, take his place, reject his law, consider the punishment merging
with desire, commit suicide in order not to fall into the hands of the other, seeing
oneself in the sacrificed other, in the child and in the servant; a wealth of images and
signifiers (or images consisting of signifiers) which the subject organises, directs and
stages with himselfas actors as well as director.
With the agon of one's life annulled not by the other but by the incorrect assumptions
the desire of blindness entails, there remains a gap, a nothing, in the place of 'life', in
the place of the missing phallus. What law and what justice can keep the subject from
falling into that void? To Whom may it concern? What law of city or god can be
invoked there without its turning against the subject the moment it is applied? / kill
and at the same time I commit suicide. Nothing.
In the end rescue (not salvation) comes from what is missed, from the only 'element'
that was apparently scorned as being unimportant: the obvious. The obvious as
external reality, as the world of visible, concrete objects. The Pythia introduces it with
uncanny precision when she questions their point of view, encourages them to
withdraw their gaze from what does not meet the eye and concentrate, instead, on
what is before their eyes. The obvious, as outside, real world, competes with the
nothing. As stable reality it supplants the endless mourning which has supported the
subject so far and mediates the frightening appearances and disappearances by
170 Thjs is as close as I can get to the function of the drive at the heart of the unconscious and the
phantasy and the compulsion to repeat. From a different perspective: a rhythm can develop into a song,
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containing both. It appeals with the simplicity of 'what is in front of your eyes', that is,
what is outside you but can still be missed. It is not a coincidence that it comes only
after the encounter with the invisible has been exhausted.
Creusa and Ion will fall into each other's arms in perfect narcissistic unison but this
comes only after the mediation of the prophetess and the goddess which settles
another imaginary relationship. As for the Other's desire we might just be able to
argue that it finally succumbs to the mark of castration in Athena's words: "71:porta psv
91 ( •) ' V ^ '/ avooov Ax>%susi o\ fiats pp yvcovai <p tA.ou [first he gave you a healthy labour so
your family did not know] (1. 1595-6) and further down: "vuv ouv Glabra, izaxq od1 orq
7iscpuKS ao<;/ t\? p SoKpoip EouGov p8scoc,sxr|" [now, tell no one that [Ion] is your true
son; so that Xuthus may enjoy the happiness that you know to be yours] (1. 1601-2). In
the deception, those who were close saw nothing because Apollo arranged it so and in
the deception of the father/husband - let him enjoy his delusion- we may recognise the
Other's signifier. It emerges in language before it is repressed by silence. It restores
the effectiveness of the symbolic, law and order in their social dimensions, by
restoring the laws of language. Isn't it common place that law never loses, that it
comes out stronger than ever after every act of transgression?
A fine coincidence highlights the point and allows us to use metaphoric language:
"cpsuycopsv, co xskouocx, pp xa daipovcov opcopsv- i\ pp Kaip&q caff ppac opav" [come
away, mother, we must not look on the face of a god, unless- unless perhaps it is
timely that we should] (1. 1551-2) says Ion on seeing Athena approaching. To avert
one's eyes, even to think about it, puts 'looking on' and 'having one's eyes fixed' into
perspective. If you do not want to be fascinated don't look. But, then again, perhaps
we should look this time... No absolute prohibition would have worked against
curiosity.
What Athena says by admitting that Erechtheus was blinded and not blind and that
Apollo was slightly 'off the mark' is indeed the law of/as Loxias. It finds its
(the drive can develop into masculine/ feminine sexuality) or it can stop (death).
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justification in the future and proceeds according to the following situation-bound
definition: the opposite of looking on is not being looked on but looking awryxlx.
In Holbein's "The Ambassadors" (discussed by Lacan [1973, p. 88]) there is a skull at
the lower front part of the painting. It is distorted and it only appears as a skull when
looked at from an angle. According to Lacan it is phallic ghost that appears at the
forefront of the picture when one looks at it from a certain angle. He notes: "If one
does not stress the dialectic of desire one does not understand why the gaze of others
should disorganise the field of perception. It is because the subject in question is not
the reflexive consciousness, but that of desire. One thinks it is a question of the
geometrical eye-point, whereas it is a quite different eye- that which flies in the
foreground of The Ambassadors" (p. 89). We can 'appropriate' this statement- it
belongs to painting- in order to highlight the effectiveness of 'looking awry'. It
concerns desire, not the conscious subject. It allows different things to appear
depending on the perspective.
Ion and Creusa have been exchanging places with others, imagining themselves
exposed, wanting to see from afar, looking, in other words, for perspective. It could be
said that 'perspective' is the essence of the play, its endless permutations, symmetries
and regular reversals, the copying of positions and its polarities alongside the desire
for the recognition of desire. Would it be an exaggeration to say that the subject wants
to 'sustain' its desire, destiny and tradition, but not 'bear the burden' of it?
There the disappearance of the father, his own dropping out of the scene becomes part
of the meaning. Everyone should pay for his folly. Everyone should suffer the
consequences of his ignorance172 -and we can say that Creusa and Ion have been
paying for their ignorance by living it. The gaze of the (imaginary) father is
neutralised and the phallus is 'stolen' away from him, the phantasy loses its meaning
'71 This is actually the tittle of Zizek's [1991] book on Hollywood cinema themes analysed in a
Lacanian way.
172 There he bears the consequences of his acts - Erechtheus is swallowed by the earth and is punished
for the killings approximately by paying with his own life, or he is punished for another crime not
being exempt by the law because of his eminence (but also, you are always punished even when you
have done the right thing, or the ignorant thing; at the heart of the comedy there lies the Greek
tragedy).
227
but the Law does appear strengthened by it. The new phallus is sought 'outside'
oneself in the 'mature' genital order.173
First an aporia appears: what governs reality and appearancel There is something
beyond appearance and it has to be the real thing.
Then comes peripeteia: reality vs. appearance is superseded by appearance vs.
disappearance. Appearance means to be made visible, to be seen and ultimately to be
exposed to the eyes of others. Disappearance connotes death, elimination but also
withdrawal from the eyes of the others. Disappearance is this sense is non-
involvement and invisibility. Invisibility connotes deception- of the eyes at least. Thus
disappearance establishes a play of meaning between elimination and 'occultation'.
The subject supports/ is supported by the circuit of meaning, its own disappearance,
and it cannot escape the reflexive return of the other meaning which connotes its own
deceptionl But the substitution of disappearance by deception neutralises the
difference between appearance and disappearance: they are actually coming close too
close: appearance and deception. Deception of the eye: of the other's eye; of your
own: if you close your eyes the world disappears. Deception connotes absence, lack,
something that isn't there but must be presumed present, a phallus that is instituted
because of its lack. Xuthus is deceived by being given what is not. The father is
deceived by what is not. Reality as the domain of consciousness and the senses is
deceptive, thus it is bearable.
And when all ends well the entire mechanism is swallowed up by 'nothing' which
encompasses the entire play and envelopes it in silence. The obvious then rules the
world (the deceptive absent phallus). Doubt may return to upset it all and start a new
game/play.
In the end Ion and Creusa save each other when their 'rescue' ambition (to rescue the
mother or the father) goes awry. The comeback of the dead may be scary or may be a
joke. Like his earthly father (Xuthus), Ion carries weapons, comes from outside but
despite appearances he comes as a friend not as an enemy. The same applies to
Creusa.




These concluding remarks are not a separate chapter. In a sense they summarise the
main features and directions of the previous chapters in order to draw them all
together
"Where to start out from? In medias res'Vztw xob Spwpaxoc? Can a hermeneutic go
beyond the question of "where to enter the circle"? "It is difficult to find the
beginning. Or better: it is difficult to begin at the beginning and not to try to go further
back". Can it be that an investigation of this play can do (no) more than proceed from
its origins? Even in the search for them. Can it go beyond the (circular or linear)
fulfilment of (a) destiny?" These are Goldhill's [1984, p. 179] opening lines of his
'Exigesis: Oedipus Rex'. The difference between the beginning and a beginning is an
essential one. The same question can be posed about the end. Have we reached the
end or an end? Greek drama always reaches the beginning and if we 'estrange'
ourselves enough to think about it rather than to take it for granted we may discover
that the whole edifice closes upon its own lines and leaves us out: that's all there is, we
have reached the beginning. From a psychoanalytic point of view, the question would
be: does reaching the beginning mean we arrive at a tautology, or does the gradual
metaphoric and metonymic displacement of meaning lead to a new beginning? But
then again, it is not just any beginning we are concerned with but the beginning of
speech and this can only be symbolic. From the psychoanalytic point of view it could
not be anything else. He who speaks is. He who does not speak is not. The play and
analysis are conducted through the medium of language and they delimit themselves
on that. They use the signifier to maximum capacity.
The time is set. Whatever is to happen, must happen now. This is another common
point between the play and psychoanalysis: the present. They both deal at present,
here and now, with an experience represented in language. The experience comes
from the past and because it concerns the future and extends to the future it must be
settled now. Ion is not a drama in the tragedy-proper sense. There is a second chance,
a second time around. But within the span of the day old fears and old tactics are
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awakened. They provide the guide to priorities, to the beginning: first things first:
what must be settled here and now is where we begin.
Like a human being the play is unique. It reflects the uniqueness of its co-ordinates
and of the individual experience. Plots may be familiar, characters may be familiar,
even their words may be familiar but so are the letters of the alphabet, the terms used
by a particular theory to describe and organise its discourse and to approach a text in
the capacity of a metalanguage.
In 'Catastrophe survived' Burnett [1971]174 reads Ion along its two plot-lines: the plot
of return and the plot of vengeance. We will present some key points from that
chapter and we will try to 'reply' to them from our perspective, revising, at the same
time, the main principles of the psychoanalytic approach.
What strikes me as important in the early part of the article is the concreteness of
characterisation. Shifting the action from Athens to Delphi necessitates a new Creusa
"a woman whose crimes were no longer simply blind but were touched now with
religious error" [Burnett 1971, p. 104, emphasis added]. Ion, on the other hand, is
decidedly pure. He lives "the closing moments of his enchanted childhood" (ibid), he
retains 'the pastoral purity' of the return-hero and when back in Athens he becomes,
according to Apollo's plan "as nearly as possible another Erichthonius". From our
point of view we cannot afford such early commitments. We follow the progress of
the play in the participants' speech, its twists and turns, and, since the narrative is in
the first person singular, we let them speak. By letting Ion speak, for instance, we get
[ have chosen Burnett's [1971] book as one of the most representative of the classical/classicist
approaches to Greek drama. It dates back to the seventies. Perhaps it is 'unfair' to contrast the present
reading with an article that was written in another tradition- at a time when literary criticism was not as
big as it is today. Yet the article is 'ubiquitous' in almost all subsequent bibliographies. I happened to
read it quite early in my research and I must admit that Burnett's criticism, especially the
unprecedented attack on Creusa impressed me. So, 1 suppose that at the end of this reading, when we
discuss beginnings and ends it is justifiable to link my analysis with one of its sources.
I have not chosen another article from within another theory - for instance, Rabinowitz [1993, chapter
7], discusses ton from a feminist perspective. To discuss psychoanalysis along with or in contrast to
another theoretical approach to Ion involves settling the theoretical issues first of all; it is beyond the
scope of this thesis.
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an insight into his purity. We learn that it is just the tip of the iceberg, a desperate
attempt at purity rather than an established virtue.175
The plot of return is discussed by Burnett along the same lines of characterisation.
Ion's monologue/refusal to be persuaded by Xuthus is considered "a charming
commentary" on the arrangements of Apollo until his good nature and the prospect of
an appealing future get the better of him. It is "the boy's natural gentleness that allows
the action to go on, for it makes him obedient to his new-found father..." (ibid). When
the misunderstanding between Ion and Creusa is resolved "the divine drama will be
done" [Burnett 1971, p. 109], The complication of Ion's doubt is swiftly dealt with by
Athena's intervention who acts in her brother's and her city's interest as she installs Ion
on the throne of Athens. Finally, "Apollo's will is done" (p. 111).
Burnett's discussion of the plot ofvengeance deteriorates into an unprecedented attack
on Creusa and a praise of Apollo. At first she appears misguided and deceived by her
friends' lies (pp. 111-2). Her monologue does not receive much attention. It is the
third falsehood (concerning her son's certain death) that continues a line of falsehoods
initiated by the chorus and the 'full of fancy' old servant (p. 113). And though this is
supposed to reveal "Creusa's true nature" (p. 113) we are not really told how. Instead,
we are assured that though it is not difficult to sympathise with her (I wonder if
Burnett 'sympathises with her') "the audience is uncomfortably aware that the lies are
proliferating and that they are leading to a deed more terrible that they had supposed,
a direct attack not only upon the son but upon the god" (p. 114). Creusa and her
friends apparently fail to grasp the subtlety of the situation, because while Xuthus, the
"ridiculously happy man", was plotting with his son "to give Creusa as large a share as
possible in their new felicity" in the next scene we have to listen "while the foolish old
tutor describes that same man as the blackest of villains" (p. 112). All will end well
for her however, because her "human deficiency in mercy" is made up by a merciful
god (p. 116). Let us reserve judgement on the 'merciful' god for the moment.
A certain air of pre-destination arises: some people are pure, some others are not. Ion
duplicates the vengeance plot [Burnett 1971, p. 118] and by reciprocating his mother's
1^5 This is more in line with adolescence. Compare him to Hippolytos [Barrett 1964], for instance:
dedicated defence against sexuality, idealisation of purity, 'women are evil' cliches and so on.
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violence "the return hero steps actively into the vengeance plot" (ibid). The fact that
he is now just like Creusa but must remain pure creates a certain confusion. Are
intentions as serious and punishable as acts? And if their separation counts on Ion's
favour where does it leave his mother? Despite recognising the similarity of the
common guilt and the intended religious crime, Burnett still defends Ion: "he is
momentarily able to play the villain's role in a wholly unexpected suppliant tableau"
(p. 119, italics added). It seems that culpability somehow depends on duration. She
also mentions the general confusion about Ion's purity in other authors: "The
transformation is so radical that many critics have rejected it as wholly against nature
and therefore bad characterisation, while others have tried to deny Ion's plain intention
to seize a suppliant woman" (p. 120). This gives her the opportunity to defend Ion
once more by referring to the moment: "Euripides has created a moment, at line 1320,
when his innocent hero will stand frozen, his posture of extreme impiety" (p. 120,
emphasis added).
The rest of the article deals with Creusa and Apollo. Creusa's portrait is completed:
Euripides' poetic justice allows the suppliant to be the source of "the blasphemous
error". Creusa's "rebellion and lack of faith"- expressed in the devouring birds
speculation- and "slanders" have "imposed themselves even upon her" [Burnett 1971,
p. 121] but she will soon be forced to make 'a gesture of faith" and throw herself at the
feet of the god "she has taught herself to hate" (ibid). She is "raised" as few suppliants
not by the secular prince but by "a divine device" (p. 122). Though the special nature
of her spiritual crime makes her "a rebellious theomachos" she "is still needed as
mother of the four Greek tribes". The god saves her and makes a point of "saving
Creusa from an open blasphemy" (ibid.) and in the next page Creusa's discovery by
the son "should release her from her torment" (p. 123). In the altar scene "Creusa
experiences a revelation... in a moment of comprehension she sees that this is the
point to which her whole life was leading, that all was necessary as preparation for
this" (p. 124). In the end she will tell her true story- because nothing but the truth will
do (p. 125). Being thus saved, she "has escaped from her own torturing fictions"
(ibid.), can now love the child she always loved and we can "easily" (p. 126) accept
this arrangement for these very maternal reasons (" but the strength of her emotion
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still has its source in her maternal love. And this is why we can so easily accept her
perfect reorientation as the drama ends").
It is not lack of faith that pushes Creusa or anyone to extremes. It is faith that does
that. Creusa and Ion have no doubts that Apollo is part of their lives and are trying to
deal with that as best as they can. To accuse them of being unable to rise above the
circumstances and accept divine will with something reminiscent of Abraham's
devotion indicates perhaps that we are transferring our religious ideas back in time.
The merciful god and Creusa's revelation are, I believe, tokens of the same influence.
Mercy does not appear to have been a particular virtue of those times. Apart from that,
there are three gods in the play, not one, and to single out the merciful one at least
shows some bias.
Creusa's 'error', both physical and spiritual', is so great that it seems hardly
containable. Creusa produces errors and imposes them upon herself, teaches herself to
hate. A strange separation of the faculties seems to be lying at the basis of this teach-
yourself method in which she is both the teacher and the pupil. Where are the errors
produced and where do they arrive? And if the lack of faith is not a clever thing to do,
surely in being forced to make a gesture of faith one ought to see one's limits. But is it
not force that Creusa has been resisting?
Still, her rescue seems to puzzle Burnett. Creusa is 'raised' and her crimes- because
they are crimes, nothing less- are answered by a god who 'makes points'. Surely,
lacking intellectual refinement, Creusa should be unable to get the message- but
somehow she does. But then, is she not saved because she will be needed? Because
the four nations need a mother? And is she not 'released' by her son? This tripartite
division of the causes creates the effect of providence and sufficiency of evidence for
it. Added to this, some moments seem more important than others. While Ion's turning
into a potential killer is 'just a moment', Creusa's revelation is the moment.
Reserving Apollo's greatness for the very last, Burnett sees that he "has been directing
the return action, but has been one of the players too" [Burnett 1971, p. 126] but I
cannot really see any other player and director more dedicated than Creusa in this play
(not outside it). That he is invisible makes no difference (ibid) and when "he forces
that heightened recognition" (p. 127) via the Pythia, he "annihilates Creusa's
rebellion" and shows himself "a god of undoubted power in human affairs" (ibid).
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From all these reasons Burnett concludes that "Apollo's divinity is the essential point
of the play" though the vocabulary of her presentation is perhaps a bit too 'forceful' to
make it the only 'logical' conclusion.
For the very last time, Apollo may be not too close to mortals but he can stop their
actions whenever he likes and anyway, being a god, "does not understand pain and
pride and resentment and doubt" [Burnett 1971, p. 128], Burnett concludes: "This
kind of lofty unconsciousness would be repulsive in a mortal character and so those
who insist on overlooking Apollo's divinity (even as they criticise it) call him a
heartless god... he is not like men; he cannot be accused of their crimes or measured
by their justice or called to account by them in any way because flawed nature is not
his. It is the one thing he cannot even know, though he can always transcend it and so
he does, in the action of the Euripidean Ion" (p. 129). By now, of course, the logical
aporias are the following: how can Apollo compromise his divine indifference and his
so human sexual behaviour? As a modern reader I am not bothered by his detachment
(the word 'unconsciousness' is inappropriate) or his sexuality-1 will refrain from those
blasphemies. I am bothered by the fact that his divinity closes rather than opens the
issue. Instead of looking at what sort of relationships the ancient woman and man
were trying to establish with the Olympians we see that the major effort goes to
establishing the gap between them. The twelve Olympians are long dead and it is
common knowledge that they were products of human minds. We examine the minds.
If modern literature requires voluntary suspension of disbelief, ancient literature
requires voluntary suspension of belief- for obvious reasons. From a 'human'
perspective Creusa is not so appalling and her extreme variety of aspects of character
is hardly monstrous. I will not defend her or anyone. They are not in need of defence,
they speak for themselves and that is what we listen to.
I do not think that Ion shows "human exertion to be blind and ineffective at best" or
that "divine pity and purpose...turn disaster into bliss" or that "the noble characters as
ineffective as the base" [Burnett 1971, p. 14]. If nobility cannot guarantee better
standards perhaps it is time to stop referring to it as the standard. Gods do not interfere
but after the circumstances for their interference have been created, circumstances that
in other cases have led to death and non-interference where, again, gods' greatness has
been affirmed.
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I do not think that Xuthus is ridiculous when he tries to get hold of his only chance to
establish himself as a father, nor is the old servant who seizes the only opportunity to
shake off the bad name of slavery. We do not need 'divine' inspiration to see how man
turns against man when the same territory is disputed and we cannot dismiss the
repetitions of the same story as mere fabrication or easily adaptable lies. There are
repetitions, reversals, copy-cat similarities, evocative resemblances, unexpressed
intentions and concealed truths. There is response from a subject to another subject's
demand, to what the other asks and to what he seems to be asking between the lines.
There is anticipation and retrogression. Everyone tries to come to terms with the un¬
seen, but, to be sure, it is not Apollo. It is what falls between the lines in the message
that gets across. Thus, the pure and the impure try equally hard to adapt to the desir de
VAutre, and in doing so to adapt to the desir de I'autre (small a, for the fellow human
being) as well. If there is a word, a problem, repeated it is not divinity but paternity. If
there is an attitude consistently replicated it is the attitude to paternity176 and to the
name of the Father. The problem of the Name of the Father, which as we know
symbolises the entry to the Symbolic and its separation from the Imaginary, is
articulated in a variety of ways. It makes the most of polarities: seeing and blindness,
nothing and the obvious, truth and un-truth, appearance and reality, appearance and
disappearance and so on. When it is missing the world seems chaotic without it.
To project any question related to the play beyond the play goes against its principles.
And ifwe start attributing blames and responsibilities we reverse its action and we fall
victim to exactly the same principles that created rivalry within it. When Apollo's
superiority is based on denigrating Creusa we are doing nothing more than duplicating
the Imaginary, the 'it's always the other's fault', the one belief that is surely refuted in
this play. In a quarrel between two, the imaginary perspective wants only one of them
to be right. Reality, and indeed psychological reality, is far subtler than that. Reaching
an understanding, by the socio-cultural standards of the time, is far more important
than glorifying god.
'76 Apolio cannot answer the issue of paternity: first of all - let's save his honour - he is not asked
about it. Second, he leaves his replica, the un-intentional father Xuthus to deal with it.
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The play guides and challenges us: if you see where blindness and insight lead
without or before falling victim to the fascination of appeals, seductions or even the
ossified standards that are currently under review, you might escape the emotional
involvement. Emotional replies to the play, imaginary responses that insist on who is
right and who is wrong, are acceptable so long as they respect the symbolic
convention of being named and acknowledged for what they are. On another level, the
play can be considered as an elaborate intellectual exercise that dictates its own
problems and provides the leads to its answers. All it takes is to divide attention
equally among all its parts and to defer judgement, especially at the point where
emotion, pity or horror or some other feeling are bound to affect it.
In this thesis I have used the Imaginary and the Symbolic along the lines of alienation
and the paternal metaphor. The variety of terms used can be grouped under these two
headings. I follow the unravelling of speech in the play along the lines of its similarity
to the unravelling of the analytic experience. The analytic experience involves the
dissolution of imaginary identifications, the recognition and articulation of the real
problem, the interpretation of the problem and its fastening to a representation of the
Oedipus complex/paternal metaphor.
In following the progress of the play we are trying to find what is inside the play and
not only at the end of it. We discover truth, the truth of the speaking subject. All
characters, all subjects, embark on the exploration of their own identity, aided by the
Symbolic and haunted by the Imaginary without really knowing what they are after
and what they will find in the end.
Focusing on Ion and Creusa, the play can be compared with the process of analysis.
For Lacan, analysis describes concentric circles around the core of the problem. It
consists of approximations of the truth of the subject. It orbits the circumference of the
circles, getting closer and closer to the core. Sometimes the sensitive centre is hit
accidentally. This causes maximum resistance in the subject.177 Creusa and Ion meet
accidentally and, reaching each other's truth too early too directly, they retreat in
dismay. During the day they will approximate their truth again and again.
177 see [Lacan:Miller 1975] for the schema and description.
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As a sequence of scenes the play exhibits shifts of interest from scene to scene,
fragmentation and in-con-sequence. Great changes occur and the subjects -all of them
but Ion and Creusa in particular- cut through the rapid changes by repeating their
story, trying to hold onto what they know and what represents their stability but at the
same time trying to adapt. They embark on an investigation of their subjectivity. We
follow it. Contrary to what has been suggested by Burnett [1971] I do not think that
the essence of the play is Apollo's divinity. Nor do I consider the play as a return to
religious feeling. From the psychoanalytic perspective I would say that the play is
primarily a beautiful account of human nature- the only nature I can accept as a
modern reader. From our point of view errors do not expose the stupidity of mankind
and the divinity of the gods. In following Lacan, in undermining consciousness and
the ego, we create the opportunity to focus on desire. We are keyed to desire, not to
misleading certainties. The demolition of the misleading certainties does not
undermine the subject.
We have examined the play in accordance with the rules of analysis and language on
two axes: on the horizontal, we examined the unfolding of the signifier-plot as a
sequence of discourses. On the vertical axis we looked at the speech of particular
subjects (Ion and Creusa) and the personal history they provided in these accounts.
We used psychoanalytic terms to describe and locate our findings in the registers of
the Imaginary and the Symbolic.
We started with a psychoanalytic reading of Ion's self-presentation, the opening
monologue of the first scene. We discovered that his purity was only a symptom, a
defence against the return of the repressed, his unresolved and ambivalent relation to
Apollo. We then examined Ion and Creusa's first meeting, the deceptive solidarity of
the first few moments which was based on the recognition of similarities of lack and
ignorance. We then saw the return of the repressed in practice once again, as Ion and
Creusa's sympathy for each other collapsed through the mention of Apollo's sexuality.
We brought into focus Ion and Creusa's relation to Apollo, which is very subjective
from the beginning. It is important to stress that both Ion and Creusa foreground their
subjective and special relation to Apollo. Thus, he is not only the one who has
answers because of his divinity but the one who owes such answers because he is a
father. Apollo knows by definition and it remains to be seen what sort of knowledge
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one expects him to have and be willing to impart. Even if Apollo can answer any
question, one must know what one is looking for. The answer you receive depends on
how you formulate your question, but ultimately and primarily on finding your voice
and learning to ask in the first place.
Now that we have reached the end of our research we can ask: what is it all about? in
the first scene. Knowledge, forbidden knowledge, which for psychoanalysis is sexual
and within the subject. Learning to speak, however, expressing oneself, and gradually
articulating the truth is not easy. Where do I start? asks the ignorant. In medias res,
start anywhere you like, it makes no difference. Where shall I look? In the entire
world, the Pythia replies. What shall I find? You will know when it finds you.
Concerning the truth of the subject Creusa and Ion manage to start from the most
difficult and most productive point: from what does not work. The early attempt to go
to Apollo 'on someone else's behalf exposes the shortcomings of pretending to have
assumed the impersonality of an ambassador or, in terms of their precious silence and
purity, of pretending that nothing is wrong. This sort of personal dishonesty rather
than scheming and lying interests us here, the consequences of avoiding the problem
and indeed of what creates the peripeteia of the play.
I said earlier that the progress of the play resembles the analytic process of circling the
core of truth and occasionally going straight to it. Creusa and Ion's first meeting is
such a straight-to-the-core moment and of course both of them are unprepared for the
consequences. The reaction is typical: refusal to face the truth, resulting in
meconnaissance (misrecognition) and rivalry. Ion assumes that Apollo needs to be
told and protected and takes it upon himself to tell and protect him. Creusa assumes
that Ion speaks on behalf of Apollo and is utterly dismayed. What is more revealing,
however, is the fact that both subjects 'speak the truth' without even knowing it. Ion
and Creusa play mother to each other, that is, they represent the father in their speech
and in doing so they speak the truth of their own experience. Mother-Creusa says:
uncontrollable sexuality, violence. Mother-Ion says: I forbid you to speak. Sexuality
and prohibition (death threat and castration) come together and are inflicted on one
another with exemplary precision. Psychoanalysis would have used the term 'bad
encounter' for such a traumatic meeting. I would say that the first meting is an
'unlucky encounter' because Ion and Creusa are so much like each other. What Creusa
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says makes perfect sense to Ion and vice versa because what comes from outside,
from the other's speech, falls into place with what remains repressed in the inside. No
sooner have they met than Creusa and Ion meet in an imaginary locus beyond the
mantic oracle. They have come across what blocks the access to Apollo from within.
Still, they are unable to recognise it. They cannot begin to recognise it until their
problem is expressed in the Symbolic, in what is at stake in terms of social position,
heritage, progeny etc. Thus the false start is repressed. The first meeting only updates
an older problem of confrontation with the Father which is always avoided and
postponed. The same happens here. The new confrontation with Apollo is postponed.
In its place, the imaginary enmity against the other emerges. The other, the fellow
human being, is the reminder of the shocking encounter. But the deception does not
lie there. Ion and Creusa have used the Name of the Father upon each other with such
conviction that they have created the impression of being rightful users of this name.
They have deceived each other but, without knowing it, they share the same aporia
(concerning the Father). So they recognise the knowledge they are deprived of in the
other, in anyone who simply appears to possess it.
The updating of the problem, its convincing representation in discourse is our starting
point. We proceed from their truth: their misunderstandings and the Father.
In the beginning we have a dis-location of the said and the unsaid, the seen and the
unseen, of the expression that does not quite catch its own meaning, an alienation in
language. In Scenes Two and Three the specific issues raised in One together with the
embarrassment of the news and the hasty suspension of the discourse will be
meaningfully incorporated into the new developments. I say meaningfully because the
two parties, Xuthus and Ion, Creusa and her friends, will manage to make sense of the
day's events and the oracle. Making sense is arriving at a non-contradictory
conclusion. Arriving at a non-contradictory conclusion involves turning a blind eye to
apparent inconsistencies, mistaking speculations for certainties, upgrading plausible
hypotheses to solid truths and, most importantly, anticipating the other party's
hostility and responding to it in advance. The semantic proximity of seeing and
knowing will, from Scene Two onwards, produce an explosion of the desire to know
and see in literal and metaphorical terms. Aided by the oracle and the appearance of
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Ion-the-child that must remain obscure and by the appetite for knowledge generated
by ignorance, a game of appearances and deceptions flourishes. The Symbolic will
provide the basis for the claim to lawful right. The Imaginary will project the wrong
onto the other side. The intellect, the field of noetic possibilities, vast and
'unprotected', is appropriated and powered by the simple imaginary opposition:
include/exclude. The ostrich-ism of the situation, developed into hatred and
anticipating the other's move, escapes the notice of the two camps. Inevitably, the
general claims of knowledge, knowing in advance, shedding ignorance and gaining
certainty, take shape 'with the other in mind'.
It is only later, with Creusa and Ion's second meeting that the shortcomings of the
imaginary scenaria of Scenes Two and Three come to light on equal terms. What does
not work and has not been working is finally surfacing with the urgency of a death
threat, that is, as an issue to be addressed without further delay. The altar scene opens
the road to truth but this does not permit us to dismiss the previous two scenes as
errors or useless scheming. On the contrary, by examining the content of Scenes Two
and Three we gain an understanding of the Imaginary and the Symbolic in relation to
Desire. In psychoanalysis there are times for understanding (temps pour comprendre)
and moments ofconcluding (moments de conclure).178 The latter cannot be conceived
without the former. If nothing else, the play shows, right from the beginning, that
unexplained 'truths' are not very well received.
In order not to diminish their importance, I do not label Ion's attachment to Xuthus or
Creusa's attachment to the old servant as 'cursory identifications' from the beginning,
although I have used the term discussing Ion's identifications in Chapter Three. What I
want to emphasise is that Scenes Two and Three make perfect sense if we consider
them as two isolated scenaria, barring our knowledge of who is who. Adopting this
'blind' point of view allows us to go through the mechanisms of the Imaginary and the
influence of the Symbolic with an awareness that it is pre-conceived ideas and
'78In Wilden [1968, pp. 18-19]. Times for understanding: examining imaginary identifications,
assuming one's own personal history, reaching the error or contradiction concerning past events;
moment of concluding: deciding what meaning to confer upon them (once they have been articulated
and recognised).
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certainties that create misunderstandings. This is exactly what we find in the two
scenes.
From the point of view of psychoanalysis we explore the properties of the Imaginary,
the domain of the ego and narcissism. We trace the 'genesis' of the ego in the Mirror
Stage, in the alienating identification with the form of the other. We follow Lacan's
argument according to which, despite the jubilation felt by the infant at the
approaching mastery of its body, the initial identification structures the subject as rival
to himself. This prepares the ground for another rivalry, the identification with the
father. We explain the restrictive and fixed character of the ego and the notions of
alienation and aggressivity in relation to the subject of the unconscious and what is
left outside the strict 'orthopaedic' ego. We situate jubilation and aggressivity at
opposite ends: at the anticipation ofmastery and at the ego under attack. Then we turn
to a visual representation of the Imaginary, Lacan's optical schema. With the
arrangement of mirrors we account for the development of sexuality beyond its
formative stages. Sexuality is directed towards (external) objects by recognising its
own narcissism in them and investing them with libido. Bringing in the three different
types of identifications suggested by Freud and modified by Lacan, we 'open up' the
Imaginary to human behaviour in general, not just sexuality. Our final reference, to
the reality of the psychoanalytic experience, allows us to highlight the significance of
the 'building up' as well as the 'demolition' of the imaginary identifications.
Concerning Scenes Two and Three we apply the main idea of the optical schema to
the content of the scenes. We consider then an arrangement of mirrors. Not only can
Xuthus see himself (his ideal) in Ion and vice versa, not only can Creusa see her ideal
coming back to her from the old man and the chorus, but the two parties can reflect
each other via the chorus, the plain glass that reflects death, what they would have
received (imaginary) either way.
The exhaustion of the Imaginary, the peeling off of its layers in analysis, is in our case
realised in the clash between Creusa and Ion. The clash, the second meeting, is not
arranged by any deity but is naturally arrived at as a consequence of the
misunderstanding and the need for clarification necessary in order for the subject(s) to
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face up to the contradictions produced in speech, or, in our case, to the paradox of the
altar scene.
Concerning human behaviour from a psychoanalytic point of view we can see nothing
ridiculous in Xuthus and the old man. We see two desperate individuals who
foreground the importance of parenthood and identity in the most intense way. Their
fascination with Ion and Creusa respectively and the eagerness with which they play
the role of the father they would like to be, is a perfect example of how desire is
captured by form (the form of the child). On the other hand, the desperation of the
king and the old man and their commitment to their imaginary children leaves Ion and
Creusa almost clean, suspiciously clean, of the responsibility of the error. This is a
misconception to which we must not surrender. By stressing the mirror properties of
the Imaginary, we eliminate the question of responsibilities from our discussion, in the
sense that we refuse to 'blame' the one party more than the other. Likewise, we do not
need stupidity, badness, falsehood or any other such notion to account for their
behaviour. We are not interested in describing them but in reaching an understanding
of the play.
As such, identification with the father is mocked in Scenes Two and Three but the
insights are valuable. The world of appearances and deceptions and stealth has its
roots inside 'me': in order to deceive I must be deceived. What catches Ion and
Creusa's desire in Xuthus and the old man? The altruism and the utter resignation of
the father who (appears to) want nothing but what is best for the child. Now that we
have studied the entire play and have discussed Creusa and Ion's special relation to
their real fathers we are in a position to appreciate the impact of Scenes Two and
Three. As earthly approachable father Xuthus and the old man revive the idea of the
caring father, the almost complete opposite of what Ion and Creusa have expressed.
Can there be an image more persuasive than the father/king abandoning himself into
the arms the son/slave or the old man who has been over-using the word 'my daughter'
now declaring he has been rejuvenated in order to do his duty? Such a happy
encounter can only produce jubilation.
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But jubilation goes with aggression as certainly as the gift of love is to be reciprocated
and returned and not just acknowledged179. I would die for you, or conceal the truth
for you, or claim you to be mine, are proposals that need to be met on the same level.
We do not really expect Ion and Creusa to step out of the circle of fascinations and
address the circumstances with the cool detachment of a disinterested onlooker- they
have already failed once. It is not lack of maturity that produces the inability to
respond in such a way. It is the play of form and desire that revives their narcissism
and refuses to forgo its satisfaction180 unless it has to. To push the issue any further, to
say that they should not have fallen for it is like blaming someone for falling in love.
It leads to nonsense.
But why aggression? We have seen that the Imaginary is the field of perfect
knowledge minus the error. It has its own logic: love your friend and hate your enemy.
It works the other way too: the one I love is my friend, the one I hate is my enemy.
And also: if I hate him or her s/he is my enemy, if I love him or her s/he is my
friend.181 This simple logic is applied when 'something beyond the eyes' does not
seem to work in the perfect world ofXuthus or in the other party's perfect plan. It does
not come from the other side any more than it comes from the inside: the hide and
seek that evades the eyes, the secrecy of a lifetime, the deceptive dissimulation of loss
and pain, the compulsive alertness to death, pollution, dirt, shame all return with the
jubilant ease of the recognition of the father and the child. Because Xuthus and the old
man's vocabulary reverberate with personal connotations for Ion and Creusa it
produces the anxiety and aggressivity characteristic of the ego under attack. Without
knowing it, responding just to the imaginary requirements of the role they have just
assumed, Xuthus and the servant will impose their will upon their 'children', inflicting
contradictory demands and evoking ambivalent reactions. They are urging Ion and
Creusa to behave like them, to assert their right, to be a real man or woman, to ignore
179 ] refer to the difference between symbolic recognition of desire and imaginary reciprocation,
giving back the equal.
180 jn *Qn Narcissism' [1914] Freud suggests that the ego refuses to forgo familiar forms of
satisfactions. Narcissism is essentially the return to familiar forms of satisfaction.
181 The idea is based on the observation of the properties of the Imaginary in Chapter Two and on
Lacan's description of the imaginary emotional transitivism in Lacan. [1948, p. 19]
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while being ignored, to hit instead of being hit, but at the same time to lie low and
wait as usual.
For the second time the cause of aggressivity is missed. It does not come from the
other but from one's own camp. For the second time Ion and Creusa will fail to
recognise (meconnaissance) the return of the repressed and will deflect/anticipate it
from outside. The other/rival will be the perfect victim. The new-found friend/father,
the real cause of anxiety, will not be hated. Further alienation of the subject's truth is
taking place under the pressure of and the secrecy of the 'present circumstances'.
It is when we return to Creusa and Ion's language in the monologues that we enter into
the causes of aggression. We trust the properties of language to reveal them in the
retroactive effect of signification that always returns to the key point (quilting point)
of the Other (unconscious) and seeks to rectify its relationship with the Other (Mother
and Father). We will focus on that aspect in this part of our discussion.
Creusa and Ion's response to the situation are two monologues which are characterised
by confusion and intensity. They are, nevertheless, successful enough in articulating
fear. We have examined Ion's monologue (1. 585-647) only very briefly. But his
anxiety about the return to Athens with Xuthus foregrounds the problems of the
present solution and the inadequacies of the Imaginary. Creusa voices similar
concerns in her monologue. Ion highlights the practical difficulties of returning to
Athens and being accepted as an equal. Creusa highlights the difficulties of living
secretly. Ion imagines a life of failure and isolation on the margins of society, Creusa
declares she has lived just that. Ion seeks the mark of origin-ality that will allow him
to enter Athens as equal, Creusa raises the issue of originality with the theme of
deceptive appearances and the question of who authenticates truth and who exposes
the impostors. In both cases, it is so long as Ion and Creusa want to see themselves
inside society and do not (voluntarily) exclude themselves that these issues arise. And
it is not just participation but integration that they seek. To live lathra is, in essence,
to live outside society.
The tragic moment, I think, in this play is the encounter of the Imaginary and the
Symbolic at the personal level, even before the second meeting at the altar. What
prepares the ground for that final encounter, the sharpening of the questions and the
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acceptance of the settlement is born in the expression of fear which in all cases takes
the form of failure and the return of narcissism. With Creusa's monologue, we come
closer to the personal aspect of truth and to what psychoanalysis describes as the
imaginary integration of one's history by the subject. Creusa does not speak a single
lie in her monologue. She does not speak a single lie in the entire play and we might
even say that no one does. From a psychoanalytic point of view every utterance is an
attempt to say something that is only true or false by the standards of formal logic,
which is irrelevant to our case.
On the issues of 'living lathra1, 'the father' and 'Law', the entire Symbolic seeks to
separate itself from the Imaginary. These are the very issues that seem to defy black
and white monolithic attitudes, of instance, kill your enemies and love your friends,
and to advance more sophisticated questions, for instance, how to you tell a friend
from an enemy in the first place? What I see as important in the issues raised in
Scenes Two and Three and in Creusa's monologue -which is part of the latter- is a
deeper philosophical or ontological issue concerning discerning abilities and being
able to acquire a stance and maintain it without having to refer to the ossified law that
seems to 'betray' the interests of the subject anyway due to its incapacity to address
these issues. From this point of view we see the mis-accomodation of the individual to
the all-encompassing Symbolic. The Symbolic may be adequately organised but
somehow Ion and Creusa have managed to locate its black holes and fall into them.
Again, I must stress that it is only from the personal perspective that the anxiety and
fear may arise. Individual questionings of the Law such as these draw the entire
system to the subject rather than the subject to the system, and this is exactly the point
of interest in psychoanalysis. If this relationship is not improved or resolved the
subject will have a mechanistic position in society and will fall victim to what we
have already highlighted: cursory identifications. Lathra is not integration, it is a
sham. Ion and Creusa know very well what it involves. And in trying to say so, they
see themselves swallowed up by an indifferent society that neither profits nor loses
from their disappearance. Again, according to the modes of the Imaginary the
question can be eternally posed, eternally generating its own fear, eternally failing to
ensure a reply, unless the subject manages to separate itself from the viscous circle of
failures and 'exiles'.
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What Ion and Creusa seem to grasp and articulate with the fear of isolation and death
is the scapegoating by which both of them see themselves excluded from society. This
is the issue that the mandate poses as 'impossible to assume'. It is a composite
expression consisting of the fundamental ignorance of the desire of the Other (Father),
the assumption that the Other's desire is synonymous with transgression and violence,
the subject's reluctance and failure to comply with this desire and the symbolic
exclusion of the other (fellow human being) who, by being excluded or dying, takes
away all badness and leaves 'me' pure and innocent and a champion of the (F)Other's
cause182. If Creusa kills Ion, or, if Ion kills Creusa they will appear to have done the
Other's will by serving his cause, his country or his name, but in reality they will have
inflicted on the other their own worst fear and they will have evaded the issue that
concerns themselves one more time.
This becomes obvious when we consider by what standards Ion and Creusa 'reach' this
mess and by what standards they have lived their lives and who is it that they have
imitated all their lives. In all cases the answer is one: the impossible to imitate Father,
the larger than life Erechtheus and Apollo. The issue of transition into the human
world, for Ion and Creusa alike, exposes the real problem, a subject trapped between
heaven and earth, and, from a slightly different perspective, a subject trapped in the
myth of omnipotence and excess of regulation by the standards of which it fails
miserably. At this point the figure of Apollo is deceptive. It is precisely the divinity
that they want to avoid and separate themselves from; it is this high standard that
petrifies them in their attempt to be something they should have been for the Other,
something more than they are. Again, we return to the issue of narcissism and to the
beginning: where does one start from? Where does one start from when one has
reached the point of repeating in different forms the personal problem, reflecting it
onto society and receiving it back, reflecting it onto gods and receiving it back.
In the end, the second meeting at the altar cuts short the excessive intentions and gives
way to the confrontation that is not an intention but reality. The survival of Creusa and
Ion in the hands of each other depends largely on the eternal failure to reach the mark
of excellence set too high: to die, to commit themselves to something they do not
82 See Zizek [1989, pp. 114-117], for a similar position to our social scapegoating.
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know. If Creusa and Ion should thank someone or something for their survival it is
only their traumatised narcissism that generates hesitation, low self-esteem, inability
to finish a task. It is their symptom that saves their life. It ties Ion's hands and refuses
to push the sword. It freezes Creusa and holds her back from falling onto it.
The moment illustrates and summarises the alienated meaning of a lifetime. Indeed we
are talking about a dead-end here: eternal repetition, eternally living de-centred lives
in which only the other/ Other is responsible and the subject is forced to participate,
for good or for worse. In Scene Two Ion gets what he wants, Athenian parents. Creusa
gets what she wants, a son, but in both cases the irony of 'isn't that you wanted?' (to
which the only answer is 'No') returns to them only the form of their desire, empty,
alienated, divested from all meaning.
The same happens with their imminent sacrifice in the altar scene. Having lost the
social and religious overtones, having become absolutely human, the confrontation
poses a single question: will you die, will you take yourself out of the picture
voluntarily? The answer is 'No'. By refusing to do the other's bidding, they also refuse
to comply with the (imagined) Other's desire because it does not make sense. Ion and
Creusa have been exposed to this nonsense all their lives and have been trying either
to express or remove it from sight. In the altar scene the return of the repressed
catches up with them: the desire to live, which does not need any justification I
suppose, meets the obligation to die. The contradiction is faced: how am I doing Your
will if I die? and, in Creusa's case, how do I serve Your city by clearing myself out of
my rival's way? What good is it to me? The eternal aporia has fallen into place.
Towards perspective
The motionlessness of the altar scene represents the time for concluding, in which
Ion's hesitation to kill Creusa and die (in every sense but the physical one) is
postponed. The subject is constantly suspended in the time of the Other, says Lacan in
the commentary on Hamlet [1977, p. 17]. He creates the circumstances for being the
phallus of the Other and fails miserably. If it were so in our case, Ion and Creusa
would have fallen by each other's hand, but it is not, and in reality their hesitation
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forces the Other's hand for the first and the last time. The meaninglessness of the
Other's desire shines through. The final moment of the psychoanalytic process comes,
according to Zizek, "precisely when he gets rid of this question- that is, when he
accepts his being as non-justified by the big Other" [Zizek 1989, p. 113]. Ion and
Creusa only go that far for a single moment. It might be bearable for the modern
subject to live in the relative destitution of no-mandate but we must accept that it was
unthinkable in ancient society. Two consecutive interventions on the precise issue
confirm this point. I am bringing in the 'modern subject' because I would like to draw
attention to the two stages of the adventure, first the assumption of an alienating
mandate and then its renunciation. I found a similar point in Zizek in a comment
concerning 'modern subjectivity' and I bring it into our discussion in order to update
Athena's intervention: "what Lacan renders visible is a radical, redoubled self-
referring renunciation by means of which the dimension of subjectivity emerges. The
first level is the symbolic pact: the subject identifies the kernel of his being with the
symbolic feature to which he is prepared to subordinate his entire life, for which he is
prepared to sacrifice everything- in short, the alienation in the symbolic mandate. The
second level consists in sacrificing this sacrifice itself: in a most radical sense, we
'break the word', we renounce the symbolic alliance which defines the very kernel of
our being- the abyss, the void in which we find ourselves thereby, is what we call
'modern age subjectivity" [Zizek 1992, p. 167].
It seems to me that 'ancient subjectivity' poses different requirements from within the
very questions it asks and actually carries the issue of sacrifice and sacrifice of
sacrifice one step beyond. It seeks reconciliation with the Other. It cannot bear the
void. Thus, it creates Athenas and good will in the place of bad faith (the narcissistic
mauvais foi).183 If a play is a cultural product that reflects the contemporary social
issues filtered through the personal perspective of an individual author and refracted
through the characters of the first person drama we should be almost certain that we
are receiving the echoes from the very core of society, from the dialectic itself that
constitutes society and language that never ceases to update its definition and to
negotiate its meaning. Athens is the city of words [Goldhill 1986, p. 57] and keeps
'83 See Wilden [1968, p. 291].
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itself alive so long as it does not settle its aporias by a meaningless exhibition of
power.
In Ion the final part of the drama is played by the redefinition of the mandate. Thou
shall be... a man and a M>oman...father or mother... does not settle the issues of
masculinity or femininity and does not provide placebo-answers. It rather sketches
directions that might not be all that easy to follow but which are compatible with the
contemporary definitions of society and inclusion into society. But in doing so within
the constraints and according to the demands of the specific play it exposes the
illusory character of the settlement itself184. The question of 'having the phallus' or
'being the phallus', says Lacan, finally settles by the intervention of a 'to seem' that
replaces the 'to have', masks its lack and creates the effect of the opposite sexes
[Lacan 1958, p. 289], In our case the 'to seem' of sexuality is supported by and
translates into a generalised game of appearances and deceptions. No one is spared-
we should know that by now.
It is not, however, the dis-located difference of appearances and reality. What Athena
brings is perspective. Indeed the world does not change: it has remained the same old
world of lies and deceptions and appearances but now contains the knowledge that
allows ignorance to fall into place. Athena gives two signifiers: 'father' and 'blindness'
so long as Ion and Creusa have asked for them in particular. She separates Truth from
Knowledge, to the extent that this knowledge is associated with meconnaissance 185
when she (and the Pythia before her) recognises the subjects' desire. The current
solution is not an absolute and continuous disillusionment, which might have been as
difficult to bear as the fragmentation of the world, but a brilliant reintroduction of the
'84 We could say that from within the play Creusa and ion are 'comments' on society. From within
society they are 'ordinary people'.
'85 Wilden [1968, p. 166] illustrates the point: "Who or what am 1? The subject, like Oedipus, always
knows the answer, but the distinction between Knowledge (savoir) and truth repeatedly emphasised by
Lacan points up the function of meconnaissance and reconnaissance in human life. Truth for the
subject is not knowledge but recognition. Mental illness on the other hand is precisely the refusal to
recognise that truth; the mechanisms of negation, disavowal, rejection, isolation, and so forth flow
from it. But a certain meconnaissance - which we might call sublimation - is essential to health".
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law of the father as Loxias, as play of the signifier, metonymy and metaphor,
deception of the eye and truth mixed with appearances.
The new perspective symbolises the separation of the geometrical symmetries of the
Imaginary from the poetic flux of the Symbolic. It joins two truths: the sin of the
father and the sign of the father. The reply to the desire for this perspective voiced by
Creusa's desperate attempt to gain over-view and see from afar, is answered with a
trick of the eye with which one manages to be and not to be like the father.186 This
encapsulates the entire history of the subject as the history of deception, lathra,
avoiding the Other's eye takes on a different meaning. Creusa discovers that her
father, too, was subject to castration (the symbolic blindness) and in some ways she
has been closer to his signifier than she ever thought. Ion discovers the meaning and
perhaps the direction of the future in the epithet (adjective of quality) of the father:
Loxias, double-sighted and by extension many other things: cross-eyed, far-sighted,
and double-edged (like his 'tongue' and his long forgotten weapons). The essential
point is that the new perspective encourages the renounciation of the neurotic pure-
ism that has been associated with the fruitless confrontation and the repetition of
aporia.
The new beginning is the end of the drama, an end not the end. It is brought upon by
the laws of language which are certainly older than cut and dry advice to new citizens.
One might say that by reliving the Oedipus complex they just rediscover the wheel-
nothing new in it. But it is absolutely necessary that the wheel be rediscovered by
every human being; otherwise it remains a luminous circle in the sky, the fiery sun-
god who blinds and scorches instead of giving life.
Another circle closes: in the end the truth foretold joins the truth of the subject.
Hermes' prediction does not quite capture the events. The divine truth undergoes the
vicissitudes of the play and in the end re-appears mixed with deceptive appearances.
Shall we question Hermes' truthfulness like Ion who questioned the truth of Apollo?
We do not need to. The end is clear: believe the liar because he tells the truth. Hermes
'86 A reminder: for the paternal super-ego Freud [1923, p. 374] commends: "Its relation to the ego is
not exhausted by the precept: 'You ought to be like this (like your father)'. It also comprises the
prohibition: 'You may not be like this (like your father) - that is, you may not do all that he does; some
things are his prerogative'.
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is the god of metaphor, he embodies "metaphor's movement from one place to
another, alien place, and the enrichment and risk that movement entails" [Padel 1992,
p. 11]. Our play is movement, the movement of desire.
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